CWE-1294

Class Abstraction Level
Pillar — Highest-level weakness category
Class — Abstract, language-independent
Base — Specific enough to detect
Variant — Tied to specific technology
Compound — Requires multiple weaknesses Incomplete MITRE CWE Status
Stable — Fully reviewed and complete
Draft — Under development, may change
Incomplete — Partially defined by MITRE
Deprecated — No longer recommended
Obsolete — Replaced by another CWE
Insecure Security Identifier Mechanism

Description

The System-on-Chip (SoC) implements a Security Identifier mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, the Security Identifiers are not correctly implemented.

Systems-On-Chip (Integrated circuits and hardware engines) implement Security Identifiers to differentiate/identify actions originated from various agents. These actions could be 'read', 'write', 'program', 'reset', 'fetch', 'compute', etc. Security identifiers are generated and assigned to every agent in the System (SoC) that is either capable of generating an action or receiving an action from another agent. Every agent could be assigned a unique, Security Identifier based on its trust level or privileges. A broad class of flaws can exist in the Security Identifier process, including but not limited to missing security identifiers, improper conversion of security identifiers, incorrect generation of security identifiers, etc.

Consequences

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control — Modify Memory, Read Memory, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Quality Degradation

Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Security Identifier Decoders must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.

Phase: Implementation

Access and programming flows must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.