CWE-611

If the attacker is able to include a crafted DTD and a default entity resolver is enabled, the attacker may be able to access arbitrary files on the system. By submitting an XML file that defines an external entity with a file:// URI, an attacker can cause the processing application to read the contents of a local file. For example, a URI such as "file:///c:/winnt/win.ini" designates (in Windows) the file C:\Winnt\win.ini, or file:///etc/passwd designates the password file in Unix-based systems. Once the content of the URI is read, it is fed back into the application that is processing the XML. This application may echo back the data (e.g., in an error message), thereby exposing the file contents.

An attacker may supply a crafted DTD using URIs with schemes such as http://, forcing the application to make outgoing HTTP requests to servers that the attacker cannot reach directly, which can be used to bypass firewall restrictions; hide the source of attacks such as port scanning; or otherwise leverage the server's trust relationship with other entities.

The product could consume excessive CPU cycles or memory using a URI that points to a large file, or a device that always returns data such as /dev/random. Alternately, the URI could reference a file that contains many nested or recursive entity references to further slow down parsing.

Many XML parsers and validators can be configured to disable external entity expansion.

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)